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What is fascinating about the Arctic region1 is that despite its remoteness, sparse population
and hostile climate, it is still of high interest and relevance in contemporary politics. From an
environmental perspective, it is by now well documented that the polar areas are deeply inter-
connected with the rest of the world. This is alarmingly demonstrated by the impacts of climate
change, and most Arctic states recognize the need for cooperative actions to deal with these
challenges. Politically, even though there seems to be a general agreement that the likelihood
of a “new Cold War” in the Arctic is scant, the Arctic states, as well as non-Arctic states and
actors, are paying close attention to the region and what others are doing in terms of estab-
lishing a presence, resource development, capacity building and military activities. In addition,
there have been recent examples of spillover from conflicts elsewhere in the world affecting
Arctic cooperation and circumpolar relations. Such realities have also gained increased media
attention, and as a result, Arctic issues are rising on the political as well as the public agenda.
Canada is the world’s second largest country after Russia, over 40 % (3.4 million km²) of
its landmass is located in the Arctic – including the northern territories the Yukon, the Northwest
Territories and Nunavut – and the Arctic coastline of 162,000 km constitutes almost 75% of
Canada’s total shoreline (Bonikowsky, 2012). Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy (2010, 4) states:
“Given our extensive Arctic coastline, our Northern energy and natural resource potential, and
the 40 percent of our land mass situated in the North, Canada is an Arctic power”. Yet, up until
very recently, Canada’s knowledge about and presence in its northern region has been more
or less absent. Canada clearly needs to cooperate with other states to be able to respond to
the challenges and opportunities arising in the Arctic, in particular to manage both natural and
human resources in the region. The consequences of this reality are becoming evident, and the
Canadian government is working to advance its knowledge about the High North2, to position
itself in the region and increase control over its Arctic territories by asserting and exercising
sovereignty. When Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper took office in 2006, he made
the Arctic a central part of his electoral platform and has later made several promises regarding
the region, which will be examined throughout this thesis.
1The term Arctic will be used to refer to the northernmost region of the world, containing the Arctic Ocean and
parts of the eight Arctic states: Canada, the United States (Alaska), the Russian Federation, Norway, Denmark
(Greenland), Sweden, Finland and Iceland.
2An example is ”The State of Northern Knowledge in Canada” issued by the Canadian Polar Commission in
March 2014.
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1.1 Research objective and problem statement
1.1.1 Research objective
Firstly, I have chosen Canada’s Arctic policymaking and implementation as the object of study
for my thesis because the Canadian north is severely underdeveloped compared to the High
North of most of the other Arctic states, and I find it interesting that this otherwise well-
developed country face such vast challenges in its Arctic region. Secondly, the Arctic is an un-
predictable region in which several states express ambitions for territorial claims and sovereignty
expansions. In this regard, Canada has the potential to become an Arctic great power by virtue
of its landmass, coastline and resource potential in the region. This combination of Canada’s
prospect to become an Arctic great power with its underdeveloped northern territories allows
for an interesting case in terms of examining how Canada works domestically and maneuvers
on the international arena to meet these challenges while safeguarding national interests and
protects its Arctic sovereignty. To this end, Canada’s actions, the intentions and motives behind
these actions, as well as the outcomes and effects of Canadian Arctic policymaking are matters
of interest. I will examine the ‘new era of the Arctic’ and how Canada works to position itself
in this transforming region unilaterally, through bilateral relations with the other Arctic states
and through transnational cooperation in multilateral forums, primarily the Arctic Council.
1.1.2 Problem statement and research questions
The problem statement of this thesis is:
What are the main priorities for Canada in its Arctic region, and how does Canada
pursue its Arctic policy on the domestic and international level?
The first part of the problem statement leads to the question:
• Is Canada driven primarily by sovereignty and security motives, or by a genuine interest
in cooperative stewardship?
The second part of the problem statement derives two research questions:
• How does Canada work to position itself in its High North, both domestically and inter-
nationally, seen in light of the recent spark of interest in the circumpolar region?
• To what extent does Canada’s Arctic policy contribute to influence international relations
and shape the international Arctic agenda?
1.1.3 Theoretical foundation and justification for the problem statement
To structure the empirical findings and enable an analysis, a theoretical framework addressing
particularly international relations, the state and the role of international regimes is necessary.
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To this end, realism and neoliberal institutionalism are appropriate, seeing how they represent
opposing views on relevant aspects I wish to examine in the thesis. Of particular relevance are
views on central actors in international relations and driving forces behind state behavior; to
what extent are states able or willing to disregard national security interests in order to achieve
broader goals? In addition, the role and significance of international regimes and prospects
for transnational cooperation based on shared interests to achieve mutually beneficial political
outcomes are matters of interest. The main divide in the literature on Canadian Arctic poli-
cymaking can be related to these two theoretical perspectives. One one side, realist scholars
request a stronger assertion of Canadian control and sovereignty in the Arctic, and criticize the
Government for not doing enough to upgrade Canada’s military capabilities in the region, which
are considered far below international standards. On the other side, those in the liberal camp
emphasize how Canada’s Arctic region and circumpolar relationships are well managed through
diplomacy, partnerships and collaboration, and that the Government should focus on other po-
litical issues, such as integrating the northern territories into Canada as a whole (Griffiths et al.,
2011; Coates et al., 2008). This project consequently relates to the theoretical tradition within
political science as well as the existing literature on Canadian Arctic policymaking.
1.1.4 Contributions
Being aware of the above-mentioned divide in the theory and literature, I wish to go beyond
theory testing and development. The main purpose of this project is rather to examine different
aspects of Canada’s political approach to the Arctic, and deepen the understanding of Cana-
dian Arctic policymaking. By shedding light on recent developments and exploring in depth
Canada’s domestic circumpolar policy and actions internationally, this project will contribute
to existing research in the field. One of the main contributions of the thesis is to present a
change in the social efforts directed towards the Canadian High North since the change in gov-
ernment in 2006. While the conservative Harper government as expected focuses on security
and sovereignty, the well being of and development for Canada’s northerners is also at the fore-
front of its Arctic policy. Throughout this thesis, I will demonstrate both the main initiatives in
the Canadian northern territories and why these issues are prioritized by the Government.
1.2 Canada’s territorial north
Canada is a federal state, with one federal, ten provincial and three territorial governments:
the Northwest Territories (NWT) created in 1870, the Yukon established in 1898, and Nunavut
in 1999 (Coates & Poelzer, 2014). The three territories constitute “the territorial north”, while
“Canada’s north” often referrers to a wider area including the northern part of some of the
provinces (Figure 1.1). While Canada’s territories covers a vast land area, the population is
very sparse. In 2013, Canada had a total population of 35,158,304, while the population in
the territories was 36,700 inhabitants in Yukon, 43,537 in the Northwest Territories and 35,591
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Figure 1.1: Map over Canada’s provinces and territories (Natural Resources Canada, 2006)
in Nunavut (Statistics Canada, 2014). Thus, the entire population of the territories is approxi-
mately 115,828 people, which means 0.32% of Canadians inhabit 40% of the country’s land-
mass. The sparse population give rise to a wide range of socio-economic, administrative and
financial challenges, which I will return to in later in the thesis. The Aboriginal peoples of
Canada, as defined by the Constitution Act of 1982, comprise of First Nations (Indians), Métis
and Inuit. Aboriginal communities are predominantly located in reserves, in the northern terri-
tories, as well as in Nunavik in Northern Quebec and in Nunatsiavut, Labrador in the province of
Newfoundland and Labrador (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2013a).
In terms of distribution among ethnic groups, Nunavut has the largest Aboriginal population.
In 2006, about 85% of the total population in Nunavut was of Aboriginal identity, while the
Aboriginal population constituted 25% in the Yukon, and 50% in the Northwest Territories
(Statistics Canada, 2009). Lastly, there is a significant constitutional difference between the
Canadian provinces and territories. While the provinces are co-sovereign units and practice
constitutional powers in their own right, the territories are part of the federal realm and exercise
delegated powers under the authority of the Parliament of Canada (Privy Council Office, 2010).
However, since the 1970s, the territories have attained increased self-government, and I will
elaborate on this development known as the “devolution process” in chapter seven.
1.3 Historical background: Developments in Canada’s Arctic approach
The Arctic is undergoing rapid transformations, and in order to develop an understanding of
Canada’s contemporary circumpolar policy, it is useful to look at the historical development of
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Canada’s approach to the region and how it has been altered by changes in the international
environment. The Canadian Arctic was transferred from the British in 1880, but the Govern-
ment showed little interest in the region and did not send official missions to the Arctic until the
Klondike gold rush in the early 20th century (Lackenbauer, 2011a, 73). For decades, Canada’s
northern sovereignty remained unchallenged, partly based on entitlement through international
law, and partly due to the territory’s geographical remoteness (Coates et al., 2008, 51-53). This
changed with the Second World War, which can be seen as one of the first illustrations of
the implications of international events on the Arctic region. Even though Canada’s territorial
ownership remained intact after the war, the north was brought into strategic focus and the in-
terdependence between security and sovereignty became evident (Lackenbauer, 2011a, 73-74).
Consequently, the Canadian government became concerned about its Arctic security, realizing
its importance for national security in general (Huebert, 2011, 34). This reality became evident
for the United States (US) as well, which during the 1950s pushed for access to Canada’s Arctic
for strategic reasons, focusing on surveillance and air defense (Lackenbauer, 2011a, 74). Reac-
tions to the American involvement in Canada’s north were split. Some expressed concern about
the Canadian government’s lack of control over its own territory, while others, seeing how the
US accommodated Canadian interests and sought harmony instead of relying on coercion, saw
it as an affirmation of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty (Lackenbauer, 2011a, 75-76).
Canada has since been more or less dependent on the United States to uphold its Arc-
tic security. This has certain benefits for Canada, who has been able to “free-ride” American
projects in the region, but also complicates the bilateral relationship. For instance, in the 1960s,
the Canadian government was able to pursue an ad hoc approach to Arctic sovereignty and
focus on environmental projects, development and higher living standards for northerners be-
cause it could ultimately rely on the United States to provide security in the region (Coates
et al., 2008, 123-124). At the same time, it was American actions that sparked Canadian Arctic
sovereignty concerns in 1969 and 1985, when the US government announced it would be using
the Northwest Passage as though it was an international strait and not Canadian internal waters,
i.e. transiting through the Passage without seeking Canadian permission (Byers, 2009). These
incidents must be seen in light of Canada’s dependence on the United States, and are consid-
ered the primary threats to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty over the past 50 years (Byers, 2009).
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union again illustrate how shifts in
the international climate triggered changes in Canada’s Arctic approach. As the potential for
conflict at this point seemed unlikely, the Government lost its strategic interest in the region
and traditional preoccupations with “defending sovereignty” and military activities in the north
declined (Coates et al., 2008, 125-135). Instead, focus turned to diplomacy and cooperation,
attention shifted from traditional to new security concerns, and issues such as Aboriginal land
claims, northern self-government and environmental considerations came to the forefront in the
1990s (Coates et al., 2008, 126). This also resulted in downsizing of the Canadian Forces, and
by the end of the 2000s their assets in the north were sparse (Coates et al., 2008, 133).
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1.3.1 The Harper government’s Arctic approach
In 2006, Stephen Harper from the Conservative Party became Prime Minister, and Canada’s
Arctic approach was altered again. The Conservatives and the Liberals are known for different
Arctic priorities, with the former emphasizing enforcement and surveillance capabilities, and
the later focusing on diplomatic initiatives (Huebert, 2011, 60). During the 2005-06 election
campaign, Harper made Arctic matters a central piece of the electoral platform for the first time,
assigning great political importance to the Arctic as one of his primary legacy projects (Griffiths
et al., 2011, 4). Also after taking office, Prime Minister Harper has made the north a top prior-
ity, and the Government sees the north as a fundamental part of Canada’s heritage and identity,
as key to current and future prosperity, and critical to Canada’s economic strength (Canada’s
Northern Strategy, 2009). In accordance with Huebert’s characteristic, the conservative govern-
ment emphasizes the primacy of safety and security for Canadians, the importance of Canadian
sovereignty and the need to ensure Canada can return to the international stage as a credible
and influential country (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008). Underlining the importance at-
tributed to the region, the Prime Minister has since 2006 conducted an annual Northern Tour,
meeting with and listening to northern people and leaders to help make lives easier and more
affordable for Canada’s northerners (Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, 2014b). The ninth
tour, conducted in August 2014, reflects the priorities set out in Canada’s Northern Strategy:
“[the tour] will build on the Government’s comprehensive and far-reaching work
to date, by supporting Northerners through investments in education, research and
development, agricultural science and modern technology, as well as by enforc-
ing and defending Canadian territorial sovereignty” (Office of the Prime Minister,
Canada, 2014b).
Despite the efforts and investments allocated to the Canadian High North, the Harper
government is criticized for its Arctic policy from to fronts. Some express concern about the
Government’s lopsided approach, claiming there is too much emphasis on military initiatives
over the integration of the territories into the country as a whole (Coates et al., 2008), or that the
Government’s thinking is not able to meet the new problems and possibilities of the 21st cen-
tury (Lackenbauer, 2011a). On the other side, based on the promises made to invest in northern
defense capabilities, the Harper government is criticized for not attributing enough resources
to capacity building in the High North, and Canada is still seen as a laggard internationally
in terms of Arctic military capabilities. The first critique is not entirely justified, as Canada’s
Arctic foreign policy focuses not only on national security and exercising sovereignty, but also
protection of the Arctic environment, social and economic development and the empowerment
of northerners (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010). Arguably, the Government has a some-
what more comprehensive approach to the Arctic than it is given credit for, and there has been
significant investments in social initiatives directed towards the territorial north since Harper
took office. In short, this can be seen as a result two factors. Firstly, the political mobilization
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among indigenous peoples beginning in the 1970s and increased pressure from more organized
communities means the Government needs to take northerners’ demands and needs into account
when formulating domestic policies. Secondly, the Harper government recognizes the need to
improve the living conditions in the Canadian north to facilitate the continued habitation of the
territory, which again is a prerequisite for safeguarding Canadian Arctic sovereignty. Neverthe-
less, as will be demonstrated, the Canadian territories are severely underdeveloped compared to
most of the remaining circumpolar north, and there is still a vast gap between what is being done
and what needs to be done for Canada’s northerners to have the same opportunities and quality
of life as southerners. Related, I will argue there is more truth to the second point of critique -
that there is not enough resources attributed to the north. The Government has been investing
in the Canadian Arctic, and its attention towards the region is definitely superior to that of its
predecessors. However, Canada still lags behind the other circumpolar states in terms of Arctic
investments, presence and capabilities3. For instance, Canada’s icebreaking fleet consists of
only six ice-breakers, each patrolling 27,000 km of the 162,000 km Arctic coastline (Kingston,
2014). In comparison, Russia is adding ten new nuclear-powered heavy icebreakers to what
is already the world’s largest icebreaking fleet at 36 ships, and the significantly larger Russian
fleet is responsible for an Arctic coastline of “only” 40,000 kilometers (Kingston, 2014).
1.4 Arenas for Arctic policymaking and cooperation
In order to situate Canada’s Arctic policy in a broader context, it is necessary to look at multi-
national arenas for circumpolar cooperation. In this regard, Young and Cherkasov (1992, 9)
differentiate between two types of regions: regions in which conflicts threaten to escalate in
ways that entangle outside parties and trigger conflicts, and regions attracting outside powers
in pursuit of their wider interests, like the Arctic. The central problem in the latter category is
to establish institutional arrangements regulating the interaction of outside actors to protect the
integrity of the region, without impeding the pursuit of national interests (Cherkasov & Young,
1992, 9). Cooperation occurs when parties realize there is potential to achieve joint gains by
coordinating actions, and I will demonstrate how this has been the development in the Arctic.
The end of the Cold War marked a shift in thinking about the Arctic, and the region
has over the past decades become the focal point for a range of initiatives, forming a complex
picture of transnational cooperation (Young, 2005, 9). Arctic issues tend to transcend national
boarders, and states recognize that many of the challenges and opportunities cannot be dealt
with or exploited unilaterally, in large part due to the region’s brutal environment and the global
reality of climate change. Young argues that the cooperative arrangements emerging in the
Arctic differs from what is traditionally considered international regimes. Arctic arrangements
are based on ministerial declarations rather than conventions or treaties, which means their legal
3More specific numbers on the Harper government’s investments in the Arctic and northerners will be presented
in ch. 5.4, Canada’s Economic Action Plan, and in ch. 7 on governance in Canada’s northern territories.
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status is relatively weak, and they are not regulatory in nature or empowered with the authority
to make binding decisions (Young, 2005, 10). However, this is not necessarily a weakness,
and while realists push for a “hard law” approach and the creation of a regional treaty for the
Arctic, others emphasize how “soft law” declarations and informal arrangements are the most
effective and appropriate regimes in the region, illustrated by growing institutional cooperation
(Lackenbauer, 2011a, 138-139). Young argues for the latter based on three factors. Firstly, he
highlights the position of non-state actors in circumpolar cooperation, particularly the central
role of indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council. Secondly, he claims adjustable governance
agreements have clear advantages because of the unpredictable conditions prevailing in the
Arctic. Lastly, because many Arctic issues result from the impact of outside forces, a legally
binding treaty would not be able to address the root causes of the issues (Young, 2009, 76).
1.4.1 The Arctic Council
The salient organization for multilateral cooperation in the circumpolar north today is unques-
tionably the Arctic Council (AC) (Huebert, 2014b), and accordingly, significant attention will
be devoted to the Council throughout the thesis. To provide the background for the later dis-
cussion and analysis of the Canadian chairmanship, this subchapter will account for the history
and structure of the Arctic Council. Canada considers itself a leading Arctic state, and a core
element of its multilateral approach to the region is the Arctic Council, which has emerged as a
significant component of Canada’s northern foreign policy (House of Commons Canada, 2013;
Huebert, 2014b). The Canadian government expresses great faith in the Arctic Council as the
cornerstone of intergovernmental cooperation on Arctic issues, considering it to play a key role
in developing a common agenda among Arctic states and as an important venue for deepening
global understanding of the region (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 35).
Already in 1989, Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney suggested the creation of a multi-
lateral body to improve cooperation among the Arctic states, but neither the Americans nor the
Soviets welcomed this initiative (Huebert, 2011, 36). However, the governments of the Arctic
states did recognize the need for a collective approach to the environmental threats to the Arc-
tic (AEPS, 1991, 6). Thus, on a Finish initiative, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United States,
Canada, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Denmark (Greenland) – the Arctic States –
signed the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991. AEPS can be seen as a
compromise between the cooperative Canada and the rather reluctant United States, but perhaps
the only viable option under the international circumstances in the aftermath of the Cold War.
Noteworthy, Canada was able to include participation of northern indigenous peoples as per-
manent participants in AEPS (Huebert, 2014b, 3), which shows Canada’s commitment to the
involvement of and consultation with northerners at an early stage of circumpolar cooperation.
Canada finally succeeded in transforming the somewhat limited AEPS into the Arctic
Council in 1996, which was established as a high-level intergovernmental forum by the Gov-
ernments the Arctic states at a meeting in Ottawa (Arctic Council, 1996). The United States
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was still reluctant towards the creation of an international organization with a legal personal-
ity, and only agreed to join after the proposed powers of the Council had been substantially
reduced (Huebert, 2011, 24). The Arctic Council’s objective was to provide a means for pro-
moting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement
of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants, on common Arctic issues, in
particular sustainable development and environmental protection (Arctic Council, 1996). The
Council was also intended to oversee and coordinate the programs established under the AEPS,
to adopt terms of reference for, oversee and coordinate a sustainable development program, and
lastly, disseminate information, encourage education and promote interests in Arctic related is-
sues (Arctic Council, 1996). The Arctic Council’s leadership is based on a bi-annual rotating
chairmanship between the eight member states, and its activities are conducted in six working
groups4, in addition to task forces created for specific initiatives (Arctic Council, 2011g).
In addition to the member states, permanent participant status has been granted to six
indigenous people’s organizations5. According to the Ottawa Declaration: “the category of
Permanent Participation is created to provide for active participation and full consultation with
the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council” (Arctic Council, 1996). The
Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat in Copenhagen, established under the AEPS, has been main-
tained to support the permanent participants. Funding for the secretariat is provided by the
Arctic states on a voluntary basis, but while the Government of Canada has been more help-
ful than most Arctic states in this regard, the support is still insufficient to address capacity
issues and funding needs (House of Commons Canada, 2013, 55). Moreover, there are also
currently twelve non-Arctic states 6 that have been admitted as observers to the Arctic Council,
in addition to nine intergovernmental organizations, and eleven NGOs (Arctic Council, 2014b).
Observer status continues as long as consensus exists among the Ministers, and observers en-
gaging in activities at odds with the Ottawa declaration or the Rules of Procedure will have its
status suspended (Arctic Council, 2013). Decision-making in the Council is the exclusive right
and responsibility of the member states with the involvement of permanent participants, and all
decisions are made by consensus. However, observers are encouraged to make contributions,
primarily through engagement at the working group level (Arctic Council, 2013).
1.4.2 The Arctic Five
While the Arctic Council is the primary forum for circumpolar cooperation, and the main object
of interest in this thesis, another constellation of Arctic stakeholders has formed over the past
4Arctic Contaminants Action Plan (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conserva-
tion of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), Protection
of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) and the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).
5The Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Aleut International Association, the Gwich’in Council International, the
Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North and the Saami Council
(Arctic Council, 2011e).
6France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, Italy, China, Japan, India, Singapore and
the Republic of Korea (Arctic Council, 2014b).
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years that is worth mentioning. Among the eight Arctic states, geography divides the “Ocean
Five” from the “Non-Littoral Three” (Griffiths, 2011, 191). The Arctic Ocean coastal states
are often referred to as the “Arctic Five”, and comprise of Canada, the United States (US), the
Russian Federation, Norway and Denmark (Greenland). These states have found it purposeful
to address certain Arctic issues among themselves rather than within the Arctic Council, and
the exclusion of the territorial states, indigenous peoples groups and observers of the Council
from the decision making process in region has caused tensions among the Arctic stakehold-
ers (Young, 2012, 171). This arrangement has thus been considered to undermine the primacy
and authority of the Arctic Council, and to challenge the Council’s role as the “principal inter-
national forum for addressing Arctic issues” (Young, 2012, 171). In this way, the Arctic Five
illustrates an intermediate position between unilateral and multilateral actions in the High North
and suggest a fragmentation of Arctic affairs (Young, 2012, 171).
In 2008, the Arctic Ocean costal states met in Ilulissat, Greenland with the objective of
affirming the role of the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the process of mapping
out and submitting claims for the outer limits of the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean. The
meeting produced a statement of common purpose on the adherence to UNCLOS: the Ilulissat
Declaration (Ilulissat Declaration, 2008). On the one side, it seems natural that issues concern-
ing the Arctic Ocean are dealt with in the forum of the coastal states, seeing that these countries
have immediate interests at stake, in particular related to extended continental shelf claims.
However, on a general basis, all Arctic issues are of relevance for each of the Arctic states,
and this form of “exclusive cooperation” has been criticized by the non-littoral states as well
as representatives of indigenous peoples organizations. In 2010, the Arctic Five met again, on
invitation from the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, in Chelsea, Quebec. As with the Ilulis-
sat meeting, the remaining Arctic Council member states, permanent participants and observers
were excluded, and the Canadian government was criticized for marginalizing the role of the
Council (Lackenbauer, 2011b, 241). The non-littoral states expressed public frustration over
the fact that they had not been invited, the EU opposed this narrowing of the Arctic agenda, and
Hilary Clinton stated the United States did not support the exclusion of actors with legitimate
interests in the region, even though the US itself is a member (Lackenbauer, 2011b, 242). The
thesis will further elaborate this “sub-regional approach to Arctic governance” (Griffiths, 2011,
191) and the tensions between the Arctic Five and the other Arctic stakeholders when presenting
the political context in the region and in the chapter on Canada’s Arctic Council chairmanship.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
This chapter has provided an introduction to the topic of the thesis - Canadian Arctic policy-
making and implementation - with the objective to facilitate later discussions and analysis. I
have presented Canada’s territorial north, the historical background for Canada’s approach to
its High North and an outline of the current Harper government’s Arctic approach. I have also
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addressed arenas for Arctic policymaking and cooperation, emphasizing the supremacy of the
Arctic Council. The following chapter will present the theoretical framework of the thesis,
consisting of realism and neoliberal institutionalism, and I will illustrate how both perspectives
can be said to have certain explanatory power when it comes to Canadian Arctic politics and
the political situation unfolding in the region. Thereafter, I will account for the methodologi-
cal approach, and why qualitative methods are most appropriate for my research objective. I
will justify the case selection and describe the data collection process, address strengths and
weaknesses of my data, as well as ethnical considerations for carrying out this research project.
After the theoretical and methodological framework for the thesis has been established,
I will address the political context and central stakeholders in the Arctic. Firstly, I have chosen
to devote quite a lot of attention to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), based on the significance of this maritime treaty in the governing of the world’s
oceans, and hence in regulating relations between the Arctic states and their sovereignty in the
region. Thereafter, I will present the Arctic policies and strategies of the other Arctic states,
with the objective to outline their political priorities and to conduct a comparison with Canada’s
highlighted policy areas. Based on statements from these documents, I will briefly discuss
the tensions between the Arctic Five and the remaining member states of the Arctic Council.
Lastly, this chapter will address the general political situation in the Arctic with the purpose of
deepening the understanding of the trends and processes unfolding in the region: are we moving
in a cooperative direction or towards a conflicted situation?
In the subsequent chapter, I will present a summary of the main documents constituting
the foundation for the thesis’ discussions and analysis. The purpose of this synopsis is to set
forth Canada’s Arctic policy as it is expressed in official documents in order to examine high-
lighted areas, how the Government is working to position itself in the region, and to what extent
it is successful in promoting and implementing its Arctic policy domestically and internation-
ally. Thereafter, I will discuss and analyze the cases: the Canadian Arctic Council chairmanship
2013-2015 and governance in Canada’s northern territories. Chapter six will begin with an ac-
count of the Arctic Council’s development from a transnational forum towards an international
organization, followed by a discussion of Canada’s chairmanship, including highlighted policy
areas, motives behind these and how Canada acts both in its own national interests and in the
interests of the broader circumpolar community through the chairmanship. Lastly, I will estab-
lish Canada’s influence on the Arctic agenda through the chairmanship, as well as the Arctic
Council’s significance for Canadian policymaking. Chapter seven examines the political devel-
opment of the northern territories, achievements so far in terms of the transfer of governmental
power, authority and resources to the territorial governments, as well as remaining challenges.
In the final chapter, I will analyze and develop an answer to the research questions, and based




This chapter will outline the theoretical foundation for the thesis, consisting of realism and
neoliberal institutionalism. The objective is to look at Canadian Arctic policymaking from both
perspectives, and examine which theory best explains state actions and events unfolding in the
Arctic as a result of the spark of interest in the region. The theories have different views on
international relations (IR), particularly regarding the role and impact of international regimes1
and prospects for cooperation. Realism argues states are mainly driven by self-interests and
security concerns, and rarely collaborate because of barriers to cooperation in the international
system. This is a systemic feature institutions cannot mediate, as they are unable to make
significant contributions to policy outcomes. In contrast, neoliberal institutionalism holds that
states can find common ground for cooperation, especially through international institutions,
which are considered capable of influencing the political agenda and state actions.
2.1 Theoretical approaches to international relations
The two main theories in international relations are realism and liberalism, and most debates
take place between or within these approaches (Mearsheimer, 2001). Liberalism was preva-
lent after the First World War and the creation of the League of Nations; the first international
organization intended to maintain world peace. However, largely as a result of the outbreak
of the Second World War and the failings of the idealist project in the 1940s, realism came
to the forefront and has since been the salient theory (Marsden & Savigny, 2011). This is the
reason why I have included it in the theoretical framework of my thesis. Furthermore, liberal
institutionalism is considered the major challenger to realism’s dominance, and I will focus on
neoliberal institutionalism, a branch developed in the 1980s (Grieco, 1988, 486). However, in
spite of divergences between realism and liberalism, the transition to neorealism and neoliber-
alism resulted in “the neo-neo synthesis of the 1980s”, meaning the main theories of IR became
increasingly compatible (Waever, 2000, 163). Consequently, both theories view states as the
principal actors in international politics, and the difference of primary interest for this thesis is
thus whether international regimes markedly affect the prospects for cooperation and interna-
tional stability. Hence, I have chosen neoliberal institutionalism because the theory combines
the realist assumption of states as the main actors with a strong faith in international regimes’
ability to impact world politics and optimism regarding cooperation. These aspects make ne-
oliberal institutionalism relevant for this project, as it can shed light on the combination of
unilateral actions and cooperative arrangements emerging in the Arctic.
1Regimes and institutions are used interchangeably in both realist and institutionalist literature (Mearsheimer,
1995). International regimes are in this thesis understood as “principles, norms, rules and decision-making




Liberalism has its roots from the Enlightenment and thinkers such as John Locke and Im-
manuel Kant, and is optimistic about the prospects of making the world safer and more peaceful
(Mearsheimer, 2001, 15). In contrast to earlier versions of liberalism, the neoliberal approach
accepts the realist argument that states, as unitary-rational actors in pursuit of self-interests, are
the main actors in world affairs, as well as the notion of the international system as anarchic
(Grieco, 1988, 492). However, seeing the world as interconnected and interdependent, neolib-
eral institutionalism refuses realism’s prioritization of strategic and military power, which is
considered secondary to absolute gains and long-term mutual benefits, and argues states care
about a wider range of issues than just relative power gains (Marsden & Savigny, 2011, 51-55).
2.2.2 Cooperation and institutions
Neoliberalism emphasizes cooperation and how states can join forces with other states and
non-state actors to achieve their goals and mutually beneficial outcomes (Marsden & Savigny,
2011, 76). Neoliberal institutionalism considers cheating to be the greatest obstacle to coop-
eration, but that international institutions can contribute to overcome this barrier and facilitate
interstate collaboration (Grieco, 1988, 486-487). Thus, while accepting the realist assumptions
of the state as a rational actor in pursuit of self-interests and the premise of an anarchic inter-
national system, neoliberal institutionalists argue realism is wrong to dismiss possibilities for
international cooperation and the abilities of international institutions (Grieco, 1988, 492). See-
ing institutions as mechanisms to achieve cooperation, states are not the only significant actors
on the international arena. International institutions are relevant in world politics as arenas;
bringing officials together and activating potential coalitions, as members of transgovernmental
coalitions and as points of governmental intervention in transaction systems (Keohane & Nye,
1974, 55). Institutions facilitate interstate cooperation by providing services, through norm
creation and allocation, rule observation and settlement of disputes, as well as facilitating com-
munication and information flow (Keohane & Nye, 1974, 54).
2.3 Realism
The principal branches of realism are classical and structural realism, represented by Hans
Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, in addition to Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. What makes
these realist theories important is the explanation for why states pursue power and how much
power they are likely to want (Mearsheimer, 2001, 18). Classical realism dominated the study
of international relations from the late 1940s until the early 1970s. This perspective is based
on the assumption that human beings have an inherent “will to power”, which is seen as the
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principal driving force behind state behavior as they look for opportunities to dominate other
states (Mearsheimer, 2001, 19). States aim to gain as much power as they can, looking to
maximize their relative power to others, and hegemony is the ultimate goal (Mearsheimer, 2001,
22). Classical realists recognize that international anarchy can make states worry about the
balance of power, but such structural constraints are nevertheless considered a second-order
cause of state behavior (Mearsheimer, 2001, 19). Structural realism entered the field in the
late 1970s, and this approach assumes states primarily aim for survival, making security their
main priority. In contrast to classical realists, Waltz focuses on the structure of the international
system as the principal explanation for state behavior (Mearsheimer, 2001, 19). Anarchy is a
central factor, forcing states to compete with each other for power. However, structural realists
argue states ultimately act defensively, and concentrate on maintaining the balance of power in
the system (Mearsheimer, 2001, 22). Mearsheimer’s offensive realism is also a structural theory
of international relations, emphasizing the system rather than human nature as the driving force
behind state behavior, and that states consider power as key to their survival (Mearsheimer,
2001, 21). However, offensive realists dismiss the idea of status-quo powers acting defensively,
and claims the system creates powerful incentives for states to maximize their relative power at
the expense of rivals, with hegemony as the ultimate state goal (Mearsheimer, 2001, 21).
2.3.1 Core assumptions
In contrast to liberals, realists have a pessimistic outlook on international politics and see the
world as dominated by security competition and war (Mearsheimer, 2001, 17). Realism en-
compasses five basic assumptions: states are the key unit of analysis and assumed to behave
as unitary-rational actors. International anarchy is the principal force shaping states’ motives
and actions. States in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, thus predisposed to-
wards conflict and competition, and often failing to cooperate even when they have common
interests. Lastly, international institutions have only marginal affect on the prospects for coop-
eration (Grieco, 1988, 488). The main behavioral patterns resulting from these assumptions are
that states in the international system fear each other, all states aim to guarantee its own survival
and to maximize its relative power positions over other states (Mearsheimer, 1995, 10-11).
Power is a key concept for realists, defined primarily through military capabilities: the
ability of the state to achieve its objectives, ensure its survival, and the capacity to coerce other
states (Marsden & Savigny, 2011, 49-50). Also central to the study of foreign policy is the
emphasis on the international system as anarchic. Neoliberal institutionalism defines anarchy
as the lack of a common government in world politics to enforce promises, and thus increasing
the likelihood of cheating. Realism has a more gloomy interpretation of anarchy, stressing it
means there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, thus increasing
the likelihood of war (Grieco, 1988, 497-498). This reality explains for realists why states
rely on power and seek to maintain or increase their power position relative to others (Viotti
& Kauppi, 2010, 56-57). Because they operate in an anarchic world, each state faces a self-
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help situation in order to ensure their own survival. This increases the likelihood of the use of
violence and further leads to what is known as a “security dilemma”: even if a state is sincerely
arming only for defensive purposes, it is rational in a self-help system to assume the worst about
other states and keep pace in any arms buildup (Viotti & Kauppi, 2010, 57).
2.3.2 Cooperation and institutions
Realism also has a pessimistic outlook on the prospects for international cooperation and on
the capabilities of international institutions. Because international anarchy fosters competition
and conflict among states, they are unwilling to cooperate even when they share common inter-
ests, which is something international institutions are unable to mitigate (Grieco, 1988, 485).
However, classical realists have more faith in the ability of international regimes to contribute
to stability than structural realists (Viotti & Kauppi, 2010, 67). The later does not believe insti-
tutions can have an independent effect on state behavior, but are created and shaped by the most
powerful states in the system to serve their interests and increase their power base. Thus, in-
stitutions are essentially “arenas for acing out power relationships”, reflecting state calculations
of self-interests based on and mirroring the distribution of power (Mearsheimer, 1995, 13).
Neoliberal institutionalist assumptions have thus been met with heavy critique from the
realist camp. Especially the claim that states seek to maximize individual absolute gains and are
indifferent to the gains attained by others (Grieco, 1988, 487) seems to be hard to swallow. The
possibility of cooperation is not completely ruled out by realists, but when states do cooperate, it
is often because balance-of-power logic causes them to form alliances against common enemies
(Mearsheimer, 1995, 12-13). Seeing the world as fundamentally competitive, realists argue that
there are two major barriers to international cooperation. Firstly, states are often reluctant to
enter cooperative agreements out of fear that the other side will cheat. Second, because they
are always concerned about systemic balance of power and because “today’s friend may be
tomorrows enemy in war”, they also worry their partners might gain more from cooperation
and thus care about relative gains, which complicates cooperation (Grieco, 1988, 487). Hence,
realists claim that by focusing merely on the obstacle of cheating, neoliberal institutionalism
fails to consider the threat of conflict arising from international anarchy. This allows them to
ignore the matter of relative gains, and consequently, neglect a major source of state inhibitions
about international cooperation (Grieco, 1988, 487). Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin counter
these claims by specifying two issues regarding the “relative gains debate”; the conditions under
which relative gains are important, and the role of institutions when relative gains are at stake
(Keohane & Martin, 1995, 44). They argue liberal institutionalism does not ignore relative
gains, but is aware of the conditionality of such considerations. Relative gains considerations are
not likely to have much impact on cooperation if the potential for absolute gain is substantial or
in any context involving more than two states. Secondly, they argue that distributional conflicts
and coordinating joint actions to achieve a stable cooperative outcome can make institutions
more important (Keohane & Martin, 1995, 44-45).
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2.4 Applying the theoretical framework to Canada’s Arctic policy
The aim of this chapter has been to account for two competing perspectives on international
relations. Both theories can be considered to have certain explanatory power with regards to
Canadian Arctic policymaking and state actions, and complement each other by one theory be-
ing strong where the other is weak. Undoubtedly, the Arctic is being altered by a widespread set
of factors, and the region is exposed to geopolitical changes with implications for all the Arctic
states. Some argue emerging trends suggests that the prospect of conflict and an “arms race” in
the Arctic remains a real possibility. For instance, Rob Huebert points to the development of
Arctic foreign and defense policies, and the strengthening of militaries’ ability to operate and
conduct more complex operations in the High North (Lackenbauer, 2011b, 232). These con-
cerns are dismissed by those arguing the Arctic is still a peaceful region in which transnational
cooperation prevails, that an armed conflict is very unlikely to play out in the foreseeable fu-
ture, and what we are witnessing is nothing more than a classic security dilemma (Lackenbauer,
2011b, 233). These opposing views suggest that both the realist and the liberal approach needs
to be taken into account when analyzing the current situation and future of the Arctic.
Realism consider states to be the only relevant actors in international relations, operating
in an anarchical world based on self-interests. This approach can best explain state actions such
as the emphasis on sovereignty and security, the formulation of defense policies and measures
taken to protect national interests and secure natural resources. Considering the transformations
taking place in the Arctic from a realist perspective, every state should “assume the worst” of
others’ intentions and activities in the region, and should be prepared to defend their national
sovereignty and security primarily through military means and the ability to act on potential
threats. Realism however fails to provide a good explanation for the cooperative transnational
arrangements emerging in the High North, as well as for the stability that has characterized the
region since it appeared on the political radar. Seeing institutions merely as tools in the hands
of states, reflecting the balance-of-power in the international system and expressing the inter-
ests of the most powerful actors, they are considered unable to contribute to policy outcomes
of significance. Realism would emphasize the weak legal status and “soft law” character of
Arctic arrangements and declarations, as well as the lack of formal conventions or treaties in
the region. On that account, the American reluctance towards creating the Arctic Council as
an international organization with regulatory power and authority to make legally binding deci-
sions fits well within the realist outlook. From this perspective, it is to be expected that states
are hesitant to surrender sovereignty to super-national bodies on Arctic issues, seeing how the
region holds valuable natural resources and could become strategically important if predictions
of new waterways opening to year-round navigation are fulfilled. Based on realism’s worldview,
Canada’s first priority in the Arctic should be to protect national interests, security considera-
tions should always be at the forefront, and the Government should devote substantial resources
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to military capabilities, since the ability to respond to threats is the core of national security2.
Neoliberal institutionalism on the other hand, would dismiss the importance of military
upgrades and other “hard power” initiatives in the region, and fails to explain states’ intentions
behind such actions. Instead, this theory emphasizes cooperation and interdependence, and has
its strengths where realism falls short, namely to account for the rise of cooperative circum-
polar arrangements and the general commitment to international law when regulating Arctic
affairs. Neoliberal institutionalism emphasize the value of international regimes in world poli-
tics, which are considered to influence policymaking outcomes by functioning as arenas where
representatives from states meet to address common issues. Intentions behind entering such
cooperative arrangements are not simply based on national security concerns or pursuit of self-
interests, and this optimistic outlook on international relations downplays the significance of
relative gains concerns, claiming states can work together to achieve absolute gains. Looking at
transnational issues from the neoliberal institutionalist perspective, an explanation of outcomes
made simply in terms of “sovereignty” and “national interests” is therefore insufficient (Keo-
hane & Nye, 1974, 57-58). There is also the question of distribution, and governments may
find themselves politically dependent on other governments in order to achieve their goals. In
such cases, sub-units of governments are likely to make use of international organizations for
policy coordination and coalition building (Keohane & Nye, 1974, 58). The different forms
of transnational cooperation in the Arctic region can be categorized by using neoliberal institu-
tionalist theory. Examples of direct intergovernmental agreements are the Arctic Environmental
Protection Strategy from 1991 and the creation of the Arctic Council in 1996 (Young, 2005, 9).
The Northern Forum, subnational actors cooperating based on interests that differ from those
of their national government (Young, 2005, 9), is an example of transgovernmental coalition
building. Such coalitions take place when subunits of government collaborate with like-minded
agencies from other governments, jointly using their resources to influence the decision mak-
ing process (Keohane & Nye, 1974, 44-47). Lastly, international institutions can be involved in
transgovernmental relations in an issue area requiring a central point or agency for coordination
(Keohane & Nye, 1974, 54). Examples of such arrangements designed to address specific Arctic
issues and convey the significance of these concerns are the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and
the International Arctic Science Committee (Young, 2005, 9). Therefore, a natural extension of
the increased activity in the Arctic region would be the establishment of international regimes
to coordinate and manage transnational issues, and to pursue common interests and achieve
mutually beneficial outcomes. From the neoliberal institutionalist perspective, Canada can ben-
efit from collaboration with other states on Arctic issues, both to advance national interests and
achieve joint objectives in the circumpolar north.
2Canada has for decades more or less neglected its Arctic region, leaving it to the United States to provide security
in the region. Realists consider this to be a major flaw in Canada’s foreign and security policy. Seeing that
multiple factors are transforming the North into a more accessible region, and how Arctic states has begun
rebuilding their Northern military capabilities, Canadian policymakers need to strengthen Canadian Arctic




The purpose of this study is to examine and develop an explanation for “why” and “how” in
the Canadian Arctic policymaking process. In other words, to uncover the intentions behind
Canada’s Arctic policy and to analyze how Canada works to position itself in the circumpo-
lar north, both domestically and internationally. In addition, I will examine the outcomes of
this process, with the objective of deepening the understanding of Canada’s influence on in-
ternational relations and in shaping the Arctic agenda. This research objective consequently
corresponds to literature and theory on actors and state actions in international relations. What
are the driving forces behind states’ foreign policies, and what are the methods used to pursue
national interests on the international arena? What are prerequisites for political influence and
agenda setting internationally? Specifically, who sets the agenda in the Arctic? I find a qual-
itative methodological approach to be most appropriate for this research objective. Through
document analysis, literature review and unstructured interviews, I will develop an answer to
the problem statement and research questions.
3.1 Qualitative research design and case study
Social science methodology can be divided into qualitative and quantitative methods - often
labeled “large-n” and “small-n” analysis, based on the number of units being studied (Ragin,
1992). Quantitative research projects are variable-oriented, aiming to define key variables that
might influence a dependent variable, i.e. the objective of study, and problem statements are
usually concerned with statistical generalizations (Ragin, 1992; Thagaard, 2009). Variables and
relations between them dominate the research process, and the understanding of these relations
is shaped by examining patterns of covariation in the data set, observed and averaged across
many cases, not by studying how different features or causes fit together in individual cases
(Ragin, 1992, 5). As opposed to “large-n” statistical quantitative analysis, qualitative research
projects are often case-oriented, examining one case at the time with the objective to provide in-
depth information on a smaller selection of units (Ragin, 1992; Thagaard, 2009, 17). Qualitative
methods include observation, interviews, document analysis and analysis of audio and video
recordings, and entail research questions emphasizing the meaning behind phenomena, aiming
for an analytical description and understanding (Thagaard, 2009, 13; 17).
Despite its widespread use and centrality to social scientific discourse, the term “case”
is not well defined within the social sciences (Ragin, 1992). However, implicit to most notions
of case analysis is the idea that the objects of investigation are similar and separate enough to
permit treating them as comparable instance of the same phenomenon (Ragin, 1992). Bennett
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and George (2005, 17) define a case as “an instance of a class of events referring to a phe-
nomenon of scientific interest”. In other words, the case, or “unit of analysis”, is an instance of
a phenomenon selected for study. The case study approach in social sciences consists of detailed
examination of an aspect of an episode to develop or test explanations that may be generalizable
to other events (Bennett & George, 2005, 5). Case study methods include both within-case anal-
ysis of single cases and comparisons of a small number of cases, and this method is generally
strong where statistical methods and formal models are weak (Bennett & George, 2005, 18-19).
The strengths of case study methods are conceptual validity, deriving new hypothesis, explor-
ing causal mechanisms and the ability to accommodate complex causal relations (Bennett &
George, 2005, 19-22). The limitations and potential pitfalls are that case studies are particularly
prone to case selection bias, meaning cases are chosen that share a particular outcome, they are
generally strong at assessing whether and how a variable mattered to the outcome, but weak in
terms of assessing how much it matters. Lastly, case studies are criticized for being unable to
discriminate between competing explanations on the basis of the evidence, for a lack of repre-
sentativeness of diverse populations and for overgeneralizing findings to types or subclasses of
cases unlike those studied (Bennett & George, 2005, 22-32). Bennett and George (2005, 6) em-
phasize that process tracing, tracing the links between possible causes and observed outcomes
in close detail, can be used to remedy some of the shortcomings of the case study method.
3.1.1 Case selection
The starting point for my research project was a general interest in international relations, which
I wanted to direct towards the High North seeing that the region is currently the focal point for
a range of unilateral actions, as well as interstate and multilateral cooperative arrangements.
Specifically, I chose to focus on Canada because while the country cannot be said to be a global
superpower, it still holds great potential for influence and opportunities in the Arctic. Canada is
one of the main initiators in the circumpolar north, and I wanted to look in depth at the prospec-
tive for Canada to assume a leadership role in the region. While the two potentially strongest
poles in the Arctic – The United States and Russia – are unwilling and unable to dominate
the region for various reasons, Canada enjoys influence through the UNCLOS and the Arctic
Council, and is thus one of the main beneficiaries of the region’s legal and intergovernmental
framework (Wegge, 2011, 173). In addition, seeing that Canada’s territorial north covers such
a vast area of the total land mass, and is home to most of Canadian Aboriginal peoples, it is
interesting to look at Canada’s domestic approach to the Arctic. How does the Government
operate to foster social and economic development while safeguarding the environment in the
region? How has the northern territories evolved in terms of greater self-government? What are
the achievements and remaining challenges? The main purpose of this thesis is thus to examine
Canada’s Arctic policymaking, both domestically and internationally, and in order to develop
an understanding of this process I will elaborate on the Canadian Arctic Council chairmanship
from 2013-2015, as well as governance and indigenous peoples in Canada’s territorial north.
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The Arctic Council chairmanship can be seen as a case of the phenomenons “circumpolar
cooperation” and “international leadership”. Of interest is how Canada has worked through the
Council since taking over the chairmanship from Sweden at the Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna
in May 2013, in particular, how Canada advances national interests and/or common objectives
with the other Arctic states. To this end, the Canadian chairmanship can shed light on Canada as
a unilateral actor in pursuit of domestic interests on the international arena, and to what extent
Canada is successful in promoting national priorities through this multilateral forum. Secondly,
this case allows for an examination of Canada’s commitment to international leadership and
cooperative efforts intended to serve the whole Arctic community. Thirdly, the Arctic Council
case is chosen because of its contemporary relevance. Canada is in the last year of its chairman-
ship, which allows for an examination of priorities and achievements so far. Lastly, the cases
needed to be embedded within the theoretical framework guiding the thesis. The establishment
and development of the Arctic Council, as well as interstate relations taking place within the
forum, are well in line with the neoliberal institutionalist approach to international relations.
Based on this theory’s assumptions, the Council functions as an arena for cooperation and the
production of mutual beneficial policy outcomes among the Arctic states. From a realist outlook
on the other hand, Canada can be expected to utilize the chairmanship exclusively in pursuit of
national policy interests, preferably to achieve relative gains compared to other actors, and the
Arctic Council is seen as expressing the will and interests of its most powerful member states.
Throughout the thesis, it will become evident that the neoliberal institutionalist perspective is
most accurate when examining Canada’s Arctic policymaking. However, it will also be demon-
strated how Arctic states are greatly preoccupied with national interests, resources, sovereignty
and security concerns in the region. These issues fits within the realist perspective, and are
worth investigating to develop a complete picture of the political situation in the Arctic today.
The second case, concerning governance in Canada’s northern territories, evolved as a
result of the work with the Arctic Council chairmanship when it became evident how much em-
phasis and political attention is directed towards the north by the Government of Canada. The
main purpose of this case is consequently to look in depth at Canada’s northern territories and
the situation for Canada’s northerners and indigenous peoples. To this end, I will outline histor-
ical developments, the evolvement towards greater self-government for the territories, achieve-
ments through the devolution process, as well as remaining challenges, both regionally and for
the federal government. These two cases can be seen as representing Canada’s political focus
in the Arctic internationally and domestically. Above all however, I have aimed at maintaining
a connection between the cases, focusing on how domestic interests are pursued internationally
and how Canada’s domestic policy can be seen in a broader international perspective. This is in-
teresting because the Arctic is considered to be a region blurring the lines between national and
interstate politics (House of Commons Canada, 2013), thus challenging traditional distinctions
in IR, and because Canada has been criticized for focusing on the “local” - especially Canadian
indigenous peoples - over the global in its Arctic Council chairmanship (Extner-Pirot, 2014).
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3.2 Data collection
3.2.1 Challenges related to attaining data material for my thesis
I initially intended to pursue this study primarily through interviews. First and foremost I was
determined to approach someone from the Arctic Council secretariat, and I assumed this was
an achievable objective, seeing as the secretariat is located in Tromsø. I initiated contact with
the secretariat through email March 18th 2014, and again on April 23rd after a month without
receiving an answer. After my second email, the secretariat replied that they have a purely
administrative role, and are not able to answer questions about the current chairmanship. How-
ever, they referred me to Julie Boyer, the Canadian coordinator for the chairmanship, and I tried
to contact her without success. In addition, I asked the Arctic Council secretariat whether they
would be able to answer questions about the Council on a general basis, as a forum for transna-
tional cooperation, and/or how the secretariat works as an administrative body and coordinator,
to which they declined but offered to send me the Canadian chairmanship program. Further-
more, I was in contact with several officials in the Norwegian Foreign Department who work
towards Canada or the High North, but neither had the time to meet with me. I also attempted
to establish contact with Canadian governmental officials, but this proved difficult due to rules
and regulations within the Canadian bureaucracy. I was informed that no Canadian official can
participate in interviews for something that will be published or printed without permission
from the Government in Ottawa. After several attempts to different bureaucracies and depart-
ments, I realized this was going to prove more challenging than expected. The conclusion based
on the replies I got was that, adding to the issue of time and availability, it seemed as though
contributing to a master project was not considered a priority. As a consequence of these ex-
periences and through consultation with my supervisor, I decided to change the approach and
use document analysis as the primary data material for my thesis. The decision was also based
on the fact that I had both limited time and resources, and at one point needed to move forward
with my project. However, I am confident that I have been able to gather valuable and fruitful
information through careful examination of governmental documents and other written sources,
and that this data is sufficient for the discussions and analysis conducted throughout the thesis.
3.2.2 Document analysis
Document analysis has a long tradition within qualitative research, and “documents” include
all written sources available for investigation (Thagaard, 2009, 62). However, I will base my
analysis primarily on governmental documents and policy statements and strategies. The main
sources for my thesis are Canada’s Northern Strategy (2009), Achievements under Canada’s
Northern Strategy (2011), Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy (2010) and the Canada
First Defense Strategy (2008). These publications have proved very valuable for my project,
giving insight into the Government of Canada’s domestic priorities, as well as intentions, in-
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terests and involvement in the Arctic and the broader international arena. Other governmental
publications of relevance include the Economic Action Plan introduced in 2009 and later up-
dates, the Action Plan to Improve Northern Regulatory Regimes (2010), as well as devolution
agreements transferring power and authority to the territorial governments and other documents
regarding indigenous peoples. Seeing as the Canadian Arctic Council chairmanship 2013-2015
is the main case under investigation, and to examine the Council’s development and political
output, I have studied its founding documents, declarations, meeting documents, joint state-
ments and working group reports and assessments. Furthermore, to portray a more complete
picture of the political situation in the circumpolar north, I have analyzed the Arctic foreign
policies of the other Arctic states, and will provide a summary of these. Additionally, I have
looked at international treaties, conventions and declarations, in particular documents relevant
to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and northern territories, as well as scientific publications and
research reports, especially resulting from programs Canada have participated in, such as the
International Polar Year 2007-2008. Lastly, to constantly keep up with current developments
and political initiatives, I have monitored the Government of Canada’s and the Office of the
Prime Minister’s news centers, and used press releases, statements and speeches to comment on
the Government’s responses to recent events and changing international circumstances.
In terms of document analysis, it is important to note that this method distinguishes itself
from data collected in the field by the fact that the documents are written for a different purpose
than what the researcher uses them for. Thus, in order to maintain a holistic perspective of the
data, a principal aspect of this method is evaluation of the sources relative to the context they
are created in (Thagaard, 2009, 62-63). This means that when for instance looking at Canada’s
defense strategy, one must keep in mind that this will naturally focus on the Canadian Forces
and the security and safety of Canadian citizens, but will not include policy areas such as health,
education, economy and trade. Consequently, it is wrong to interpret this as an expression of
“exclusive focus on security” by the Government, as other issues and policy areas are addressed
in other statements and strategies. What can be read from this document however is priorities
within the defense policy: what is at the center of Canadian security concerns and what issues
are devoted most attention? The same caution applies to the other governmental documents, and
hence, it is important to consider them together in order to grasp Canadian Arctic policymaking
as a whole, covering all issues and priorities.
3.2.3 Literature review
In order to construct a chronological narrative to help understand the basic outline of the case, it
is useful to gather academic literature on the case and its context (Bennett & George, 2005, 89).
I have done this by reviewing existing literature on Canada’s Arctic policy from central northern
experts. These include Franklyn Griffiths, Rob Huebert and Whitney Lackenbauer, who were
granted research fellowships for 2008-09 by the Canadian International Council to examine
Arctic issues. The resulting white papers guiding Canadian Arctic policy were published in
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the book Canada and the Changing Arctic. Sovereignty, Security and Stewardship (2011). I
have chosen to present a short summary of these three authors, as their views fits well within
the theoretical framework of my thesis, and as they express opposing outlooks on how Canada
should work to position itself in the High North given the transformations taking place there.
Rob Huebert aims to provide an understanding of Canadian sovereignty and security
in the context of a fundamentally changing Arctic, emphasizing geopolitic forces, strategic
developments, climate change and resource development. Huebert is among the critics who
argue Canada has neglected its High North for too long and needs to move to assert its presence,
in particular seen in light of the increased international interest in the region (Huebert, 2011,
13). Huebert focuses on international challenges emerging over Canada’s claim to its Arctic
maritime space, and argues the core issue of Canadian Arctic sovereignty is control, while the
core issue of Canadian Arctic security is about responding to threats (Huebert, 2011, 19-21).
Such statements situates him within the realist camp, and his work is central for the discussion of
the political context in the Arctic. Nevertheless, Huebert ultimately acknowledges that Canada
cannot act alone in the Arctic, and needs to work with its circumpolar neighbors to develop a
spirit of cooperation and international rules to protect the region (Huebert, 2011, 60-61).
While Huebert sees the Arctic as a “potential battleground” and a “hostile world where
only the strong will survive”, Griffiths and Lackenbauer have more faith in Canada’s sovereignty
being secure, and that shared interests among the circumpolar states indicate a future of cooper-
ation (Griffiths et al., 2011). Their position is thus more in line with neoliberal institutionalism.
Lackenbauer points out that what we are witnessing might just be a classic security dilemma,
and that fears of a “polar race” or “new Cold War” in the Arctic are exaggerated (Lacken-
bauer, 2011b, 233). His main message is that the Government must avoid creating a sense of
alarmism, and instead focus on integrating defense, diplomacy and development in the region
(Lackenbauer, 2011a, 93). Griffiths emphasizes stewardship and the need for ongoing dialogue
between southern stakeholders and northern residents with regard to agenda setting and prior-
ities. He provides recommendations for Canadian leadership, and argues Canadian efforts for
stewardship in the Arctic should be governed by three main objectives. To elevate Arctic inter-
national relations to the highest political level, to engage Russia on behalf of a larger collective
commitment to cooperative stewardship, and lastly, Canada should strive to invigorate the Arc-
tic Council and its ability to coordinate and support stewardship projects (Griffiths, 2011, 195).
3.2.4 Semi-structured interview
Even though I was not able to conduct interviews to form the basis for analysis in my thesis,
I was fortunate to get the opportunity to talk to Jeannette Menzies, Head of the Canadian In-
ternational Centre for the Arctic Region at the Canadian Embassy to Norway, and Professor
Greg Poelzer at the University of Saskatchewan, Canada. These conversations were based on
a semi-structured approach, where I had relevant topics prepared beforehand but we also ad-
dressed other issues that came up through discussion. The topics I had prepared were closely
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connected to the research questions, in order to facilitate the overall objective of the thesis and
gain information to help develop an understanding of Canada’s Arctic policy. The informants
provided me with useful insight in Canadian domestic policymaking and national priorities and
interests. In particular, they helped me understand the challenges facing Canadian northerners,
territorial governments and the federal government in Canada’s Arctic region form a domestic
perspective and in comparison to other circumpolar states.
3.3 Research quality: strengths and weaknesses of my data
Central features when evaluating research quality are reliability and validity. Reliability con-
cerns how trustworthy the research is, for instance if it is accounted for how the data has been
developed (Thagaard, 2009, 198). One can distinguish between internal and external reliability,
where the former refers to the accordance in the construction of data between researchers work-
ing on the same project and the later concerns replicability (Thagaard, 2009, 199). With respect
to this project, internal reliability is not applicable, but external reliability can be achieved by
others examining the same data material to see whether they are left with the same conclusions.
Another way to strengthen the reliability is to make the research process transparent by giving
a detailed description of the research strategy and analytical method so these can be evaluated
step by step (Thagaard, 2009, 199). I have strived to achieve this throughout my thesis, account-
ing for my intentions, objectives and approach, as well as referring to the theoretical framework
representing the foundation for my interpretations and analysis when appropriate.
A fundamental objective of qualitative methods is to achieve an understanding of social
phenomena, and interpretations are central in this type of research. Thus, it is important to be
aware of how the researcher to some extent creates data based on his/hers understanding of soci-
ety by utilizing qualitative methods (Thagaard, 2009, 11; 47). Validity concerns the soundness
of the interpretations derived from the study, meaning the researcher should critically exam-
ine his/hers interpretations and possible get them confirmed by other studies (Thagaard, 2009,
201). Consequently, one must show precaution in terms of how one understands actions and
behavior, interpret documents, and analyze and present results and findings. I have strived to
avoid making presumptions, in particular regarding Canada’s political priorities, motives and
intentions. For instance, Canada is usually known as being a cooperative state, primarily using
“soft power” in international relations. However, it would be a mistake to approach Canadian
policy statements and strategies with the assumption that they are only looking to cooperate and
please others, and if sanctions were to become necessary, these would only include diplomatic
means. Canada, as all other states, have national interests and priorities, and it was important to
examine the governmental documents looking for both sides of the political specter - interna-
tional cooperation and national self-interests. This approach also corresponds with the opposing
views on international relations of the two theories forming the foundation of my thesis.
The strengths of my data are the amount of official documents, strategies, statements,
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treaties, conventions, declarations, speeches and press releases I have examined. I have looked
into all political aspects of the Canadian Arctic, from foreign policy and security to the hu-
man dimension and economic and environmental policies. This has provided me with a sound
overview of Canada’s priorities and interests in the High North, and I would argue it has given
me a solid base for analysis and conclusions on Canada’s Arctic policymaking - how Canada
works to position itself in the region, and motives behind its actions. Another strength of my
data is the fact that I also have examined the Arctic foreign policies of the other Arctic states,
which facilitates an evaluation of Canada’s interests and actions in the broader context of cir-
cumpolar politics and stakeholders. The weaknesses of my data are first and foremost that it
would be beneficial if I had more informants, which would be a means to avoid personal bias.
However, I have strived to achieve this by looking into secondary sources, such as literature by
esteemed scholars, both from the realist and liberal camp. Another possible pitfall by studying
governmental documents is that they mostly present an official outlook, largely focusing on
accomplishments and progress made by the Government, and are rarely self-critical. To com-
pensate for this, I have looked at literature by northern scholars commentating on the statements
and strategies, which has given me a more balanced outlook. In addition, the examination of
recent articles and press releases has enabled the evaluation of what has actually been done
compared to the promises made in these documents. Lastly, my participation at conferences,
such as the Arctic Frontiers in Tromsø, January 2014, the Canada Norway Northern Innovation
Initiative in Tromsø, September 2014, and the Trans-Arctic Agenda in Reykjavik, Iceland in
October 2014 has been very useful for the work with this thesis. It has given me the opportunity
to confirm or disprove my interpretations, and to get several different outlooks on the situation
in the Arctic, both from political, environmental, business and indigenous perspectives.
3.4 Ethnical considerations
All scientific activities require the researcher to adhere to ethical guidelines and to demon-
strate integrity and accuracy in the presentation of results and in the assessment of other re-
searchers’ work (Thagaard, 2009, 23-24). Regarding studies involving close contact between
the researcher and objectives, the researcher must adhere to specific ethnical precautions ap-
plicable to studies involving the processing of personal data (Thagaard, 2009, 24-25). These
include the principles of informed consent and confidentiality, and that the researcher is respon-
sible for avoiding that the participants are subject to harm or distress from partaking in the study
(Thagaard, 2009, 26-29). These guidelines are not of particular relevance for me, as I have not
gathered any personal data. What is more applicable is the fundamental principle of scientific
integrity to avoid plagiarizing others’ work. To this end, I have constantly made sure to cite
researchers, scholars, documents and so on I have used, in order to make clear that these are not




POLITICAL CONTEXT AND SALIENT STAKEHOLDERS
This chapter will focus attention to the general political situation in the Arctic, with the objective
to deepen the understanding of developments and processes taking place in the region. Firstly, I
will account for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an important
treaty central to the legal regulation of affairs concerning the world’s coastal states. I will
elaborate on its contents and account for the Arctic Ocean coastal states’ extended continental
shelf claims, including implications of potential overlapping claims. The objective is to give
insight in the political and legal context Canada operates in when formulating and executing
its Arctic policy, which will contribute to the backdrop for the analysis of Canada’s policy in
the region. Next, I will present an overview of the Arctic policies of the circumpolar states,
with the aim to portrait a fuller picture of the circle of stakeholders by comparing their interests
in and approaches to the region, and in this regard, I will also devote attention to the tensions
surrounding the Arctic Five arrangement. Lastly, I will address the general political situation in
the Arctic to look at whether it is developing mainly in a cooperative or conflicted direction.
4.1 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was negotiated from 1973 to 1982 and
entered into force in 1994 when it had the required 60 ratifications. The UNCLOS consists of
rules and regulations governing the world’s oceans, and is the most comprehensive international
maritime treaty (Côté & Dufresne, 2008, 2). The Convention defines three zones of maritime
control of particular interest for the analysis of territorial claims and Arctic sovereignty: the
territorial sea, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the extended continental shelf (Huebert, 2011,
15). The UNCLOS establishes that the sovereignty of a coastal state extends beyond its land
territory and internal waters to an adjacent belt of sea: the territorial sea, including the airspace
above and its seabed and subsoil (UNCLOS, 1982, Article 2). Further, Articles 55-75 addresses
the maritime zone beyond and adjacent to a coastal state’s territorial sea: the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone (EEZ). The EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which
the breath of the territorial sea is measured (UNCLOS, 1982, Article 57). Within its EEZ,
a coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and
managing natural resources, both living and non-living, as well as jurisdiction regarding the es-
tablishment and use of installations and structures, marine scientific research and the protection
and preservation of the marine environment (UNCLOS, 1982, Article 56).
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of maritime zones (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2014)
UNCLOS’ Article 76 defines the continental shelf of a coastal state, comprising of the
seabed and subsoil extending 200 nautical miles beyond the territorial sea as a natural prolonga-
tion of the land territory (UNCLOS, 1982, Article 76.1). While the EEZ must be proclaimed by
the state and cannot extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea,
the continental shelf inherently belongs to the state and can extend beyond 200 nautical miles if
it is a natural prolongation of the land territory (UNCLOS, 1982, Article 76.4). This is known as
the extended continental shelf, and under Article 77 the coastal state has sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources. Noteworthy is the specification that
these rights “do not depend on occupation, effective or notional or on any express proclamation”
(UNCLOS, 1982, Article 77.3), meaning the coastal state does not have to exercise sovereignty
over the continental shelf in order to enjoy its rights. It is the state’s responsibility to establish
the outer edge of its continental shelf, and information on the limits of the extended continental
shelf must be submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the basis
of unbiased geographical data. The Commission makes recommendations to coastal states, and
the limits of the shelf established on the basis of these recommendations are final and binding
(UNCLOS, 1982, Article 76.8). The Commission, which is entirely a technical body, does not
partake in overlapping claims or disputes. They must be solved by the states themselves by
peaceful means and based on international law (UNCLOS, 1982, Article 83).
As of today, all the Arctic Ocean coastal states with the exception of the United States
(US) have acceded the UNCLOS: Norway in 1996, the Russian Federation in 1997, Canada
in 2003 and Denmark in 2004. After acceding the treaty, a state has ten years to submit its
claim for an extended continental shelf to the UN Commission. Thus, Canada had until 2013
to submit evidence for its extended continental shelf outside the 200 nautical mile Exclusive
Economic Zone, and filed its submission regarding the Atlantic Ocean, as well as preliminary
information concerning the Arctic Ocean, on December 6th 2013 (Foreign Affairs, Trade and
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Development Canada, 2013). The United States, which has neither signed nor ratified the Con-
vention, cannot obtain international recognition for Alaska’s extended continental shelf. Efforts
to accede the treaty are being prevented by a small minority of Republican senators, primarily
motivated by an ideologically based opposition to the United Nations (Huebert, 2011, 41-42).
The general opinion seems to be that the likelihood of the US acceding to the UNCLOS in the
near future is scant (Centre for Arctic Policy Studies, 2014), but should they do so, this would
have consequences for Canada’s relationship to the United States, as well as for negotiations
concerning the Arctic maritime disputes addressed below.
Lastly, it is worth drawing attention to the UNCLOS as a source of power and influence
for the Arctic Ocean coastal states vis-à-vis the territorial states and other Arctic Council actors.
In the article “New power, new priorities: the effects of UNCLOS on Canadian arctic foreign
policy” (2013), Ciara Sebastian argues that as continental shelf claims are being submitted, the
coastal states find themselves in a temporary power position in the region. Canada, by virtue of
its lengthy coastline, gets influence in the Arctic without having to invest in traditional military
and economic sources of international power (Sebastian, 2013, 140). This is also emphasized
by Njord Wegge in the article “The political order in the Arctic: power structures, regimes and
influence”, in which he claims the UNCLOS and the Arctic Council give Canada much greater
influence that it would have in the absence of this institutional framework (2011, 174). As
mentioned, the potential consequence is that the power invested in the Arctic Five through the
UNCLOS could undermine the Arctic Council as the leading forum for Arctic cooperation, and
promote the pursuit of national interests over multilateral cooperation in the region. Sebastian
claims this is in line with the Conservative Harper government’s priorities, aiming towards more
unilateral action or bilateral agreements in the circumpolar north (Sebastian, 2013, 142-144).
4.1.1 Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and continental shelf submission
Canada has exclusive sovereignty rights, authority and privileges in relation to the landmasses
of its Arctic Archipelago, hence can enforce its laws, regulate activities and exclude foreign
nationals entering without permission (Côté & Dufresne, 2008, 1). The basis for Canadian
sovereignty rests on a combination of cession; grants of northern territory by the United King-
dom, occupation; Canada’s activities in the Arctic since cession, and self-determination; the
will of northerners to be governed under Canadian institutions (Côté & Dufresne, 2008, 1).
These criteria are similar to Huebert’s definition of sovereignty, which includes three elements:
a defined territory, an existing governance system and a people within the defined territory (Hue-
bert, 2011, 14). Firstly, within the borders of the Canadian Arctic, the northern population has
accepted the government’s right to govern, and thus, transferring powers to the territories does
not diminish the sovereignty of the Canadian state. Secondly, as there is no limit to how many
people must live within the defined territory for a state to exercise sovereignty over it, the small
number of individuals living in Canada’s Arctic is enough for Canada to claim sovereignty over
the region (Huebert, 2011, 14-15). The third element - defined boundaries - has the greatest
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significance for the discussion of Canadian Arctic sovereignty and is the element of sovereignty
being possible challenged, especially Canada’s Arctic maritime borders (Huebert, 2011, 15-16).
With the exception of Denmark’s claim to the uninhabited 1.3 km² Hans Islands, Canada’s
sovereignty over its Arctic lands and islands is undisputed. According to the Government of
Canada, this dispute is “on a diplomatic track” following the Joint Statement of September
2005 between Canada and Denmark (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 13). However, both
countries have reasserted their sovereignty through on-site visits, and neither has abandoned
its claim, which means the dispute remains unresolved (Côté & Dufresne, 2008, 1). Some see
the question of sovereignty over Hans Islands as having broader implications for Canada’s Arc-
tic claims, while others argue disputes over Canadian Arctic waters are more serious than this
marginal island, which seems to be an issue primarily about national pride (Hartmann, 2013).
Regarding Canada’s sovereignly over its Arctic waters, these borders are not settled yet,
seeing that the Arctic coastal states are still in the process of mapping out their territory and
submitting claims to the UN Commission. The mapping of continental shelfs is not only a
territorial issue, but also very much a matter of securing national resources and potentially
significant economic gains. In 2008, the US Geological Survey completed an appraisal of the
oil and gas reserves in the Arctic. The Arctic Circle encompasses about 6 percent of the Earth’s
surface, which equals more than 21 million km², of which 8 million km² is onshore and more
than 7 million km² is on continental shelves (Brid et al., 2008). The report from the survey
concludes that the extensive Arctic continental shelves may constitute the larges unexplored
area for petroleum remaining on Earth, estimated to approximately 90 billion barrels of oil,
1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids, which equals
15 % of the worlds undiscovered oil and 30 % of undiscovered gas (Brid et al., 2008).
The main point of liberal scholars is that Canada should use diplomacy and cooperative
mechanisms, rather than unilateral measures, to seek support for their case and secure national
interests (Lackenbauer, 2011a, 123). Still, despite the diplomatic spirit characterizing relations
among the Arctic coastal states, there are current maritime boundary disputes in the region, and
further overlaps are expected as the states file their extended continental shelf claims. Canada
and Denmark has had a longstanding dispute regarding the northern maritime boundary in the
Lincoln Sea: the body of water bordering the Arctic Ocean between Canada’s Ellesmere Island
and Greenland. However, the two states reached a tentative agreement on the northern bound-
ary in November 2012, which means the boundary between Canada and Denmark is complete
with the exception of Hans Island (Hartmann, 2013). Other disputes in the Arctic include the
Lomonosov Ridge, which Canada, Denmark and Russia claim is an extension of their conti-
nental shelf. The United States argues it is an oceanic ridge, and thus disproves any claim to
its ownership (Stimson, 2013). In addition, Canada and the United States have an ongoing dis-
pute regarding the boundary line in the Beaufort Sea, and disagree about the legal status of the
Northwest Passage. Canada holds the position that the Passage is part of its internal waters,
and thus subject to full Canadian sovereignty, while the United States argues it fulfills the legal
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criteria of an international strait by connecting two expanses of high seas - the Atlantic and
Arctic oceans - and because it is being used for international navigation (Byers, 2009, 42). The
two states have a long-standing precedence of “agreeing to disagree” on the legal status of the
Passage, and the dispute does not seem to be a very pressing issue for the Canadian govern-
ment. In Canada’s Arctic foreign policy, it is stated that the Northwest Passage is not predicted
to become a large-scale transit route in the near future, due to mobile and unpredictable ice
posing significant navigational challenges, and because other routes are likely to become more
commercially viable (2010, 13). Even so, increased international interest and activity in the
region may force the states to settle the legal status of the Passage sooner than later, which
would be in their best interest regarding security and environmental regulations in the North
American Arctic. Canada’s Northern Strategy addresses these disagreements, claiming they are
well managed and pose no sovereignty or defense challenges for Canada:
“the disagreements have no impact on Canada’s ability to work collaboratively and
cooperatively with the United States, Denmark or other Arctic neighbors on is-
sues of real significance and importance.” “Canada will continue to manage these
discrete disputes and may seek to resolve them in the future, in accordance with
international law” (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 13).
A central priority regarding exercising Canadian Arctic sovereignty is securing interna-
tional recognition for the full extend of its extended continental shelf wherein it can exercise
sovereign rights over the resources of the seabed and subsoil (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy,
2010, 8). Canada has been engaged in the scientific, technical and legal work needed to delin-
eate the outer limits of its continental shelf since adhering to the UNCLOS in 2003, and to this
end, the Government has made a significant investment of $170.6 million from 2004 to 2021
(Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010; Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, 2014e). In Au-
gust 2014, the CCGS Terry Fox and CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent set out on a six week scientific
survey to collect data for Canada’s Arctic continental shelf submission, which will be followed
by a second survey in 2015. The two vessels will be examining an area in the Eurasian Basin
on the eastern side of the Lomonosov Ridge (Government of Canada, 2014b). According to
Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird, these surveys demonstrate the Governments’s
commitment to devote the necessary resources to ensure Canada secures international recogni-
tion of the full extent of its continental shelf, including the North Pole (Government of Canada,
2014b). This is a controversial issue, and when Russia planted its flag on the North Pole in 2007
then Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter MacKay, stated: “This isn’t the 15th century.
You can’t go around the world and just plant flags to claim territory” (Huebert, 2011, 43). Nev-
ertheless, when submitting preliminary information concerning the Arctic Ocean in December
2013, Canada made a similar claim, arguing the North Pole is within Canadian territory. This,
in addition to the statement from Minister Baird in August 2014, illustrates Canada’s ambitions
in the region in terms of territorial claims and expansion.
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“Our government is securing our sovereignty while expanding our economic and
scientific opportunities by defining Canada’s last frontier. This is important to
Canadians, especially those in the North, as this is their future and prosperity at
stake” - Honorable Leona Aglukkaq, Canadian Minister for the Arctic Council
(Government of Canada, 2014b).
4.2 Arctic Policies of central stakeholders in the region
4.2.1 The United States
The United States (US) was for decades one of the more passive Arctic states, reluctant to
engage in any form of binding multinational, circumpolar cooperation, and constantly blocking
efforts to create new forums of Arctic governance (Huebert, 2011, 24). However, the United
States’ orientation towards the Arctic has markedly changed in the past years, and it has emerged
as an engaged actor with ambitions in the region. The US National Security Strategy from 2010
states the US is an Arctic nation with broad and fundamental interests in the region:
[the US] “will seek to meet our national security needs, protect the environment,
responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scien-
tific research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues”
in the Arctic region (United States Government, 2010, 50).
Moreover, the US’ National Strategy for the Arctic Region from 2013 sets forth the
Government’s strategic priorities for the High North. Thus, although the United States can be
considered a laggard in terms of Arctic engagement, considering Norway issued its strategy for
the High North already in 2006, the 2013 strategy expresses strong intentions to position the US
in the Arctic to respond to challenges and opportunities. The American strategy is built on three
lines of effort: advance US security interests, pursue responsible Arctic region stewardship and
strengthen international cooperation (United States Government, 2013, 2). These issues - se-
curity, stewardship and international cooperation - are recurring themes among the circumpolar
states, including Canada. The US also recognizes that the changing conditions in the Arctic
brings with them not only strategic and economic opportunities, but also significant challenges.
Therefore, it is considered crucial that the US proactively establish national priorities and ob-
jectives for the region (United States Government, 2013, 5). The acknowledgement of the need
for a stronger US presence in the High North was confirmed with the appointment of a special
representative for the Arctic region in February 2014. The representative, Admiral Robert J.
Papp Jr., will play a critical role in advancing American interests, particularly in preparation for
the US Arctic Council chairmanship beginning in 2015 (Kerry, 2014). The press release stated:
“The Arctic region is the last global frontier and a region with enormous and grow-
ing geostrategic, economic, climate, environmental and national security implica-
tions for the United States and the world” (Kerry, 2014).
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The third objective in the American strategy - international cooperation - is of particular
interest for this thesis, towards the US Government outlines four objectives: pursue arrange-
ments that promote shared Arctic state prosperity, protect the Arctic environment and enhance
security, work through the Arctic Council to advance US interests in the Arctic region, and ac-
cede to the Law of the Sea Convention and cooperate with other interested parties (United States
Government, 2013, 9-10). The US Government will continue to emphasize the Arctic Coun-
cil as a forum for facilitating cooperation among the Arctic states on issues of mutual interest
within its current mandate (United States Government, 2013, 9). Thus, there is not mention of
the need to strengthen the Council, which is a recurring theme in other Arctic states’ policies,
nor does the US government mention the Arctic Five. However, it is recognized that a growing
number of non-Arctic states and other actors express increased interest in the region, and that
the Arctic states should seek cooperation in a manner that protects their national interests and
resources (United States Government, 2013, 10). Accordingly, clearly at the forefront of the
United States’ newfound interest in the Arctic are security concerns and resource development.
Because of the importance attributed to the United States by the Government of Canada,
I will devote some attention to this relationship before addressing the other circumpolar states.
The United States is considered Canada’s premier partner and closest ally in the Arctic, and
the Canadian government strives for more strategic bilateral engagement on Arctic issues with
the US (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 24). The Canadian-American relationship can
be seen from two angles: Canadian dependency on the United States for Arctic security and
American challenges to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty - and the historical military significance of
the Arctic is fundamental to understanding this ambivalent relationship.
Firstly, it is natural that Canada devotes a majority of its political and diplomatic ef-
forts towards the United States. The US is Canada’s closest neighbor, and has been the safety
net for Canadian Arctic security since the Cold War. The ignorance and neglect characterizing
Canada’s approach to its north changed with the outbreak of the Cold War, when Canada became
geographically positioned between two increasingly hostile superpowers (Coates et al., 2008,
58-63). Canada as a potential backdoor to the United States placed it in a security dilemma:
the US, in the process of guaranteeing Canada’s safety, may itself become a threat to Canadian
Arctic sovereignty. If Canada would or could not defend its own territory, the US would be
forced to help in order to ensure its own safety and to take whatever measures they consid-
ered necessary, regardless of Canadian preferences (Coates et al., 2008, 64). In this situation,
partnership with the US offered Canadians at least a say in decision-making, solidified its al-
liance with the US, and could guarantee both Canadian security and sovereignty (Coates et al.,
2008, 78). Canadian and American security and defense has thus been linked since the Cold
War, through American strategic interests in the north and Canada’s need for American assis-
tance to fulfill its defense mission (Coates et al., 2008, 124). Throughout the years of, more
or less voluntarily, security cooperation with and protection from the United States, Canada’s
territorial sovereignty has all the same remained intact, and their essential interests have been
32
safeguarded. In fact, Canada’s most successful unilateral actions over the past decades have
been backed by negotiations with the Americans (Lackenbauer, 2011a, 73). Therefore, Canada
sees obvious benefits from cooperation with the US, and understandably aspires to maintain a
good diplomatic relationship with its superpower neighbor. This is also connected to Canada’s
reluctant attitude towards NATO. In his rather bleak assessment of Canada’s NATO member-
ship, historian Jack Lawrence Granatstein argues NATO does little to nothing to protect Canada
at home, and has proven its limited effectiveness on operations. The United States is the only
partner that can be relied on to support Canadian troops, as it protects Canada in its own interest
through the most effective military force on earth (Granatstein, 2013, 3-4). From the United
States’ point of view, they could also benefit from bilateral security cooperation with Canada,
seeing Canada’s Arctic is a backdoor into North America, and that patrolling these territories is
a task neither country is equipped to handle on their own (Baker & Kraska, 2014, 5). This is
recognized in the US’ National Security Strategy, which states:
“The strategic partnerships and unique relationships we maintain with Canada and
Mexico are critical to U.S. national security and have a direct effect on the security
of our homeland” (United States Government, 2010, 42).
On the other hand, the United States has long refused to take its circumpolar responsi-
bilities seriously, and it still remains to be seen whether the US is able to implement its Arctic
policy. It is also the US who have posed the most severe threat to Canadian Arctic sovereignty
over the past decades, by challenging the legal status of the Northwest Passage and claiming it
is an international strait in which Canada has no jurisdiction. Seen from this perspective, and
the fact that Canada and the US in many ways differ in terms of fundamental values, the ratio-
nality behind American dominance in Canada’s Arctic foreign policy is less evident. This also
contributes to explain contemporary aspects of Canada’s Arctic policy. For instance, Canada’s
commitment to develop a national Arctic security and defense policy can be understood in terms
of a desire to withdraw from American dependency. Canadians have never liked to be reliant
on the US, even though this has been the defense reality for decades (Granatstein, 2013, 3).
4.2.2 The Russian Federation
There is almost unison agreement among Arctic scholars that Canada needs to engage with
Russia in a constructive manner, given Russia’s interests and position in the region. Russia
is considered an Arctic superpower, and the Arctic is of vast importance for Russia both eco-
nomically and strategically (Griffiths et al., 2011, 10). Russia’s Arctic policy consists of two
main documents: The fundamentals of state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic in
the period up to 2020 and beyond, and the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for
the period up to 2020 (Padrtová, 2012, 340). The Arctic is vital to Russia’s relevance in world
affairs, and the objective of the Arctic strategy is to strengthen Russia’s role as a leading Arctic
power (Padrtová, 2012, 340-341). Russia’s national interests related to economic development
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are mainly based on natural resources and maritime transport, while on the geopolitical level,
the most important objective is to maintain nuclear deterrence by securing open access of its
submarines to the world’s seas. However, Russia’s ambitions in the region are far from being
fully realized, and there is a gap between rhetoric and actual capabilities (Padrtová, 2012, 347).
According to Sven Holtsmark, director at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies,
managing relations with Russia is the key to and measure of success or failure in securing con-
tinued prosperity and stability in the High North (Holtsmark, 2009, 12). Russia’s strategy for
increased influence in the Arctic rests on strengthened national control and international coop-
eration. The Arctic Council is emphasized as the central forum for Arctic cooperation, and the
function of UNCLOS as a framework for activities in the Arctic Ocean is underlined (The Nor-
wegian Intelligence Service, 2014). While Russia is making investments to secure control over
areas of jurisdiction and to establish a military presence in the Arctic, the Norwegian Intelli-
gence Service (2014) emphasizes there are no signs of quantitative escalation of the permanent
Russian power level in the region, their activity is rather characterized by routine and continuity.
The overall picture of Russia as an Arctic power thus seems to be quite optimistic, and
Russia has indeed showed willingness to cooperate and solve disputes in a peaceful manner, ex-
emplified by the Norwegian-Russian treaty concerning maritime delimitation and cooperation
in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean signed in 2010. There are good arguments supporting
the claim that Russian policymakers might indeed realize that adherence to international law,
cooperation and collective solutions are the best way forward in the Arctic (Holtsmark, 2009,
9). At the same time, Russia differs from Western states, both culturally and in strategic think-
ing, which affects international relations and diplomacy with the Russians. Norway has been
quite successful in this regard, maintaining a peaceful relationship with its superpower neighbor
throughout the Cold War until the present. However, for the future stability of the Arctic, it is
necessary that Western policymakers demonstrate the ability and will to take Russian foreign
and security interests into account as the Russians perceive them (Holtsmark, 2009, 12).
This reality was demonstrated in March 2014 with Russia’s move into Crimea, Ukraine.
In the aftermath, some observers claimed this event would not affect circumpolar collabora-
tion while others argued it would spill over into the Arctic (Huebert, 2014a). Regardless, the
importance of sheltering Arctic cooperation from international issues and disputes elsewhere
became critically evident. The Crimea crisis for instance revoked the NATO issue between
Russia and the alliance, and reignited the debate regarding full membership for Sweden and
Finland, which could be perceived by Russia as an aggressive act by NATO on its northern
flank (Huebert, 2014a). Another example of the tensions between Russia and NATO is how
Canada was reluctant to send troops to Norway to participate in the northern exercise Cold Re-
sponse, despite the government’s promises to increase Canadian arctic security capabilities, out
of fear that this would antagonize Russia. At the same time, during the Crimean crisis, Cana-
dian Prime Minister Harper was leading the effort to expel Russia from the G8, and Canada was
one of the most vocal critics of Russian actions (Huebert, 2014a).
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4.2.3 Norway
Norway is a small country but still very relevant in Arctic affairs. It considers the Arctic to be its
“near abroad”, and aims for a high profile in the region. Norway published the first High North
strategy issued by any Arctic state in 2006: The Government’s Strategy for the High North,
which introduced the High North as a new dimension in Norway’s foreign policy and focused
to a large degree on defense (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, 13).
“It is important to maintain the presence of the Norwegian Armed Forced in the
High North both to enable Norway to exercise its sovereignty and authority and to
ensure that it can maintain its role in resource management. The presence of the
armed forces increases predictability and stability, and is decisive for our ability to
respond to emergencies in the High North” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2006, 19).
The Conservative/Progress Party Government taking office in 2013 also included a chap-
ter on the High North in their political platform. It states that the Government will pursue a
proactive High North policy that will promote industrial development, safeguard Norwegian
interests, strengthen cooperation with Russia and the Arctic states, and enhance the basis for
activity and settlement in the North (Norwegian Government, 2013, 73). Their ambitions in the
region are high, aiming to provide a clear national presence, ensure sustainable management
of natural resources, improve preparedness for environmental disasters and expand search and
rescue operations and infrastructure (Norwegian Government, 2013, 73). The High North is
considered Norway’s most important foreign policy interest, and vital in terms of both security
policy and economics. Norwegian presence and exercise of sovereignty in the High North must
be safeguarded, which also requires military capacity (Norwegian Government, 2013, 73).
Norway thus ascribes high importance to a military presence and military operations in
the region, which is understandable considering Russia is one of it’s closest neighbors. The
attentiveness towards Russia is apparent both in the 2006 strategy and in the political platform
from 2013, but it is also noteworthy that when elaborating on Norway’s relationship with Rus-
sia and Russia as an Arctic player, the focus is primarily directed towards Russia’s contribution
to diplomatic Arctic collaboration. Still, Norway has invested $250 million in a spy ship to
track Russian activities in the Arctic, which will be operational by the military intelligence
service from 2016 (McIntosh, 2014), and verifies that Norway pays close attention to its neigh-
bor despite seemingly cooperative relations. In addition to high-quality military capabilities,
Norway’s focus in the Arctic is on knowledge generation and competence building, indigenous
peoples, the environment, resource management, maritime transport and business development
(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). The Research Council of Norway is a key
player in the Government’s efforts to increase focus on knowledge about the High North. Nor-
way and Canada has several research areas in common, for instance social challenges related
to geopolitics and indigenous issues, technology, energy and environmental research, as well as
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maritime activities, management of marine areas and aquaculture (Research Council of Norway,
2014). The Norwegian Research Council emphasizes that Norwegian-Canadian research col-
laboration is at a lower level than it should be, and polar research is highlighted as a prioritized
area for cooperation, in which Norway is ranked third worldwide, after the US and Canada,
measured in number of publications (Research Council of Norway, 2014).
To summarize, despite Norway’s small size and population base, it is an active and cen-
tral Arctic player, and considers the High North to be of significant national strategic interest.
It can be expected that Norway will continue its strong presence in the region, and remain an
essential member of the Arctic Council and other forums for multinational circumpolar coop-
eration. The Government of Norway does not mention the Arctic Five forum specifically, but
instead ascribes great importance to bilateral relations and cooperation, in particular with Rus-
sia, Canada and the United States. Norway has always had a close relationship to Canada, and
this is likely to intensify in the common years, in particular in the field of Arctic research.
4.2.4 Denmark
Greenland and the Faroe Islands belong to the Danish Realm, which makes Denmark an Arctic
state and member of the Arctic Council. In 2011, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
together with the Governments of Greenland and the Faroes, issued the Kingdom of Denmark’s
Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. The aim is to strengthen the Danish Realm’s status as a global
player in the Arctic, and to reinforce the foundation for appropriate cooperation on the many
new opportunities and challenges in the region (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). In
spite of the Faroes and Greenland having home rule since 1948 and 1979, and that the two
autonomous states are continuously moving towards greater independence, the Kingdom of
Denmark has strong ambitions for its position and influence in the Arctic, and aims to play a
key role in shaping the future of international agreements and cooperation in the region:
“In an equal partnership between the three parts of the Danish Realm, the Kingdom
will work overall for a peaceful, secure and safe Arctic with self-sustaining growth
and development with respect for the Arctic’s fragile environment and nature in
close cooperation with our international partners” (Danish Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, 2011, 10-11).
In terms of international Arctic collaboration, the strategy emphasizes the UNCLOS as the ba-
sis for peaceful cooperation, as well as the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, which aimed to confirm
the responsibility of the five coastal states for managing the development of the Arctic (Danish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, 13). Regarding extended continental shelf claims, it is rec-
ognized that Denmark’s claim will to some extent overlap with other state’s, but the Kingdom
commits to close collaboration with the other Arctic Ocean coastal states, and that unresolved
boundary issues will be resolved in accordance with international law (Danish Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, 2011, 15). This is in accordance with Canada, and other states’, declarations on
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these challenges. The strategy addresses the unresolved issue with Canada over the sovereignty
of Hans Island: “the dispute will be handled professionally as would be expected between two
neighboring countries and close allies” (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, 15).
The strategy also addresses the need for global solutions to global challenges, enhanced
regional cooperation and bilateral safeguarding of the Kingdom’s interests. Strengthening co-
operation in the Arctic Council, which is seen as the primary organ for cooperation in the Arctic,
is a central goal, and the Council must be reinforced as “the only relevant political organiza-
tion that has all Arctic states and peoples as members” (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2011, 52). At the same time, it is stated that the Kingdom will retain the Arctic Five format as
a forum for matters primarily relevant for the coastal states, currently continental shelf issues
(Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, 52). This is a similar attitude expressed in Cana-
dian statements – the need to address certain issues outside the Arctic Council to best safeguard
national interests. Regarding bilateral safeguarding of the Kingdom’s interests, Canada, the
United States, Norway and Iceland are emphasized as key partners for cooperation, Denmark
will maintain close contact with Sweden and Finland on Arctic issues, and wants to further
expand and develop cooperation with Russia (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, 54).
4.2.5 Sweden
Sweden issued its Strategy for the Arctic Region in 2011, which lays forth three priorities for the
region: climate and the environment, economic development and the human dimension (Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2011). The strategy focuses mainly on the dramatic effects of
climate change - including impacts on the living conditions of indigenous peoples, new oppor-
tunities for more sea transport, extraction of the region’s natural resources and increased focus
on international law - and describes the Arctic as an area of low political tension (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2011). Multilateral Arctic cooperation is emphasized as a main pri-
ority for Sweden, and the Arctic Council is seen as the primary multilateral arena for Arctic
issues (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2011, 19). As with the most of the other mem-
ber states, Sweden sees the need to strengthen the Arctic Council institutionally and politically,
specifically by broadening its mandate to include important strategic issues such as joint secu-
rity, infrastructure and social and economic development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden,
2011, 19). Sweden has no coastline bordering the Arctic Ocean, and is thus excluded from col-
laboration among the Arctic Five. However, the Swedish government claims the establishment
of the coastal states’ continental shelves is very much in Sweden’s interest.
“an energized Arctic Council could reduce the need for the coastal states to drive
forward issues in the Arctic Five format. It is important for Finland, Iceland and
Sweden to be able to participate in decision-making in cases where they have legit-
imate interests and that the status of the Arctic Council is maintained” (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2011, 22).
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This is a quite explicit message expressing clear dissatisfaction with the Arctic Five meetings,
and, naturally, stand in stark contrast to Denmark’s attitude. While Denmark sees this forum
as necessary to deal with issues related to the Arctic Ocean, Sweden openly condemns the
the Arctic Five forum, which is considered to undermine multilateral cooperation through the
Arctic Council and excluding actors with legitimate interests in what is being addressed in these
meetings. It is evident that Sweden would rather see all Arctic issues dealt with in the presence
of the full circle of Arctic stakeholders through a strengthened Arctic Council.
Sweden is home to 20.000 of the around 70.000 Sámi people, and highlights the hu-
man dimension and the gender perspective in the Arctic (Arctic Council, 2011f). Sweden’s
Arctic strategy emphasizes how climate changes makes many traditional customs and liveli-
hoods more difficult to maintain for the indigenous peoples living in the Arctic, and intends to
strengthen knowledge processes regarding the traditional lifestyle and necessary adaptations to
these changes (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2011, 41). These are important issues to
address, which are very much in accordance with Canada’s goals and ambitions for northerners
in the Arctic and with its Arctic Council chairmanship program’s highlights. As with Canada’s
Northern Strategy, Sweden’s strategy emphasizes economic development, the environment and
the human dimension. However, in contrast to the strategies of Canada, the United States, Nor-
way and Denmark, Arctic sovereignty is not an issue addressed by the Swedish government,
and security and military engagement in the region is barely mentioned. This points towards
the different position held by Sweden in the Arctic, as it has no territorial claim to the Arctic
Ocean. Sweden’s national interests in the region are hence on a lower political level, more ex-
clusively related to climate change and the environment, than those of the coastal states. The
Arctic Ocean coastal states have more at stake in terms of sovereignty claims, and thus focus
more on military presence and national security. Lastly, Sweden’s strategy has no equivalent
to the Canadian focus on bilateral relations with the United States, and instead emphasizes
collaboration through numerous organizations, primarily the Arctic Council.
4.2.6 Finland
Finland’s position in the Arctic is considered similar to Sweden’s, as neither country boarder
the Arctic Ocean, both are EU members, and both are home to the Sámi people (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2011, 9). Finland issued its Strategy for the Arctic Region in 2013,
which focuses on Finland’s Arctic population, education and research, business operations, the
environment and stability, as well as international cooperation. Similar to the Swedish strategy,
Arctic sovereignty is given less importance, but in contrast, security and military presence is
devoted more attention. It is emphasized how security and stability in the region is crucial to
develop the Arctic economy, which is a main priority area for Finland, and to improve the wel-
fare of the northern population (Prime Ministers Office Finland, 2013, 40). Finland’s strategy
recognizes that the Arctic Ocean coastal states have upgraded their maritime surveillance and
military capacities in the region, but that a military conflict is unlikely, as all Arctic states have
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declared that any disputes will be settled peacefully and in accordance with international law
(Prime Ministers Office Finland, 2013, 40). Nevertheless, it is stressed that Finland must pay
close attention to security developments and the complex and increasingly multidimensional
security threats in the Arctic, which requires a comprehensive approach and cooperation at a
national and international level (Prime Ministers Office Finland, 2013, 40).
International cooperation in the Arctic has been a main priority for Finland since the
end of the Cold War, when it initiated cooperation between the Arctic states resulting in the
1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (Arctic Council, 2011c). Finland’s relationship
to the Arctic from an international perspective also prevail in the 2013 strategy, which states:
“one of Finland’s key objectives is to bolster its position as an Arctic country and to reinforce
international Arctic cooperation” (Prime Ministers Office Finland, 2013, 43). Cooperation, mu-
tual dependence, trust and transparency are seen as the fundamental components of the Arctic
debate, and Finland commits to comply to the existing legal framework of international con-
ventions for the Arctic (Prime Ministers Office Finland, 2013, 43). The Government of Finland
considers the Arctic Council to be the most important forum for addressing Arctic issues, and
emphasizes how the Council should recognize its global role and responsibility, and conse-
quently, Finland is in favor of admitting new observers (Prime Ministers Office Finland, 2013,
44). In addition, Finland has been actively involved in efforts to strengthen the Arctic Coun-
cil, supports the plan to establish it as an international treaty-based organization, and is open
to expanding its operations to new sectors of value-adding activities (Prime Ministers Office
Finland, 2013, 44). Lastly, the Arctic Council’s task of monitoring and assessing the state of
the environment in the region is emphasized, as well as the importance of increasing the media
visibility of the Council’s efforts (Prime Ministers Office Finland, 2013, 44). What can be read
from this is that Finland has high ambitions for the Arctic Council, and, even more so than what
is elaborated in the other Arctic states’ strategies, has clear goals and visions for the future of
the Council. While strengthening the Arctic Council is seen as a general necessity among the
Arctic Eight, the Finnish government proposes specific actions to achieve this. There is no men-
tion of the Arctic Five in the Finnish strategy, instead it focuses on bilateral Arctic partnerships,
in particular with Russia (Prime Ministers Office Finland, 2013, 46).
4.2.7 Iceland
Iceland issued a Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy in 2011, encompassing
twelve principles aiming to secure Icelandic interests in the region. I will focus on the first two
principles, which concern the Arctic Council and the Arctic Five, and Iceland’s goal to secure
status as an Arctic Ocean coastal state. The first principle is:
“Promoting and strengthening the Arctic Council as the most important consulta-
tive forum on Arctic issues and working towards having international decisions on
Arctic issues made there” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iceland, 2011, 1).
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Iceland is not an Arctic Ocean coastal state, and thus naturally would prefer to have all Arctic is-
sues addressed through the Arctic Council. In this regard, the Government of Iceland expresses
explicit dissatisfaction with the “Arctic Five” forum:
“If consultation by the five States develops into a formal platform for regional is-
sues, it can be asserted that solidarity between the eight Arctic States will be dis-
solved and the Arctic Council considerably weakened” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Iceland, 2011, 5).
Even though the strategy does not provide any specific measures for how to strengthen the Arctic
Council, it is stressed that individual member states of the Arctic Council must be prevented
from joining forces to exclude others from important decisions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Iceland, 2011, 6). The Icelandic Government has publicly, as well as in talks with the five Arctic
Ocean coastal states, protested their attempts to assume decision-making power in the region
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iceland, 2011, 6). However, according to Iceland’s Arctic policy,
despite denying that the forum is a step towards a consultation forum on Arctic issues, some
of the states in question are willing to develop cooperation in this direction, and the Icelandic
Government stresses that further efforts that may undermine the Arctic Council and Iceland’s
interests in the region must be prevented (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iceland, 2011, 6). At the
same time, the second principle of Iceland’s Arctic Policy is:
“Securing Iceland’s position as a coastal state within the Arctic region as regards
influencing its development as well as international decisions on regional issues on
the basis of legal, economic, ecological and geographical arguments”(Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Iceland, 2011, 1).
The Government claims Icelanders more than others rely on the fragile resources of the Arctic,
and therefore it is vital that Iceland secures its position as an Arctic Ocean coastal state (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs Iceland, 2011, 6). Iceland’s Arctic policy goal of securing this status is based
on the fact that since the northern part of the its Exclusive Economic Zone falls within the
Arctic and extends to the Greenland Sea adjoining the Arctic Ocean, Iceland has both territory
and rights to sea areas north of the Arctic Circle (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iceland, 2011, 6).
“Iceland’s legal position in the North needs to be further secured in order to put
Iceland on equal footing with the other coastal states in the region”, and that “the
Government should take the initiative of developing arguments in support of this
objective in cooperation with relevant institutions” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Iceland, 2011, 6).
In summary, Iceland’s Arctic Policy focuses on cooperation, ensuring the UNCLOS
forms the basis for the settlement of possible disputes over jurisdiction and rights in the Arctic,
the strengthening of general security and prevention of militarization of the region (Ministry
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of Foreign Affairs Iceland, 2011). The Government stresses that cooperation must be strength-
ened and bilateral agreements sought with individual Arctic states, and claims there is common
willingness among the Arctic states to increase cooperation of this kind (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Iceland, 2011, 10). Other focus areas include climate changes, the well being of indige-
nous peoples, economic development, education and research, as well as national interests.
4.2.8 The Arctic Council versus the Arctic Five
By reviewing the Arctic policies of the circumpolar states, the tensions between the Arctic Five
and the remaining member states of the Arctic Council becomes quite evident. This issue is rel-
evant to Arctic cooperation, and I will briefly summarize the main findings. Firstly, the United
States does not explicitly mention the Arctic Five in their Arctic strategy, but instead emphasize
the Arctic Council as the most important forum for cooperation among Arctic states on issues
of mutual interest. However, the US does not address the need to strengthen the Council, but
rather will pursue cooperation through its existing structure, as well as through new arrange-
ments for cooperation on issues of mutual interest or concern, but does not elaborate on what
this implies. Russia, like the US, aims for increased influence in the Arctic through strength-
ened national control and international cooperation, and the Arctic Council is emphasized as
the central forum for the later. The remaining Arctic Ocean coastal states - Norway, Denmark
and Canada - have different approaches to cooperation through the Arctic Five format. Norway
greatly emphasizes collaboration through the Arctic Council and bilateral cooperation, but does
not address the Arctic Five in its High North strategy. Denmark on the other hand, also sees
the Arctic Council as the primary organization for Arctic cooperation, but in addition explicitly
address the Arctic Five. Denmark considers this to be a appropriate forum for matters primarily
relevant for the coastal states, and to this end conforms to Canada’s position on the issue, as
both countries seems more concerned with protecting national interests than including all the
circumpolar states on questions related to the Arctic Ocean coast.
The three non-littoral states - Finland, Sweden and Iceland - also have different views
on the implications of the Arctic Five arrangement for Arctic collaboration and policymaking.
Finland has been central to circumpolar cooperation since the end of the Cold War, and contin-
ues to emphasize the Arctic Council as the most important forum for addressing Arctic issues.
Perhaps more so than the other Arctic states, Finland stresses the need to strengthen the Council
and outlines specific actions to this end, but has no mention of the Arctic Five format. Sweden
on the other hand, openly condemns the excluding cooperation pursued among the Arctic Five,
and wish to strengthen the Arctic Council in order to reduce the need for the coastal states to
address issues through this forum. Although Sweden is not an Arctic Ocean coastal state, it
still consider topics such as the establishment of the coastal states’ continental shelves to be in
its national interest, and would rather see them addressed through a reinforced Arctic Coun-
cil in the presence of all Arctic stakeholders. Likewise, the Government of Iceland considers
the Arctic Five to be a threat to cooperation through the Arctic Council, and has publicly, as
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well as directly to each of the Arctic Ocean coastal states, protested their attempts to assume
decision-making power in the region. The Icelandic Arctic Policy is without doubt the docu-
ment expressing the greatest concern over collaboration among the Arctic Five, seeing this not
only to undermine the work and position of the Arctic Council, but also threatening Iceland’s
interests in the region. Iceland obviously wants to see all Arctic issues dealt with in the presence
of all stakeholders, even though they also strives for status as an Arctic Ocean coastal state.
What can be read from this review of Arctic strategies is the great primacy and impor-
tance attributed to the Arctic Council by all of the Arctic states. The Arctic Council is seen
as the most important forum for multinational cooperation and for addressing Arctic issues of
mutual interest. However, what is more interesting is what is said about the Arctic Five. Some
states, primarily Canada and Denmark, sees this as a necessary forum for addressing issues re-
lated to the Arctic Ocean coast, such as the claim to and establishment of extended continental
shelfs. Other states however, mainly Sweden and Iceland, consider the Arctic Five to threaten
and weaken the Arctic Council, and to a large extent undermine their own national interests in
the region. The United States, Norway and Finland are less explicit about whether they consider
the Arctic Five to be necessary association or a threat to broader Arctic cooperation.
4.3 ’State of the nation’ in the Arctic - cooperation or conflict?
The above account of the Arctic states’ policies allows for an analysis of the general politi-
cal situation in the region. From a foreign policy perspective, regulating affairs in the Arctic
is a unique issue, incomparable even to Antarctica. The Antarctic region is a clearly defined
area, governed by a treaty suspending all territorial claims, demilitarizing the region, banning
resource development and instructing parties to scientific and environmental cooperation (Grif-
fiths, 2011, 183). In contrast, the Arctic is surrounded by the territory of five coastal states:
Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, the United States and Russia, in addition to the ter-
ritories of Sweden, Finland and Iceland, complicating international governance in the region
(Griffiths, 2011, 184). Thus, the Arctic region is unique to the extent that it blurs the lines
between domestic and foreign policy (House of Commons Canada, 2013), which makes the
political situation in the circumpolar north particularly challenging. Each state must consider
the interests and actions of the other seven Arctic states, rights and freedoms of other coun-
tries granted under international law, as well as the indigenous peoples inhabiting the territory
(Griffiths, 2011, 184). Broadly speaking, Arctic commentators are divided between those fo-
cusing on the diplomatic spirit characterizing circumpolar cooperation, and those emphasizing
the probability for a spillover from conflicts elsewhere. The Arctic has thus far remained a
stable and peaceful region, characterized by a web of bilateral and multilateral arrangements.
However, as states strive for resources and to secure national interests in the region, and as the
security picture changes elsewhere in the world, how long will the Arctic peace last?
On one hand, diplomacy and cooperation in the High North over the past decades is quite
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impressive. States have generally adhered to the rules in the region, which has generated the
development of common norms (Wegge, 2011, 173). There seems to be a general agreement
that there is no ongoing “race for resources” in the Arctic, and that the likelihood of international
military conflict in the region is low1. In addition, the Arctic states express that they consider
international law, mainly the UNCLOS, to provide the legal framework for the Arctic Ocean
and commit to adhere to the Convention when solving potential boundary disputes following
overlapping claims, and when addressing issues resulting from climate change. Commentators
also point out the material and political costs of a large-scale interstate military conflict in the
Arctic due to the region’s remoteness and climate, and thus conclude it is highly unlikely that
states will use such means to secure their interests in the region (Holtsmark, 2009, 10). Lastly,
even Russia, who elsewhere is exhibiting a propensity towards military actions, generally plays
a constructive role in maintaining regional stability in the Arctic (Baker & Kraska, 2014, 2). The
fact that this great power has shown such commitment to cooperation and diplomacy concerning
circumpolar affairs is for many a strong indicator that a military conflict in the region is unlikely.
On the other hand, in accordance with realist theory, national interests are a strong driv-
ing force for states. The Arctic states, as well as non-Arctic actors, are paying close attention
to the region and what is happening in terms of military activities and resource development.
There might not be a “race for resources”, but the Arctic states have begun rebuilding their mili-
tary capabilities on the basis that new economic developments are going to increase the activity
level in the region (Huebert, 2011, 50). As the Arctic opens up to new shipping routes and
opportunities for resource exploitation and development, the prospect for conflict in the region
could increase accordingly. Indeed, there are several powerful nations with their eyes on Arctic
resources, such as Russia, China, the United States and EU member states (Granatstein, 2013).
In addition, despite the general cooperative spirit and downplaying of the conflict potential in
the Arctic, one cannot escape the fact that the growing strategic attention to the region makes it
more vulnerable to conflicts unfolding elsewhere (Holtsmark, 2009, 10). Therefore, it is ques-
tionable, or at least worth investigating, how robust Arctic diplomatic agreements really are.
An example of how increased Arctic integration can lead to spillover from conflicts unfolding
elsewhere is Canada, Norway and Denmark canceling of joint military operations with Russia
after the latter’s invasion of Crimea, Ukraine in March 2014. In addition, other possibilities for
military escalations may result from localized episodes developing into armed clashes despite
the original intentions of the parties involved, or one state may consider the use of limited mil-
itary force, confident that the other side will not escalate the conflict due to asymmetric power
relations (Holtsmark, 2009, 10). Seeing that interstate cooperation is absolutely essential for
stability and responsible stewardship in the circumpolar north, these are worrisome issues.
1The Canadian Government does not believe there is significant potential for conflict unfolding in the Arctic
region (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 26). Also the Norwegian Intelligence Service, in its annual
assessment released in February 2014, concludes that the conflict potential in the Arctic is low, there is no
interstate “race for resources” in the region, and rights, obligations and rules are clarified, primarily through
the Law of the Sea (The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2014, 6).
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In conclusion, while it may be fair to argue that we are unlikely to experience the unfold-
ing of a direct military conflict in the Arctic region itself, it is an inescapable fact that security
related conflicts elsewhere might affect the region in terms of hindering or canceling cooperative
arrangements. However, at the current time, there seems to be a prevailing order in the Arctic
for which Njord Wegge (2011) highlights three potential explanatory factors. Firstly, no actor
seems to dominate the region in terms of power capabilities, as the two potentially strongest
poles – the United States and Russia – are unwilling and unable to do so. The Arctic has not
been a priority for the US, they are ambivalent towards the Arctic Council and have not acceded
to the UNCLOS. Russia score high on military capabilities, but does not have the economic
power to dominate (Wegge, 2011, 173). Given the distribution of these power capabilities,
Wegge characterizes the Arctic as a multipolar system where the Arctic Five together domi-
nates. Such multipolar features can be considered a destabilizing factor, but the second factor –
institutional developments – contributes significantly to the cooperative environment prevailing
in the Arctic today (Wegge, 2011, 173). The UNCLOS and the Arctic Council gives the region
a fairly robust international framework, and states have generally adhered to the rules provided
by these international regimes (Wegge, 2011, 173). Engagement in forums such as the Arctic
Council is a way for states to consolidate their alliances and partnerships, and thus undoubtedly
contributes positively to the security situation in the circumpolar north, seeing how states are
much less likely to engage in conflict with their collaborators. The third explanatory factor is
domestic regime types – democracies - but seeing how it is questionable whether Russia can be
characterized as a true democracy, this is considered the weakest factor in terms of explaining
the political order in the Arctic (Wegge, 2011, 173). Wegge concludes the smaller states are the
prime beneficiaries of the multipolar system based on respect for international law, expressed
by their robust presence in the High North, strong support for an enhanced Arctic Council and





This chapter will present a short synopsis of the main documents this thesis builds on: Canada’s
Northern Strategy (2009), Achievements under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2007-2011 (2011),
Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy (2010) and the Canada First Defense Strategy
(2008). Throughout the summaries, I will highlight themes of particular significance for the the-
sis, such as statements about Arctic sovereignty and security, indigenous peoples and northern-
ers, circumpolar cooperation and the Arctic Council. Lastly, I will briefly account for Canada’s
Economic Action Plan, seeing as these investments are of relevance for later discussions.
5.1 Canada’s Northern Strategy (2009) and Achievements under
Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2007-2011 (2011)
Canada’s Northern Strategy was introduced in 2007 and issued in 2009, and in 2011 the Harper
government published Achievements under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2007-2011. Canada’s
Northern Strategy elaborates on the Government’s overarching vision for the North, building on
four priorities to safeguard the region’s position within a strong and sovereign Canada (Canada’s
Northern Strategy, 2009, introduction). The four pillars are: exercising our Arctic sovereignty;
promoting social and economic development; protecting the North’s environmental heritage;
and improving and devolving northern governance (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 2). The
north is described as a fundamental part of Canada’s heritage, future and national identity, as
well as being home to many of the Aboriginal peoples. The Government recognizes the great
opportunities and many challenges in the region today, and claims to be allocating more re-
sources and attention to northern issues than ever before (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009,
introduction). Moreover, international interest in the north has intensified as a result of the
potential for resource development and the opening of new transportation routes, and the gov-
ernment stresses the importance of demonstrating Canadian leadership to promote a prosper-
ous and stable region responsive to Canadian interests and values (Canada’s Northern Strategy,
2009, 1-5). Furthermore, central to the forthcoming analysis of Canadian territorial governance
is the emphasis put on northerners and Aboriginal peoples:
“Canada’s North is fist and foremost about people - the Inuit, other Aboriginal
peoples and Northerners who have made the North their home [...].” “Our nation’s
strong presence in the Arctic today is due in large part to the contributions of Inuit,
who continue to inhabit the North” (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 3).
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The north is undergoing rapid changes, environmentally from the impacts of climate change,
and politically through the growth of northern governments and institutions, and the strategy
highlights today’s close collaboration between the federal and territorial governments, and how
Aboriginal people have negotiated land claims and self-government agreements, giving them
the institutions and resources they need to achieve greater self-sufficiency (Canada’s Northern
Strategy, 2009, 4). As the vast economical potential of the north is being unlocked, the Canadian
government commits to address critical areas such as infrastructure, housing and education,
to help ensure northerners are positioned to seize the opportunities in the region (Canada’s
Northern Strategy, 2009, 5). Regarding the effects of climate change, the Government states:
“Few countries are more directly affected by changes in the Arctic climate – or have
as much at stake – as Canada. We have an important role to play in the ongoing
stewardship of the Canadian Arctic, its vast resources and its potential” (Canada’s
Northern Strategy, 2009, 8).
The first pillar of Canada’s Northern Strategy is exercising Arctic sovereignty, which
is described as longstanding, well established and based on historic title. However, it is also
recognized that current changes in the region necessitate the need to maintain a strong pres-
ence in the north, to enhance stewardship, define domain and advance knowledge in order to
exercise this right (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 9). To this end, the Harper government
is making investments to ensure Canada have the capacity and capability to protect and patrol
its sovereign Arctic territory (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 9). The strategy addresses
the research and mapping studies undertaken to ensure recognition for the maximum extent of
Canada’s continental shelf in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, a pro-
cess described as “not adversarial and not a race” but rather as a “collaborative process based
on a shared commitment to international law”, and Canada is working with Denmark, Russia
and the United States (US) to undertake this scientific work (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009,
12). Closely related are boundary disputes regarding Canadian Arctic land, islands and waters.
The only land dispute is with Denmark over Hans Islands, but “managed disagreements” over
maritime boundaries at this point exists between Canada and the United States in the Beau-
fort Sea and the Northwest Passage, and between Canada and Denmark in the Lincoln Sea1
(Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 13). The strategy emphasizes how these disputes “pose no
sovereignty or defense challenges for Canada”, have “no impact on Canada’s ability to work
collaboratively and cooperatively with [. . . ] Arctic neighbors on issues of real significance and
importance”, and “Canada will continue to manage these discrete disputes, and may seek to
resolve them in the future, in accordance with international law” (Canada’s Northern Strategy,
2009, 13). Achievements under Canada’s Northern Strategy addresses the Government’s ac-
tions towards the objective of asserting its presence in the north. Examples are aerial, land and
satellite surveillance, strengthening of the Canadian Rangers, NORAD missions, RADAR SAT-
1The disagreement with Denmark in the Lincoln Sea was settled in 2012.
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2; enhancing the ability to track ships navigating Canadian waterways, space-based surveillance
through Canada’s Polar Epsilon project, and the Long Range Identification and Tracking Sys-
tem (Achievements Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011, 11). Another measure to increase
control over Canada’s north came in July 2010, when the voluntary traffic reporting system for
the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services (NORDREG) Zone was made mandatory, meaning
all vessels of a certain size are now required to submit reports prior to entering, while navigat-
ing within and upon exiting Canada’s Arctic waters (Achievements Under Canada’s Northern
Strategy, 2011, 12). The Canadian Forces engage in major sovereignty operations in Canada’s
Arctic every year: Nanook, Nunakput and Nunalivut. In 2010 and 2011, partners from the US
and Denmark also participated in Operation Nanook (Achievements Under Canada’s North-
ern Strategy, 2011, 11), indicating the Canadian government is following up on its intention
to work together with Arctic neighbors on search-and-rescue preparedness, as well as disas-
ter and sovereignty patrols in the Arctic. In general, states recognize that these tasks are too
comprehensive to deal with unilaterally, and aim for collaboration on such missions.
The second pillar of the Northern Strategy is promoting social and economic develop-
ment, which is considered important to ensure the vast potential of the Arctic is realized in a
sustainable way, and that northerners participate in and benefit from the development (Canada’s
Northern Strategy, 2009, 14). In Achievements Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, numerous
investments and measures are listed, demonstrating the Government’s work towards this objec-
tive. For instance, the Territorial Formula Financing is considered a primary tool to fund pro-
grams and services, and in 2010 the Government introduced an Action Plan to improve northern
regulatory regimes and unlock the region’s resource potential without compromising environ-
mental protection. In addition, the economic development agency CanNor was established in
2009 to help ensure a stronger, more dynamic economy for northern workers and businesses by
enabling them to benefit from resources and opportunities in the region (Achievements Under
Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011, 3-4). I will elaborate on these initiatives and investments
when discussing governance in Canada’s northern territories.
Under the third pillar - protecting our environmental heritage - the Canadian govern-
ment emphasizes how the fragile and unique ecosystem of the north is under attack from the
impacts of climate change, and commits to ensure these ecosystems are safeguarded for fu-
ture generations (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 24). To this end, Canada strives to be a
global leader in Arctic science, and scientific collaboration through international organizations
and Canada’s contribution to the International Polar Year (IPY) is highlighted. The IPY pro-
gram took place from 2007 to 2009, involving more than 60 countries, over 200 international
research networks, and was valued at $7 billion worldwide (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development, 2011). This was the largest international program of coordinated, in-
terdisciplinary science focused on the Arctic and Antarctic ever conducted. The purpose was to
deepen the understanding of polar processes, global linkages and increase the ability to detect
changes at the poles, to involve Arctic residents in research activities, attract and develop the
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next generation of polar scientists, and capture public interest (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs
and Northern Development, 2011). Canada played an important part in this global initiative,
including research on human activities, societies, cultures and health, and provided leadership
for eight international science networks, collaborating with more than 240 researchers from
23 countries (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, 2011). Nationally, the
Canadian IPY program focused on two key research areas for the north: climate change impacts
and adaptation and the health and well-being for northern communities, and the $156 million
investment was the largest the Government has ever made in northern science (Minister of Abo-
riginal Affairs and Northern Development, 2011). The Canadian government further commits
to establish a new world-class research station in the Arctic, and the Arctic Research Infras-
tructure Fund has been established to update other research facilities across the Canadian north
(Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 25-26). Also in Achievements under Canada’s Northern
Strategy, the ambition to become a global leader and promote scientific collaboration prevails.
In addition, focus is directed towards domestic actions and what has been done in terms of
environmental monitoring and the promotion of sustainable development of the north’s natural
resources while protecting the ecosystem (Achievements Under Canada’s Northern Strategy,
2011, 8). The growing role of science and technology in supporting the Government’s activities
in the north is also highlighted, particularly regarding the submission to the UN Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, in which Canada seeks international recognition for the
full extent of its continental shelf (Achievements Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011, 16).
Fourthly, the Canadian government aims to improve and devolve northern governance,
emphasizing land claims by and self-government for indigenous peoples as they develop cus-
tomized policies and strategies to address their unique challenges and opportunities (Canada’s
Northern Strategy, 2009, 30). Territorial governments have taken on greater responsibility for
regional affairs over the past decades, most recently control over land and resource manage-
ment, and the Canadian government commits to continuing to work with all partners to advance
practical, innovative and efficient governance models (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 28-
31). These goals still stand in Achievements under Canada’s Northern Strategy, which has
an even stronger emphasis on the Government’s commitment to rebuilding its relationship with
Canada’s Aboriginal peoples, thus admitting the historically unjust treatment of indigenous peo-
ples. To this end, the Government issued an apology in 2010 to the Inuit families relocated to
the High Arctic in the 1950s, including a recognition of their contribution to a strong Canadian
presence in the region (Achievements Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011, 9).
Lastly, regarding the international dimension, it is emphasized how “cooperation, diplo-
macy and international law have always been Canada’s preferred approach in the Arctic”.
Canada has a strong history of collaboration with northern neighbors to promote Canadian
interests internationally while advancing its role as a responsible Arctic nation, and will con-
tinue to work with Arctic partners to achieve common goals while advancing national priori-
ties (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 33). As such, the strategy combines diplomatic lan-
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guage focusing on cooperation and stewardship with direct assertions about sovereignty and
national interests. The United States is highlighted as an exceptionally valuable partner in
the Arctic. The two states’ long history of effective collaboration on common interests in the
region is emphasized, and the Canadian government will continue to deepen cooperation on
emerging Arctic issues bilaterally, through the Arctic Council and other multilateral institutions
(Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 34). Russia is also mentioned as a significant Arctic actor,
and the Canadian government focuses on bilateral efforts including new trading relationships
and transportation routes, environmental protection and indigenous issues (Canada’s Northern
Strategy, 2009, 34). The Arctic Council is attributed great significance as an “important venue
for deepening global understanding of the Arctic”, which “has played a key role in developing
a common agenda among Arctic states” (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 35). Canada will
continue to ensure the Council has the necessary strength, resources and influence to respond
effectively to emerging challenges in the Arctic (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 35). Also in
Achievements under Canada’s Northern Strategy, the Arctic Council is described as a “leading
forum for intergovernmental cooperation on Arctic issues”, and it is emphasized how its struc-
ture unites the eight Arctic states and the six indigenous permanent participants around a com-
mon agenda, enhancing its strength and effectiveness (Achievements Under Canada’s Northern
Strategy, 2011, 13). Even though Canadian national interests are at the forefront, it is clearly
acknowledged that because of the depth and complexity of the challenges and opportunities in
the Arctic, many circumpolar issues are best approached cooperatively. The Canadian govern-
ment therefore commits to cooperation with domestic and international partners - through the
Arctic Council, with the Arctic Ocean states and bilaterally with key Arctic partners - to ensure
Canada is able to seize opportunities and address challenges in the Arctic region.
5.2 Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy (2010)
The Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s
Northern Strategy Abroad advances the four pillars of Canada’s Northern Strategy while focus-
ing international efforts towards specific policy areas (2010, 4). The statement highlights that
the geopolitical significance of the Arctic and the consequences for Canada has never been
greater, and how the region evolves will have major implications for Canada and its role as an
Arctic power (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 3). In pursuing the pillars of the Northern
Strategy, Canada is committed to exercising the full extent of its sovereignty, sovereign rights
and jurisdiction in the Arctic. The Government will take a robust leadership role in shaping the
stewardship, sustainable development and environmental protection of this strategic region, and
will engage with others to advance its interests (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 4).
Exercising sovereignty over the Far North is seen as the most important pillar towards
realizing the potential of Canada’s Arctic, and protecting Canadian sovereignty and the integrity
of its boarders is cited as the Government’s primary responsibility (Canada’s Arctic Foreign
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Policy, 2010, 5-6). Canada’s priority areas in the Arctic are: seeking to resolve boundary issues;
securing international recognition for the full extent of its extended continental shelf wherein it
can exercise their sovereign rights over the resources of the seabed and subsoil; and addressing
Arctic governance and related emerging issues (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 7).
Promoting economic and social development is the second priority area addressed in
Canada’a Arctic foreign policy. It is emphasized that creating a dynamic, sustainable north-
ern economy and improving the social well-being of northerners is essential to unleashing the
true potential of the region, and is an important means of exercising sovereignty (Canada’s
Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 11). Therefore, the Government will actively promote social and
economic development internationally on three key fronts: take steps to create the appropriate
international conditions for sustainable development; seek trade and investment opportunities
that benefit northerners and all Canadians; and encourage a greater understanding of the human
dimension of the Arctic to improve the lives of northerners (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy,
2010, 12). Encouragement of greater understanding of the human dimension will be pursued
particularly through the Arctic Council, and the Government commits to continue its leadership
role in the Council’s initiatives on human well-being in the Arctic, and to host the Secretariat
for the Sustainable Development Working Group (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008, 15).
Furthermore, addressing human health issues in northern communities is seen as critically im-
portant, and Canada has been supporting such efforts through the Arctic Council and Interna-
tional Polar Year research (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 15). Lastly, and of particular
interest for this thesis is the statement on traditional ways of life in the north:
“Canada’s commitment to Northern economic and social development includes a
deep respect for indigenous traditional knowledge, work and cultural activities. Go-
ing forward, Canada will promote a better understanding of the interests, concerns,
culture and practices of Northerners, including with regards to seals and polar bears.
In this context, Canada is committed to defend sealing on the international stage”
(Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 16).
The priority area “protecting our environmental heritage” focuses on how the Arctic environ-
ment is affected by events occurring outside the region, in particular the effects of climate
change (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 16). Strong environmental protection is an es-
sential component of sustainable development, and another way in which Canada expresses its
northern sovereignty (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 16). Canada is working interna-
tionally to: promote an ecosystem-based management approach with its Arctic neighbors and
others; contribute to and support international efforts to address climate change in the Arctic;
enhance efforts on other pressing international issues, including pursuing and strengthening
international standards; and strengthen Arctic science and the legacy of the International Po-
lar Year (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 17). The Government recognizes that climate
change is a global challenge requiring a global solution, and again attention is centered on
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the Arctic Council and the importance of working with indigenous peoples, building on their
unique knowledge of the region and addressing their land claims in the process of establishing
national parks (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 18-20). The Government sees itself at the
forefront in protecting the Arctic environment, and underlines its ambition to be a global leader
in Arctic science, consequently taking a lead role in the Arctic Council’s Sustaining Arctic
Observing Networks project (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 16; 22).
Lastly, Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy addresses how northern governments are tak-
ing on greater responsibility for many aspects of the region’s affairs, which is also cited as a
way for Canada to exercise its Arctic sovereignty (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 22).
The Government is committed to providing northerners with more control over their economic
and political destiny, and is taking steps to endorse the UN’s Declaration on the Rights of In-
digenous Peoples in a manner consistent with Canada’s constitution and laws (Canada’s Arctic
Foreign Policy, 2010, 22). Domestic efforts for strong governance in the north are reinforced
in three ways. Canada will engage with northerners on the Arctic Foreign Policy, continue to
support indigenous permanent participant organizations to strengthen their capacity to fully par-
ticipate in the activities in the Arctic Council, and provide Canadian youth with opportunities
to participate in the circumpolar dialogue (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 23-24).
Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy is a somewhat balanced mix of diplomatic rhetoric and
the overarching objective of protecting national interests. The Government is highly aware of
the rapid changes taking place in the Arctic, as well as the growing importance of the region.
This reality has implications for Canada as an Arctic state, and it is repeatedly emphasized how
“exercising sovereignty over Canada’s North is the number one Arctic foreign policy priority”.
This is expressed through the priority areas from the Northern Strategy, which are all seen as
important means of expressing and exercising sovereignty. Therefore, while cooperation, diplo-
macy and respect for international law is cited as Canada’s preferred approach in the Arctic, the
Government sends a clear message that it will never waver in its commitment to protect the
Canadian north (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 27). While to some extent concealed
behind talk of stewardship, sustainable development and environmental protection, sovereignty
and Canada’s national interests are clearly at the forefront. The term “Arctic power” is used
several times, demonstrating the Government’s international ambitions, and Canada intents to
show leadership in demonstrating responsible stewardship, while building a region responsive
to Canadian interests and values (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 27).
Nonetheless, in its commitment to deliver Canada’s priorities on the international arena,
the Government recognizes the need to work with other circumpolar actors bilaterally, through
regional mechanisms and in multinational institutions (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010,
24). The United States, “Canada’s premier partner in the Arctic”, is clearly at the center of these
ambitions, but Canada is also working with the other Arctic states to advance shared interests
(Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 24). The statement emphasizes that the key foundation
for any collaboration will be acceptance of and respect for the perspectives of northerners and
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Arctic states’ sovereignty. Additionally, there must be recognition that the Arctic states remain
the best place to exercise leadership in the management of the region (Canada’s Arctic Foreign
Policy, 2010, 24), underlining Canada’s international ambitions in the circumpolar north. The
Arctic Council is seen as the leading multilateral forum for promotion of Canadian northern
interests, and Canada is committed to engage with other actors to strengthen the Council and
ensure it continues to respond to the challenges and opportunities in the region, thus furthering
Canadian national interests (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 24-25). It is noted how the
increasing accessibility of the Arctic has led to a widespread perception that the region could
become a source of conflict. However, Canada does not anticipate any military challenges in
the Arctic, and believes the region is well managed through existing institutions, particularly
the Arctic Council (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 26). Nevertheless, when positions or
actions taken by others affect Canadian national interests, undermine the cooperative relation-
ships they have build or demonstrate lack of sensitivity to the interests or perspectives of Arctic
peoples or states, the Government will respond (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 27).
5.3 Canada First Defense Strategy (2008)
The Canada First Defense Strategy was issued in 2008 in support og the Harper government’s
commitment to “stand up for Canada”. The strategy aims to improve the security of Canadian
citizens, defending Canadian sovereignty and ensure that Canada can return to the international
stage as a credible and influential country (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008). The Govern-
ment considers defending Canadians to be its core responsibility, and addresses its predecessors’
under-investments in the Canadian Forces, which has left it unprepared to deal with the increas-
ingly complex global environment. Thus, since taking office in 2006, the Harper government
has confronted the nation’s security weakness by investing in the military and committed to
modernize and rebuild the Canadian Forces (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008, 5-6).
The first chapter addresses Canada’s strategic security environment, in which uncer-
tainty, changes and increased complexity dominate (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008, 6).
The effects of globalization are central, and several international conflicts with potential impli-
cations for Canadian security are listed, including concerns about the Arctic region, which is
becoming more accessible to sea traffic and economic activity. This has potential economic ben-
efits for Canada, but also exposes it to new challenges with possible implications for Canadian
sovereignty and security (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008, 6). The Government commits to
ensure Canada has the tools it needs to deal with the full range of potential threats, and essential
in this regard is to give the Canadian Forces the capabilities it need to operate effectively in the
current and future uncertain environment (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008, 6).
The second chapter addresses the roles of the Canadian Forces: defending Canada and
North America, and contributing to international peace and security. The first responsibility –
ensure the security of Canadian citizens and help exercising Canada’s sovereignty – is given
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primacy in the defense strategy and is the most important role of the CF (Canada First Defence
Strategy, 2008, 7). This entails constant monitoring of Canada’s territory, including the Arctic,
to detect threats to Canadian security as early as possible, and to address them quickly and effec-
tively (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008, 7). It is stated that in response to opportunities and
challenges arising in the Arctic resulting from increased activity levels in the region, the military
will play a vital role in demonstrating a visible Canadian presence in this potentially resource
rich region (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008, 8). Regarding defense of North America, the
United States is emphasized as Canada’s closest ally, to which Canada needs to be a strong and
reliable partner. Cooperation is in both’s strategic interest, given their common security and
defense requirements (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008, 8). The Canadian Forces will carry
out bilateral training and exercises with the United States, Canada Command will continue to
work with US Northern Command on shared objectives, and the nations’ armed forces will col-
laborate on operations in North America and abroad (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008, 8).
Lastly, the Canadian Forces role is to contribute to international peace and security. Canadian
prosperity and security rely on stability abroad, and Canada must do its part to address inter-
national challenges as they arise (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008, 8). The Government
recognizes that international leadership is vital if Canada is to continue to be a credible player
on the world stage (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008, 9). It is also recognized that today’s
deployments are more complex than in the past, requiring more than a purely military solution.
Canada will continue to contribute to key international bodies such as the United Nations and
NATO, in addition to participate in missions with like-minded states as a responsible member
of the international community (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008, 9).
“Canada cannot lead with words alone. Above all else, leadership requires the
ability to deploy military assets, including “boots on the ground”. In concert with
its allies, Canada must thus be prepared to act and provide appropriate resources
in support of national interests and international objectives” (Canada First Defence
Strategy, 2008, 9).
Lastly, the document addresses investments required to implement the Canada First Defense
Strategy, which are supported by increased long-term funding aiming to reverse the damage
done by major cuts to the defense budget in the 1990s (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008,
11). Overall, the Government intends to spend about $490 billion on defense over the next 20
years, which will be allocated across personnel (51%), infrastructure (8%), readiness (29%)
and equipment (12%) (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008, 14-19). In addition, it is pointed
out how this funding is in direct support of the Government’s strategic plan for boosting the
economic prosperity, global competitiveness and quality of life for Canadians, benefiting every
region of the country (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008, 20).
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5.4 Canada’s Economic Action Plan
Canada’s Economic Action Plan (EAP) was introduced in 2009 to counter the effects of the
worldwide recession, and includes specific initiatives towards “building the north”, developed
in support of Canada’s Northern Strategy’s four priority areas (The Government of Canada,
2014). The Economic Action Plan 2013: Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity announced
$872 million in total investments for Aboriginal and northern communities, to allow them to
participate more fully in Canada’s economy and benefit from its growth (Aboriginal Affairs
and Northern Development Canada, 2013b). Furthermore, through the Economic Action Plan
2014: The Road to Balance: Creating Jobs and Opportunities, the Government aims to as-
sert Canada’s sovereignty by investing in the north (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Develop-
ment Canada, 2014b). This will be done by a $40 million investment over two years to renew
the Strategic Investment in Northern Economic Development program delivered by CanNor,
a commitment to work with territorial governments to develop transportation infrastructure in
the North, and a $70 million investment over three years for a new targeted and time-limited
fund to increase health services in the territories (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development
Canada, 2014b). The Canadian government’s website lists three EPA initiatives related to ex-
ercising Arctic sovereignty. Firstly, Natural Resources Canada received $38.9 million for new
satellite data reception facilities and the development of a data management system in 2012
(The Government of Canada, 2014). Secondly, the Government has committed to renewing the
Canadian Coast Guard Fleet, and provided $5.2 billion over a decade to this project through
the 2012 EAP (The Government of Canada, 2014). An example is the investment in a multi-
purpose icebreaker, the John G. Diefenbaker, which will be constructed from 2018-2021 at a
cost of $1.3 billion (Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, 2014e). However, the fact that it
will be finished 15 years after Prime Minister Harper was elected and made the Arctic a central
part of his platform supports the point of the critics claiming he is too slow to deliver on his
promises for Canada’s north. Lastly, the construction of the Canadian High Arctic Research Sta-
tion (CHARS) in Cambridge Bay, announced in August 2012 and scheduled to open in 2017, is
the third initiative aiming to strengthen Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. The Government has com-
mitted $142.4 million for the construction and equipment of the station, $46.2 over six years for
the CHARS Science and Technology research program, and $26.5 for the ongoing program and
operations from 2018-2019 (The Government of Canada, 2014). CHARS is considered a key
component of Canada’s Northern Strategy, and these investments underline Canada’s goal of
becoming a world leader in Arctic science and technology. The construction of the station was
initiated in August 2014 as an event in Prime Minister Harper’s ninth annual Northern Tour.
“The ceremony marked another important step towards the Government’s goal of
improving the quality of life og Northerners, to better understand the North, and
to exercise sovereignty over Canadian territory” (Office of the Prime Minister,
Canada, 2014c).
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In terms of the other priority areas of Canada’s Northern Strategy, a majority of the EAP in-
vestments listed on the Government’s website - 13 in total - are related to social and economic
development in the north, indicating the primacy ascribed to this issue by the Harper gov-
ernment. Examples are the establishment of the Canadian Northern Economic Development
Agency (CanNor) in 2009 and the Community Infrastructure Improvement Fund (CIIF). The
CIIF was a program running from 2012 to 2014 and delivered by regional development agencies
through which the federal government invested $150 million in the rehabilitation and improve-
ment of existing community infrastructure facilities (The Government of Canada, 2014).
In addition to the above mentioned projects, there are other federal military investments,
including in the Arctic, worth mentioning in order to get a full overview of what the Harper gov-
ernment is doing to safeguard Canadian security. Major Pan-Northern initiatives in this regard
includes the Canadian Ranger Expansion project, which was provided $39 million annually be-
tween 2008 and 2012 with the objective of achieving a strength of 5000 rangers (Office of the
Prime Minister, Canada, 2014e). This goal was reached in May 2013, and as of May 2014, 18
new Canadian Ranger patrols have been established since 2007, making up a total of 179 patrols
across the country (Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, 2014e). The Canadian government
has also invested $4.4 billion through the Department of National Defense in the modernization
of the Royal Canadian Air Force’s Air Transportation Fleet, and from 2018-2023, the Govern-
ment will invest $3.1 billion in the acquisition of Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (Office of the
Prime Minister, Canada, 2014e). This is an important step towards securing Canadian Arctic
sovereignty and security, but seeing that construction of these ships will not begin until 2015,
Canada is still far behind some of the other Arctic states in terms of military capabilities in
the region. In August 2013, the Canadian Armed Forces Training Centre (CAFATC) facility
opened to a cost of $25 million, allowing for specialized training in cold weather survival and
military and search and rescue techniques (Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, 2014e).
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Chapter 6
THE CANADIAN ARCTIC COUNCIL CHAIRMANSHIP, 2013-2015
In order to deepen the understanding of Canada’s Arctic policymaking, I have examined the
Canadian Arctic Council (AC) chairmanship from March 2013, which will shed light on meth-
ods used to pursue national interests in multilateral forums and prerequisites for political influ-
ence and agenda setting internationally. The case will illustrate how Canada works both coop-
eratively and based on domestic interests through the chairmanship, and is thus in accordance
with the theoretical framework of the thesis. Realism best explains actions based on states’
self-interests, while neoliberal institutionalism can be used to rationalize why a state would
seek collaboration and work towards common objectives and benefits for the larger community.
The Arctic Council is a relatively young establishment, which makes it possible to ob-
serve and outline its development from the outset. The trend seems to be in the direction of
intensified political pressure through the Council, which increases the political constraints put
on the member states and has attracted the interest of non-Arctic states, demonstrated by the
incorporation of several new observers at the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in May 2013. One
can therefore argue the Arctic Council has evolved from a transnational forum towards an inter-
national organization, and the first objective in this case is consequently to outline the Council’s
development, focusing in particular on the role played by Canada in this process.
Furthermore, the choice to look in depth at the Arctic Council and the Canadian chair-
manship is based on the seemingly immense importance attributed to the Council by the Gov-
ernment of Canada. The Arctic Council is described as “the leading multilateral forum through
which Canada advances its Arctic foreign policy and promotes Canadian Arctic interests in-
ternationally” (Arctic Council, 2011b). Canada is also committed to ensure the Council has
the necessary strength, resources and influence to respond effectively to emerging challenges
affecting the Arctic and its inhabitants (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 36). Prior to Canada
assuming its chairmanship, the House of Commons issued a report summarizing key findings
from the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development’s meetings
aimed at providing parliamentary input to Canada’s Arctic Council agenda, and to identify the
most pressing challenges facing the Arctic states (House of Commons Canada, 2013).
“The Arctic Council combines the resources and knowledge of the eight Arctic
states with those of six international indigenous peoples organizations for the ben-
efit of cooperation on a common regional agenda. The unique nature and flexibility
of the Arctic Council makes it as relevant to Canadian priorities today as when it
was created.” (House of Commons Canada, 2013, 4).
This case thus relates to the third research question: To what extent does Canada’s Arctic policy
contribute to influence international relations and shape the international Arctic agenda? More
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specifically, to what degree is Canada successful in advancing its Arctic foreign policy and
promote its Arctic interests internationally through the Arctic Council? The second and primary
objective in this case is accordingly to develop an answer to these questions. To this end, I will
examine issue areas highlighted through the Canadian chairmanship and how Canada operates
to position itself in the High North seen in light of the need to establish a presence in the
region, to improve the social and economic situation for people in the territories, and to facilitate
sustainable development and management of the region’s resources. I will establish Canada’s
influence on the Arctic political agenda through the Arctic Council, as well as why and how
Canada’s participation in the Council can shed light on Canadian Arctic policymaking.
6.1 From transnational forum to international organization
The Arctic Council (AC) was established in 1996 as a “high level forum” and not an inter-
national organization, which reflected the general trend towards informal cooperation among
states at the time (Bloom, 1999). The United States (US) was particular reluctant to create fo-
rums of Arctic governance with legally binding decision-making authority. However, Canada
saw the importance of having the Americans on board to achieve the highest level of circum-
polar cooperation, and succeeded in persuading the US by substantially reducing the powers
of the Council (Huebert, 2011, 24). The AC’s limitations are therefore that it was designed
for policy-shaping and not policy-making, all outcomes require consensus, and “hard” security
issues are explicitly excluded from the agenda (Centre for Arctic Policy Studies, 2013). The
Arctic Council has primarily been engaged in scientific work and assessments aimed at docu-
menting challenges and opportunities in the region for policy recommendations, it has played
an important role in rising Arctic issues on the policy agenda and in enlightening the general
public (Young, 2005, 11). In particular, the Council is praised for its role in raising the voices of
indigenous peoples on the Arctic agenda and as an important venue for cooperation with indige-
nous peoples groups1, and Canada has contributed in large part to this. The AC’s advantages
thus include agenda setting, promotion of stability and peace, and emphasizing the human di-
mension in the High North (Centre for Arctic Policy Studies, 2013). It is also important to note
how the Council’s output has improved since its establishment, and now includes agreements
and treaties (Huebert, 2014b, 1). Therefore, while the Arctic Council was initially established
as a high-level forum, primarily with “soft power” influence and lack of regulatory authority to
make legally binding decisions, it is now considered the cornerstone of Arctic governance and
circumpolar cooperation, and has acquired more of the qualities of an international organiza-
tion. This development is in accordance with neoliberal institutionalism’s view on regimes and
state interdependence. Rob Huebert (2014b, 4) considers the growth of the Arctic Council to be
driven by two main forces: renewed interest in the Arctic by the United States, and the desire
1See for instance Canada’s Northern Strategy (2009) or Young, Oran R. (2005): “Governing the Arctic: From
Cold War Theater to Mosaic of Cooperation.” Global Governance 11 (1): 9-15.
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among non-Arctic states and entities to join. In addition, I will emphasize two decisions made
at the Nuuk Ministerial Meeting in May 2011 aiming to reinforce the Council: the decision to
create a permanent secretariat in Tromsø, Norway and the signing of the Agreement on Coop-
eration on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic - the SAR Agreement.
The recognition of the increased importance of the Arctic for the United States began
at the end of the George W. Bush Jr. administration, which issued a renewed American policy
for the region (Huebert, 2014b, 4). Since then, the Arctic has acquired greater prominence
within American politics, exemplified by the attendance of Hillary Clinton at the 2011 Nuuk
Ministerial Meeting - the first time the US sent its most senior State Department official to a
meeting of either AEPS or the AC (Huebert, 2014b, 4). The United States’ interest in the Arctic
has later been manifested through The US National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2013). The
strategy highlights the Arctic Council’s notable achievements in the promotion of cooperation,
coordination and interaction among Arctic states and indigenous peoples, and that the US will
continue to emphasize the Council as a forum for facilitating cooperation on issues of mutual
interest (United States Government, 2013, 9). This is quite the change in position, showing
recognition of the Arctic Council’s function both as a forum to advance national interests in the
Arctic region, and as a mechanism to strengthen international cooperation and partnerships.
The Nuuk Ministerial Meeting is significant regarding the Arctic Council’s development
towards an international organization beyond increased US involvement. Firstly, the permanent
secretariat was established in January 2013 to strengthen the Council’s capacity to respond to
the challenges and opportunities facing the Arctic (Nuuk Declaration, 2011). The secretariat is
an administrative body working under the chairmanship, and is to perform the following func-
tions: administrative and organizational support, communication and outreach, finance, Human
Resources, and other services required by the Council and its chair (Arctic Council, 2012). The
legal personality of the secretariat is the Kingdom of Norway, and an administrative budget to
cover its operating costs is determined every second year by the Ministerial Meeting (Arctic
Council, 2012). The fact that the Arctic Council can be held legally accountable for its actions
can be said to raise its legitimacy as an organization (Sellheim, 2012, 71). However, beyond
the establishment of the secretariat, there have been few changes to the internal operation of
the Arctic Council since its establishment, and thus, it still struggles with organizational issues
(House of Commons Canada, 2013, 7). The second important aspect of the Nuuk Declaration
was the approval of the SAR Agreement - the first legally binding agreement negotiated under
the auspices of the Arctic Council (Nuuk Declaration, 2011). The other institutional agreement
negotiated with the Council’s support is the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic adopted in 2013. While these agreements indicate
that the Arctic Council is acquiring more of the features of an international organization, it is
important to note that the Council is not the legal entity adopting these documents. They are in-
tergovernmental state agreements negotiated by sovereign states based on national jurisdiction,
and the Council’s contribution is to function as a forum for consultations (Keil, 2014).
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The second point made by Huebert – the desire among non-Arctic states and entities to
achieve observer status in the Arctic Council – is a more contested and debated topic. On one
side, the will of several non-Arctic actors to become observers demonstrates how the Council
has developed as an authority in Arctic governance, is perceived as increasingly legitimate and
considered crucial for the future of the region (Sellheim, 2012, 68). On the other side, the ques-
tion of observer status has become highly politicized (Young, 2012, 176), and can be seen as a
matter of not jeopardizing the interests of the Arctic states and actors. For instance, the princi-
pal argument against accepting the European Union (EU) as a permanent observer stems from
the belief that the Arctic Council has been successful as a regional body because of its focused
membership of Arctic states and permanent participants. They have joint interests in the region,
as well as a shared way of thinking on the principles of governance and on the importance of
indigenous knowledge and practices (House of Commons Canada, 2013, 59). Hence, the EU’s
application at the 2013 Kiruna Ministerial Meeting was denied, largely because of the Canadian
opposition to the EU’s ban on import and sale of seal products, which was seen as a challenge
to Inuit cultural practices (House of Commons Canada, 2013, 59). However, the Canadian-EU
dispute was resolved on August 18th 2014 when the EU Commission approved a Joint State-
ment from July 2014 between Canadian and EU officials. The statement set out the framework
for “cooperation to enable access to the EU of seal products that result from hunts tradition-
ally conducted by Canadian indigenous communities and which contribute to their subsistence”
(European Commission, 2014). Thus, the EU has lifted the ban on seal products from Canadian
communities, and in return, Canada lifted its reservations concerning the EU’s observer status
in the Arctic Council, and as Chair of the Council, will launch the procedure for the full imple-
mentation of the Kiruna decision on the EU’s observer status (European Commission, 2014).
However, even though Canada is no longer in the way of the EU becoming an observer to the
AC, other states may still look for obstacles or excuses to keep the EU out of the forum. The
EU’s observer status application has become particularly politicized, and some claim the Union
does not fit within the Arctic Council (Centre for Arctic Policy Studies, 2014). Lastly, while
there are obvious benefits for non-Arctic states to be included in the Arctic Council, seeing as it
has developed into the primary forum for multinational cooperation on Arctic issues, Michael
Byers also emphasizes how the Council can benefit from accepting additional observers:
“[. . . ] any international organization [. . . ] is only as important as the people in
the room. We want the Arctic Council to be the center of Arctic diplomacy, Arctic
governance. It is compliment to us that the European Union and China want to be
there”. “[. . . ] there are some issues that can’t be dealt with in the absence from
those major players. If we want to deal with black carbon, we need to have China
in the room. If we want to deal with regional fisheries management, we need to
have the European Union in the room” (House of Commons Canada, 2013, 59).
In addition to the factors addressed above, it can be added that the Arctic Council’s strong
position and growing importance in Arctic governance is evident through the significance at-
tributed to it by the Arctic states. When examining the Arctic foreign policies of the member
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states, cooperation through and strengthening of the Arctic Council are recurring themes. Nor-
way’s High North Strategy emphasized sustainable resource management and work towards
increased international understanding of the urgency of addressing climate changes as ambi-
tions for its 2007-2009 chairmanship (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, 15). These
were bold goals, manifesting Norway’s confidence in this forum for circumpolar cooperation.
Denmark’s strategy for the Arctic describes the Arctic Council as the “primary organ for con-
crete cooperation in the Arctic” (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, 52), and Sweden’s
Arctic strategy claims “the main multilateral arena for Arctic-specific issues is the Arctic Coun-
cil” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2011, 19). Furthermore, the Government of Finland
claims the Arctic Council should establish contact with operators outside the Arctic based on
its global role and responsibility, and supports establishing the AC as an international treaty-
based organization (Prime Ministers Office Finland, 2013, 44). Lastly, the Icelandic government
stresses the role of the Arctic Council as the most important forum for international coopera-
tion on Arctic issues, and how the growing number of observer states demonstrates increased
international interest in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iceland, 2011, 5).
6.2 The Canadian Arctic Council chairmanship program 2013-2015
Canada, as the initiator of the Arctic Council, held the first chairmanship from 1996 to 1998
and assumed its second office at the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in May 2013. According to
the Arctic Council’s website, the chairmanship’s primary role is to coordinate joint projects
and meetings between the member states, permanent participants and working groups, and to
represent the Council externally. This description points towards something noteworthy, namely
that this is an office intended to serve and represent the community – the eight Arctic states and
other participants in the Council – as a whole. Therefore, the chairmanship can be assumed to
entail limitations on the state holding it, such as restrictions on egocentric initiatives and actions
and the pursuit of purely national goals. In addition, the fact that the Arctic Council works
based on consensus means its priorities are determined collectively, limiting the possibility for
the chair to unilaterally push an agenda (House of Commons Canada, 2013, 9).
At the same time, the chairmanship does allow for agenda setting and other ’symbolic’
initiatives, and issues brought forward in the Arctic Council often emphasize links between
domestic and foreign policy (House of Commons Canada, 2013, 8). This means there are op-
portunities for the chair to steer the Council’s policy agenda in a direction that accommodates
domestic priorities and/or its foreign policy, while at the same time addressing issues of rele-
vance for the other member states. This is seemingly what Canada does through its 2013-2015
chairmanship with the theme Development for the People of the North. On the one side, the
program states that Canada’s chairmanship is putting northerners first, and this topic is arguably
chosen primarily based on domestic interests and the critical need to improve the situation for
indigenous peoples and northerners living in Canada’s Arctic. On the other side, the Canadian
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chairmanship theme can also be considered relevant for the other Arctic states, seeing that there
are indigenous peoples living in challenging situations throughout the circumpolar region. Ad-
dressing such issues allows for the sharing of knowledge and identification of best practices
(House of Commons Canada, 2013, 8), which produces a multilateral approach beneficial for
all the Arctic Council’s members. I find it interesting that, out of all the interests Canada could
have pursued through its chairmanship – such as resource exploration and extraction, economic
and business development, shipping or tourism – they chose northerners. This indicates a com-
mitment from the Government to improve the living situation and well-being for northerners in
Canada and across the circumpolar north. To this end, the Canadian program emphasizes how
the appointment of Leona Aglukkaq, an Inuk from Nunavut, as Canada’s minister for the Arctic
Council “underlines the priority the Government of Canada places on the Arctic as well as its
commitment to ensure that the region’s future is in the hands of Northerners” (Development for
the People of the North, 2013). In addition to the objective of social development, the other
side of this policy area is equally important to underline, namely the sovereignty aspect. By fa-
cilitating continued habitation in the Canadian north, the Government strengthens its territorial
claims and assertion of sovereignty in the region, which can become even more predominant in
the years to come with growing opportunities for resource development in the Arctic.
6.2.1 Issue areas highlighted through the Canadian Arctic Council chairmanship
The Canadian chairmanship program highlights three focus areas: responsible Arctic resource
development, safe Arctic shipping and sustainable circumpolar communities. Regarding re-
sponsible Arctic resource development, the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollu-
tion Preparedness and Response in the Arctic is emphasized. So is the Council’s work on
oil-pollution prevention, which is critical to ensure the protection of the Arctic marine envi-
ronment, and will continue under Canada’s chairmanship (Development for the People of the
North, 2013). Secondly, with increased opportunities for Arctic tourism, the Arctic Council will
establish guidelines for sustainable tourism and cruise-ship operations, and thus encourage the
benefits tourism brings to communities while reducing risks associated with increased activity.
The Arctic states will also continue to work together to encourage the International Maritime
Organization’s efforts to develop a mandatory Polar Code for the Arctic Ocean (Development
for the People of the North, 2013). Under the third highlight, sustainable circumpolar commu-
nities, the importance of traditional ways of life for northern communities is underlined. The
Arctic Council is working to increase regional and global awareness of these, and to incorporate
traditional and local knowledge into its work (Development for the People of the North, 2013).
Lastly, the Canadian government stresses the need to strengthen the Arctic Council and enable
it to respond to the challenges and opportunities emerging in the Arctic region as it evolves.
Canada intends to work collaboratively with Arctic partners to realize this objective, with the
aim of enhancing the capacity of the permanent participant organizations, improve the Council’s
coordination and maximize its effectiveness (Development for the People of the North, 2013).
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6.2.2 Motives behind Canadian policy initiatives in the Arctic Council
“Canada has a clear vision for the Arctic, in which self-reliant individuals live in
healthy, vital communities, manage their own affairs and shape their own destinies”
(Development for the People of the North, 2013).
Looking at the three highlighted areas in the Canadian Arctic Council program for 2013-2015,
it is possible to identify different motives behind these policy initiatives. Responsible Arctic
resource development is mainly a cooperative priority area, although building a sustainable and
economically vibrant future for the region is clearly in the domestic interest of Canada as well.
The first initiative, establishing a circumpolar business forum, is a collaborative initiative aim-
ing to foster circumpolar economic development and provide opportunities for businesses to
engage with the Arctic Council (Development for the People of the North, 2013). This goal has
been accomplished with the agreement between Senior Arctic Officials on the establishment
of the Arctic Economic Council, which was announced on March 26th 2014 (Arctic Council,
2014a). However, Dr. Heather Exner-Pirot, editor of the Arctic Yearbook, argues that the Arctic
Council is not necessarily the right place to deal with economic development, which is more of
a national issue that varies greatly within the Arctic, and that Canada has not been successful in
linking different priorities and realities (Quinn, 2014; Extner-Pirot, 2014). This underscores a
recurring theme, namely the distinctness of the Arctic states and great variations in challenges,
opportunities and needs among northerners. Secondly, the Agreement on Cooperation on Ma-
rine Oil Pollution and Preparedness Response in the Arctic signed in May 2013 is considered
critical to ensure the protection of the Arctic marine environment, and is also clearly in the
interest of the international community as a whole.
Arctic resource development is an interesting policy area because of its complexity, and
is highlighted by Rob Huebert as an example of a challenging issue Canada might not be able to
solve through the Arctic Council. In a policy brief for the Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs
Institute, Huebert illustrates how balancing supporting economic development for northerners
while protecting the Arctic’s fragile environment is one of the greatest challenges facing Canada
and the Arctic Council at the moment (Huebert, 2014b, 1). Huebert argues that the question of
oil development or not is poised to become the most divisive issue facing the Arctic states,
and how well Canada navigates the Arctic Council through it will determine the success of the
Canadian chairmanship (Huebert, 2014b, 1). The development of oil and gas resources in the
Arctic is one of the region’s most significant economic activities, but seeing that environmental
protection is one of the Arctic Council’s primary roles, this is not compatible with the Council’s
mandate (Huebert, 2014b, 5). Huebert argues it seems unlikely that the Council will be able
or willing to deal with this issue on a consensus basis, and instead, the individual Arctic states
will most likely want to guard their unilateral sovereign rights to develop these resources within
their national territory, regardless of the Council’s approach to the matter (Huebert, 2014b, 5-8).
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The second highlighted area, safe Arctic shipping, is also a cooperative priority with
national implications for Canada. Guidelines for sustainable tourism, cruise-ship operations,
and a mandatory Polar Code for the Arctic Ocean is necessary for and will benefit the entire
international community, especially the circumpolar states. At the same time, such efforts are
highly significant for Canada, seeing as it has the world’s second largest coastline. The third
highlighted area – sustainable circumpolar communities – is more exclusively based on national
interests and needs, but while it is an important domestic priority for the Government of Canada,
it is also a challenge facing the other Arctic states (House of Commons Canada, 2013, 8-9).
There are several subareas to this priority, firstly the importance of traditional ways of life for
northern communities. The emphasis of the Council’s work to increase regional and global
awareness around this issue is very much in Canada’s national interest. It is critical for the
Government of Canada to make southerners, both within Canada and worldwide, understand
the significance of seal hunting for the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, in particular the Inuit.
Because settlements in Canada’s north are so remote and inaccessible, hunting is essential for
the survival and livelihood of the people living there. However, this is a controversial issue, one
that has complicated for instance Canada’s relationship with the European Union2. Secondly,
the Arctic Council’s work to enhance scientific cooperation in the Arctic is emphasized. This is
a cooperative measure, intended to improve shared knowledge of the region and advance joint
efforts to promote good governance in the Arctic (Development for the People of the North,
2013). However, it is also in Canada’s domestic interest, seeing that the conduct of research
and studies in the Arctic’s challenging environment is very costly and time consuming for one
state to undertake alone. Scientific cooperation is thus something Canada pursues bilaterally
or multilaterally for the joint benefit of all participants as well as the international community.
For instance, Canada and the United Kingdom has signed a Memorandum of Understanding
for cooperation in polar research (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 35), which also is an
example of Canada’s work with non-Arctic states on Arctic issues. The third subarea is the
development of recommendations for incorporating traditional and local knowledge into the
Arctic Council’s work, which is in line with Canada’s domestic priorities. There have been
several developments in the direction of self-government for the territories since the 1970s
(Coates & Poelzer, 2014), and the federal government recognizes the importance of working
together with territorial governments on Arctic issues. Fourthly, the program addresses climate
changes and pollutants, and efforts made to target these issues are in the interest of the entire
international community. So is the aim to pursue cooperation among Arctic states and non-
Arctic states to support the conservation of migratory birds. Lastly, the Canadian program
states: “by promoting mental wellness, the Council will increase the ability of Arctic residents
to thrive and adapt to the many changes affecting the region” (Development for the People of
2For an in depth account of the European Union’s ban on seal trade products and Canada’s attempts to influence
the outcome of the EU proposition, see Wegge, Njord (2013): Politics between science, law and sentiments:
explaining the European Union’s ban on seal trade products.” Environmental Politics 22 (2): 255-273.
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the North, 2013). The transition from hunting-and-gathering lifestyles to ones more connected
to southern economies has not been easy for Canada’s northerners (Huebert, 2014b), so this is
a pressing domestic issue, considering suicide rates in Canada’s High North are very high3.
To summarize, although the Arctic Council chairmanship allows for the accommoda-
tion of domestic and/or foreign policy issues together with issues relevant for the whole Arctic
community, there is at the same time the challenge of different perceptions or interpretations
among the stakeholders. For instance, the Arctic Council’s mandate rests on two main pillars:
sustainable development and environmental protection. Canada has in particular pushed for the
inclusion of sustainable development - economic and social development, improved health con-
ditions and cultural well-being - but has interpreted this differently from some of the other Arc-
tic states, who focus more on the resource aspect of Arctic development (Extner-Pirot, 2014).
Thus, when Canada sat the theme for its chairmanship many actually saw this as breaking with
the Arctic Council’s agenda, and Canada has been criticized for the pursuit of domestic interests
(Extner-Pirot, 2014; Menzies, 2014). There are concerns that Canada sees the chairmanship as
a means to further its own Northern Strategy, and the focus on the “local” - especially Canadian
indigenous peoples - versus the global aspect of the Arctic is seen as problematic by external
actors (Quinn, 2014; Extner-Pirot, 2014). Northern communities in Canada differ greatly from
those in other Arctic states. Scandinavian countries in particular have more infrastructure, less
indigenous demographics and access to resources that are not available in the Canadian north
(Quinn, 2014). This is a valid point, and undoubtedly, the Scandinavian Arctic is much more
developed than the Canadian territories, which means they face more advanced challenges and
have different needs to further evolve than northerners in Canada.
6.2.3 Comparison of the Arctic Council program and Canada’s Northern Strategy
To further examine how Canada pursues its national interests and policy through the Arctic
Council chairmanship, I have compared the program with Canada’s Northern Strategy and
found striking similarities between the two documents. This gives prominence to the critique
that Canada is using the chairmanship to further its Northern Strategy. For instance, the quote:
“Canada has a clear vision for the Arctic, in which self-reliant individuals live in healthy, vital
communities, manage their own affairs and shape their own destinies” is also found in Canada’s
Northern Strategy (2009, 1) when presenting Canada’s vision for the north. The Canadian gov-
ernment intends to achieve this vision through the strategy based on four priorities: exercising
Arctic sovereignty, promoting social and economic development, protecting the environmental
heritage and improving and devolving northern governance (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009,
3In 2013, deaths by suicide in Canada was 10.2 per 100,000 population, which equaled 1.56% of the total deaths
that year (Statistics Canada, 2013a). The rate in the Northwest Territories was 13.4 per 100,000 population,
and deaths by suicide (18) constituted 3.8% of the total (476) deaths in the NWT in 2013 (Statistics Canada,
2013a). In the Yukon, the rate was 8.9 per 100,000 population and equaled 1.9% of total deaths (10 of 531)
(Statistics Canada, 2013c). In Nunavut, the rate was as much as 52.2 per 100,000 population, which equals
about 0.15% of the total population in 2013 and 15.1% of total deaths that year (Statistics Canada, 2013b).
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1-2). The fact that Arctic sovereignty is not mentioned anywhere in the Arctic Council program
demonstrates the noted limitation of using the chairmanship for egocentric purposes. Canada
would not be able to promote such nationalist objectives internationally through the Council.
This also illustrates the shortcomings of the realist perspective on international regimes, which
sees them as only mirroring the most powerful member state’s priorities and interests. In this
case, the neoliberal institutionalist perspective is much more accurate, seeing international or-
ganizations as expressing common objectives for the mutual benefit of all participants.
The last three priority areas on the other hand are clearly recognizable in the Canadian
Arctic Council program for 2013-2015, hence supporting the argument that Canada pursues
national interests through the chairmanship. Although, it can be argued that it is possible to
continue the priorities from Canada’s Northern Strategy in the Arctic Council because they are
in the common interest of the other Arctic states. Looking at the second Canadian priority –
promoting social and economic development – this corresponds well with the Arctic Council
program highlight of responsible Arctic resource development. The third and fourth priorities in
Canada’s Northern Strategy – protecting our environmental heritage and promoting and devolv-
ing northern governance – are compatible with the last highlighted area of the Arctic Council
program: sustainable circumpolar communities. Regarding promoting and devolving northern
governance, Canada’s Arctic Council program focuses on the importance of traditional ways
of life, the incorporation of traditional and local knowledge into the Council’s work and pro-
motion of mental wellness for Arctic residents, while Canada’s Northern Strategy emphasizes
devolution, land claims and self-government agreements for the northern territories (Canada’s
Northern Strategy, 2009, 28-31). Thus, while the latter focuses more on the specific governance
situation in Canada’s northern territories and the Arctic Council program highlights traditional
ways of life and traditional and local knowledge, the basic idea is still the same: improving the
lives of northerners and making their voice heard both in Canada and internationally.
6.3 Canadian influence on the Arctic agenda through the Arctic Council
Based on the above account of the Canadian chairmanship program, I will elaborate on Canada’s
influence on the international Arctic agenda through the Arctic Council. Specifically, I will dis-
cuss the question posed initially: to what extent is Canada successful in advancing its Arctic
foreign policy and promote its Arctic interests internationally through the Arctic Council? With-
out question, the Arctic Council is considered vital for the advancement of Canadian domestic
interests on the international arena, to promote circumpolar cooperation and facilitate collabo-
ration on Arctic issues. The Government of Canada also intends to invest in and strengthen the
Arctic Council for the future, which is considered necessary to ensure it is equipped to address
challenges arising in the region. To this end, Canada will lead efforts to develop a more strategic
communications role for the Council and address its structural needs (Canada’s Arctic Foreign
Policy, 2010, 24-25). The latter objective was partly accomplished by the establishment of the
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permanent secretariat, but as mentioned, the Council still struggles with organizational issues,
such as the increased workload undertaken by the working groups and matters related to the
permanent participants and observers (House of Commons Canada, 2013, 7).
Firstly, Canada has been very active in the establishment of the Arctic Council, as well
as its development from a transnational forum towards an international organization, and has
always been pushing for closer cooperation and integration between the Arctic states. Canada’s
engagement and leadership role in the Council’s six working groups is an illustration of this.
According to the Arctic Council’s website, “Canada is taking a leadership role or contributing
in a significant way to much of the work underway in the Working Groups and Task Forces of
the Arctic Council” (Arctic Council, 2011b). This is in accordance with the Canadian foreign
policy ambition to assume international leadership in shaping the stewardship, sustainable de-
velopment and environmental protection in the Arctic region (Achievements Under Canada’s
Northern Strategy, 2011, 13). Participation gives a state at least a say in decision making, and
undoubtedly, Canada has demonstrated more than the will to just participate. The dedicated en-
gagement and responsibility assumed by Canada is a way of shaping the direction of the Arctic
Council and the broader international Arctic policy agenda. In addition, the active involvement
in the production of working group assessments is a way of influencing policy recommenda-
tions directed towards other states and actors. At the same time, this is not unconditionally, and
there are challenges facing states when engaging in multilateral cooperation through interna-
tional regimes. Even though Canada’s engagement in the Arctic Council entails the opportunity
to influence circumpolar politics, the national interests of other member states still matter to
a large extent. This reality is illustrated by the recent issue of Arctic resource development
conflicting with the Arctic Council’s mandate and primary focus on environmental protection.
Secondly, agenda setting is power. The foremost example of this is how Canada has been
central, and successful, in pushing for the human dimension in circumpolar cooperation. This
can be seen from the insistence on the involvement of indigenous peoples at the establishment
of the AEPS through the theme for the 2013-2015 Arctic Council chairmanship. Encourag-
ing greater understanding of the human dimension of the Arctic is one of the focus areas for
Canada’s international efforts as it advances the four pillars of the Northern Strategy (Canada’s
Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 4). The Government of Canada recognizes the important role
northern governments and indigenous peoples organizations at the Arctic Council have played
and will continue to play in shaping Canada’s international actions (Canada’s Arctic Foreign
Policy, 2010, 22). Thus, this is an essential topic for the Canadian government, both domesti-
cally and to promote on the Arctic agenda. The permanent participants of the Arctic Council are
already well integrated in the Arctic Council’s work in terms of partaking in negotiations and
decisions (Arctic Council, 2011e). In the future, Canada aims to enhance the capacity of the per-
manent participants organizations as a means of strengthening the Council, a commitment that
is consistent with the Government’s obligation to renewing and rebuilding its relationship with
the Aboriginal peoples of Canada (Development for the People of the North, 2013; Achieve-
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ments Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011). Moreover, Canada encourages the other Arctic
states to support the participation of their permanent participants organizations, and will work
to ensure the central role of these organizations is not diminished as interest by non-Arctic ac-
tors in the work of the Council grows (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 22). Lastly, the
human dimension has been a recurrent theme in Arctic events, such as the 2012 IPY conference
From Knowledge to Action in Montréal, which emphasized this topic in polar research for the
first time (Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, 2013), and illustrates the possibility to influence
the broader circumpolar agenda through the Arctic Council.
In conclusion, although the Canadian chairmanship has been somewhat problematic both
internally and externally (Extner-Pirot, 2014), I will argue Canada has been fairly successful in
promoting its national interests through the Arctic Council. This can be seen as a result of two
strategies. Firstly, Canada’s genuine engagement in the establishment of and active participa-
tion in the Arctic Council, especially by assuming leadership through the working groups, is a
way of influencing the policy direction of the Council and the Arctic policy agenda in general.
The second strategy is agenda setting, and the emphasis on domestically important themes and
issues of national interest through the Arctic Council and the current chairmanship. Through
promotion of, and transnational cooperation on, matters of common interest for the circumpolar
states, particularly the involvement of indigenous peoples in Arctic issues, Canada contributes
to steering the international Arctic policy agenda in a direction that accommodates its domestic
priorities. At the same time, challenges related to resource exploration and oil development in
the Arctic points towards an important aspect of the Arctic Council as an international organi-
zation, and limitations in terms of steering its policy direction. Underlining realist assumptions
about international relations, this issue shows that despite the cooperative spirit among Arctic
actors, individual state interests and motivations ultimately matter. Not all issues can be solved
by consensus through the multinational arena the Arctic Council offers, in particular when large
economic gains are at stake. Comparing the Canadian success of including indigenous peoples
in circumpolar cooperation with the challenges facing Canada and the Arctic Council regard-
ing oil development, the difference of “soft” and “hard” politics becomes evident, despite the
Council’s accomplishments and developments in the direction of binding political agreements.
6.4 The Arctic Council’s significance for Canadian Arctic policymaking
Considering the Arctic Council’s development and increasingly binding political outcomes, one
can hardly analyze Arctic policymaking without taking it into consideration. There is little
doubt that the Government of Canada holds the Council in high regard, and the importance and
supremacy attributed to it in policy statements and strategies indicates its significance for Cana-
dian Arctic policymaking. The influence of the Arctic Council can be established by looking
at Canadian policy initiatives resulting from the Council’s general political direction, recom-
mendations and decisions. For instance, the Arctic Council’s mandate and Canada’s priorities
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in High North converge around several issues, such as environmental protection, sustainable re-
source development, social and economic development and the well-being of northerners. This
illustrates the close connection between Canada’s Arctic policy and the Arctic Council.
However, this interdependence can be interpreted differently according to the two per-
spectives constituting the theoretical framework of this thesis. From a realist account, the Arctic
Council’s policy and actions are exclusively a result of member states’ agendas and goals, and
the Council has no ’will of its own’ or ability to influence the political agenda or state poli-
cies. Neoliberal institutionalism on the other hand, asserts that by acting as an arena bringing
together members of governments, the Arctic Council can influence the international political
agenda and shape state politics. In reality, both perspectives are relevant when evaluating the
Arctic Council’s position in world politics, but based on the above account of its development,
I will argue it has evolved from fitting the realist outlook on international organizations towards
fulfilling more of neoliberal institutionalism’s assumptions. The Arctic Council, by bringing
together Arctic senior officials as well as other interested parties, does have an influence on
the international political agenda and state policies. By functioning as an arena for states to
pursue their Arctic foreign policies, the Council will certainly be an expression of the member
states’ ambitions and goals. However, it is at the same time a forum serving the circumpolar
community as a whole, which means egocentric actions will be limited, and one can assume the
Council acts more or less on behalf of the common interests of the member states combined.
Consequently, the Arctic Council influences Canada’s Arctic policy in two ways. Firstly,
is is a forum for Canada to express and pursue its national interests and policy objectives in the
circumpolar north, and this is the “beneficial side” of membership. An illustration of the func-
tioning as an arena to act out Arctic foreign policy ambitions is how Canada operates through
the Council to pursue leadership and cooperative stewardship. Nevertheless, it must be stressed
that the success of this process depends on compliance with other states’ goals, and whether
the other members consider Canada’s policy direction to be worth pursuing and endorse its
initiatives. Secondly, the Arctic Council influences Canada’s Arctic policy by limiting unilat-
eral actions and merging Canada’s political objectives with those of the other Arctic states to
achieve consensus in the decision-making process. This aspect can be considered “the price to
pay” for participation, as there is no guarantee the member states will get their national interests
advanced in the Council’s policy outcomes. Accordingly, the Government of Canada will have
to decide how to best balance its bilateral, regional and global efforts in the region, and Canada
does pursue certain issues outside the Arctic Council. Matters such as Arctic military security
is emphasized through bilateral relations with the United States, seeing that these two states
share common defense and security requirements in the region, and issues related to the Arctic
Ocean are addressed among the Arctic Five without the involvement of outside parties. This
shows that despite Canada’s high regard of the Arctic Council, if it is considered to limit the
fulfillment of national interests in areas of great importance for the Government, Canada will
resort to other forums to ensure domestic concerns are safeguarded in the best way possible.
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Chapter 7
GOVERNANCE IN CANADA’S NORTHERN
TERRITORIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
Through the discussion and analysis of the Canadian Arctic Council chairmanship, it became
evident that the Government of Canada attributes great significance to cooperation with and
development for the Aboriginal peoples and northerners living in Canada’s territories. This
chapter will pursue this topic by examining some of Canada’s domestic challenges and oppor-
tunities in its High North. I will commence by presenting the general political situation and
population composition in Canada’s northern territories, followed by the history of territorial
governance, indigenous rights and land claims. Thereafter, I will account for the devolution
process of increased self-government for the territories, emphasizing accomplishments in terms
of regional resource control, the modernization of the Northern Regulatory Regime, job creation
and financing, as well as remaining challenges, including the completion of the devolution pro-
cess as part of Canadian nation building, infrastructure, and social and economic development.
Afterwards, I will conduct an analysis of northerners in Canadian governmental documents, and
lastly, summarize how indigenous peoples’ issues are raised on the international agenda.
7.1 Canada’s northern territories and Aboriginal peoples
About 500,000 of the Arctic’s 4 million inhabitants are indigenous peoples, with the high-
est proportions found in Greenland (88.1%), the Canadian north (50.8%) and Alaska (15.6%)
(House of Commons Canada, 2013, 2). The Canadian constitution recognizes three groups of
Aboriginal peoples: First Nations (Indians), Métis and Inuit (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development Canada, 2013a), and these minorities makes Canada a multinational state consist-
ing of three distinct groups: the English, French and Aboriginal peoples (Kymlicka, 1995, 12).
Canada is a federal state, which means power is divided between the national government, the
provinces and the territories. However, as mentioned initially, an important aspect about gover-
nance in Canada is the fact that the northern territories are part of the federal realm and exercise
delegated powers under the authority of the Parliament of Canada (Privy Council Office, 2010).
This has broad implications for nation building, the way of life in the Canadian north, and for
resource development and revenues derived from natural resources (Poelzer, 2014).
Firstly, nation building in Canada is largely an incomplete process, and most Canadians
have a distant relationship with the country’s High North (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 6). Be-
cause national interest in the north has changed based on external sovereignty threats or the
prospect for resource development, there has never been a long-term strategy for northern de-
velopment and political incorporation of the region (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 6). Consequently,
the Canadian north is severely underdeveloped compared to the southern provinces in terms of
road systems, community infrastructure, technology, health care, housing quality and educa-
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tion facilities, and these inequalities are a source of irritation and political unease for Canada’s
northerners (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 29). These gaps in conditions impedes the process of
nation building in Canada by contributing to alienation between the provinces and territories.
Secondly, in terms of well-being and quality of life, the Community Well Being (CWB)
index, developed by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada to measure the quality of life for
First Nations and Inuit communities relative to other communities and over time, reveals a
significant gap between indigenous communities and non-Aboriginal communities in Canada.
The index uses Statistics Canada’s Census of Population data to produce “well-being scores”
for individual Canadian communities based on four indicators: income, education, housing and
labor force activity, and range from 0 to 100 (O’Sullivan, 2011). One of the main findings of the
review of the CWB index in First Nations, Inuit and non-Aboriginal communities between 1981
and 2006 are that CWB scores for First Nation and Inuit communities were respectively 20 and
15 points lower than non-Aboriginal communities on average (O’Sullivan, 2011; Penney et al.,
2012). Among the “bottom 100” Canadian communities, 96 were First Nations, and only one
First Nations community ranked among the “top 100” in 2006 (O’Sullivan, 2011). Likewise,
34 of the “bottom 500” communities were Inuit, and no Inuit communities ranked among the
“top 500” (Penney et al., 2012). CWB scores improved for both First Nation, Inuit and non-
Aboriginal communities between 1981 and 2006, but while the gap between First Nation/ Inuit
and non-Aboriginal communities decreased slightly in the earlier part of this period, it widened
again between 2001 and 2006 (O’Sullivan, 2011; Penney et al., 2012).
What can be read from this data and review of developments since the 1980s is that
while the well-being scores in First Nation and Inuit communities has generally improved, it is
alarmingly that the gap has recently widened between these and non-Aboriginal communities.
This indicates that the former are not benefiting from general advancements and improvements
in quality of life in Canada. It is also noteworthy that differences in scores are greater among
Aboriginal communities than non-Aboriginal communities (O’Sullivan, 2011), which illustrates
the multiple and diverge challenges facing the various indigenous communities in Canada, and
the necessity for community-specific measures to meet their local needs. Related, it is worth
noting the challenges facing the Aboriginal peoples of Canada compared to other indigenous
peoples across the circumpolar north. Canada’s northern region and the living conditions for its
inhabitants are incomparable to other Arctic states, in particular the Scandinavian countries. In
fact, Canada’s north is more often compared with Russian Siberia than the equivalent territories
in the Nordic countries (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 29). There are enormous differences in terms
of infrastructure, technological development, job opportunities, education, housing, health care
and so on. To mention one example, there is no university in Canada’s Arctic, only one college
in each territory, while all the other circumpolar states have universities in their Arctic regions.
Thirdly, the fact that the territories are not sovereign units, but exercise delegated power
under the federal government, has vast impact on natural resource development and manage-
ment. Natural resources in the territories have been under federal control, thus belonging to the
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whole of Canada. In contrast, the provinces are in charge of their own resource development,
giving the federal government little power over the distribution of the revenues derived from
these (Poelzer, 2014). The devolution accords transferring authority to the territories are still
limited in terms of resource development and revenues, and does not relate to offshore land.
Seeing as the revenues are capped for the territories, they are left with a smaller share than the
funds available to the provinces, with the federal government of Canada remaining an active
player in the north (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 32).
7.2 The history of territorial governance in Canada
Before presenting and discussing the devolution process, I will provide a brief overview of the
history of Canadian territorial governance. The Northwest Territories (NWT) was established in
1870, and the Yukon was created in 1898 by removing land from the NWT in order for the fed-
eral government to secure the revenues from the Klondike Gold Rush (Coates & Poelzer, 2014,
6). The Canadian government continued to break up the Northwest Territories, which was down
to a third of its original land mass by 1905 (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 6). Indigenous peoples and
their territories have thus been subordinated to and governed within the Canadian political sys-
tem without their consent, a process described by James Tully as “internal colonization” (Tully,
2000, 37-38). The essence of internal colonization is the appropriation of land, resources and
jurisdiction, not for the sake of resettlement and exploitation, but for the territorial foundation
of the dominant society (Tully, 2000, 39), in this case the Canadian state. The treatment of
indigenous peoples in Canada is undeniably a dark chapter in the country’s history, which the
Government is working to redress. Tully elaborates on the long-term effects of internal colo-
nization, which reduced formerly economically self-sufficient and interdependent societies to
small and overcrowded reserves, led to welfare dependency, high levels of unemployment, poor
health, low life expectance, high levels of infant mortality and so on (Tully, 2000, 39).
After the Second World War and increased American presence across the High North, the
Canadian government’s attention was directed towards the north in order to assert sovereignty
and attempt to equalize social and economic opportunities in the region (Coates & Poelzer,
2014, 8). In the mid-1960s, demands for local autonomy in the north increased, and a series
of court cases in the 1970s drew attention to the sustained political and legal bias against Abo-
riginal peoples (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 9-10). The Supreme Court later defined the rights of
Aboriginal peoples in section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982 (Tully, 2000, 45). Land claims
negotiations followed the political and legal mobilization among the Aboriginal population,
and in 1973 the liberal government, under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, accepted the Yukon’s
submission, which was soon followed by claims from the Northwest Territories. In 1979, both
Yukon and the Northwest Territories gained responsible government (Coates & Poelzer, 2014,
10-12). During the 1980s, tensions were building related to rising Inuit political aspirations and
the evolution of land claims. Following the 1982 plebiscite, the Northwest Territories agreed
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to division, which resulted in the formal establishment of Nunavut in 1999 with a jurisdiction
of 85% Inuit (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 12). The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement provided
the Inuit of the Eastern Arctic with 350 000 km² in the largest Aboriginal land claim settle-
ment in Canadian history (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 30). The signing of agreements
and modern treaties in the 1980s brought about major changes in the north, such as the infu-
sion of capital, removal of the Indian Act as a governing document over indigenous peoples in
much of the north, royalties from future resource developments, new government structures and
enhanced financial opportunities and responsibilities (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 13).
7.3 The devolution process in Canada’s northern territories
Devolution is defined as the transfer of governmental power, authority and resources from
the federal government to sub-national governments, which has been an ongoing process in
Canada’s territorial north from the 1970s until today1 (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 2). Through this
process, territorial governments are gaining greater authority over development, economic plan-
ning and community improvement strategies. However, the federal government also continues
to pursue an active agenda, focusing on sovereignty, resource development and its relationship
with Aboriginal peoples (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 2). Today, Yukon is the most advanced terri-
tory both in terms of self-government and connection to the south, followed by the Northwest
Territories and lastly, Nunavut; the most challenged region in almost every regard (Grosu &
Higginbotham, 2014). I will now account for achievements through this process, followed by
remaining challenges for the federal and the territorial governments in Canada’s north.
7.3.1 Accomplishments through the devolution process
Since the devolution process begun, northerners are undoubtedly more in command of their
affairs. Among the many elements in the overlapping processes of Aboriginal self-government
and devolution, Coates and Poelzer emphasize the engagement of indigenous peoples in gov-
ernance of natural resources as the potentially most significant (Coates & Poelzer, 2014). In
2003, Yukon became the first territory to take over land and resource management responsibili-
ties, in 2008, the Governments of Canada and Nunavut signed a protocol for future negotiations
towards a devolution agreement, and in 2011, an agreement-in-principle for the transfer of land
and resource management responsibilities to the Northwest Territories was signed (Achieve-
ments Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011, 10). The later project has been running from
2011, and in April 2014, the Northwest Territories Land and Resource Devolution Agreement
was successfully implemented (Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, 2014e). The Northwest
Territories is the most promising economic region in Canada’s Arctic in terms of public and
1This process is presented in detail in the article “An Unfinished Nation. Completing the Devolution Revolution
in Canada’s North” from 2014 by Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer.
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private potential, scale of resources, variety of transportation routes, well functioning govern-
ments and close cooperation with neighbors (Grosu & Higginbotham, 2014, 3). Approximately
one third of the NWT’s GDP is generated by mining, oil and gas, and the territory is the world’s
third largest diamond producer by value (Grosu & Higginbotham, 2014, 5). These numbers un-
derline the economical significance of regional control over natural resources for the territories.
However, as mentioned above, the devolution accords are limited in terms of revenues derived
from natural resources, so despite advancements, the territories are left with a smaller share
than the funds available to the provinces (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 32).
The modernization of the legislative foundation governing the territories – the North-
ern Regulatory Regime – is another essential development in the devolution process. Building
on the Government of Canada’s efforts to create a strong and prosperous north, and as a key
step in implementing the Northern Strategy, an Action Plan to Improve Northern Regulatory
Regimes was launched in 2010 (Achievements Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011). The
Action Plan focuses on job creation, growth and long-term prosperity by making the northern
regulatory frameworks strong, effective, efficient and predictable (Office of the Prime Minister,
Canada, 2014e). On March 25th 2014, the Northwest Territories Devolution Act received Royal
Assent. This act involved amendments to three pieces of legislation: the Territorial Lands Act,
the Northwest Territories Waters Act and the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act, and
intended to spur economic development in the north by placing more decision making power in
the hands of northerners (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2014a). On
June 3rd 2014, Bill S-6 – the Yukon and Nunavut Regulatory Improvement Act – was intro-
duced in the Senate, completing the legislative component of the Action Plan. Bill S-6 includes
proposed amendments to the Yukon Environmental and Socio-economic Assessment Act and the
Nunavut Waters and Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal Act, and aims to foster economic opportu-
nities and growth while promoting environmental stewardship, which again will boost investor
confidence in the territories (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2014a).
Furthermore, for people in northern communities to benefit from the opportunities aris-
ing in the region, federal contributions to job creation and investments in skill training is es-
sential. In June 2013, the Northern Jobs and Growth Act received Royal Assent, a legislation
creating the Nunavut Project and Planning Assessment Act and the Northwest Territories Sur-
face Rights Board Act, and made amendments to the Yukon Surface Rights Board Act (Office of
the Prime Minister, Canada, 2014e). On August 12th 2014, the Governments of Canada and the
Northwest Territories announced the signing of the Canada Job Fund, including the creation of
the Canada Job Grant to help connect Canadians with available jobs (Government of Canada,
2014a). The grant will be delivered through the Canada-Northwest Territories Job Fund Agree-
ment, through which the federal government will transfer $ 1.1 million to the Northwest Terri-
tories, in addition to an annual transfer of $19 million in support of skill training (Government
of Canada, 2014a). In addition to job creation and skills training, it is important to ensure the
business environment and investment climate in the region is stable and attractive for outside
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actors. To facilitate this, the Canadian government has established the Northern Projects Man-
agement Office, a key element of CanNor that works with the industry, Aboriginal communities
and federal and territorial government partners (Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, 2014e).
Currently, the office is working with 50 industry clients to advance major resource exploration
or development projects across the north, which represents $26 million in capital investments
and over 12,000 operating jobs (Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, 2014e).
Advancements have also been made regarding finance and funding for the territories.
Before 1985, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development worked on a com-
plex and unreliable program-by-program funding model. The Territorial Formula Financing
system introduced in the mid-1980s was an improvement in this regard, providing the north
with more stable and substantial formula based funding (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 17). Through
this system, the Government of Canada provides an annual unconditional funding of $2.5 bil-
lion to the territories (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 19). Territorial funding is a crucial part
of the devolution process, and it is important to bring increased revenues to the territorial gov-
ernments to provide the region with the resources needed to manage their new duties (Coates
& Poelzer, 2014, 19). The political transformations have also had a significant impact on the
economic structures, processes and opportunities in Canadian territories (Coates & Poelzer,
2014, 24). Over the years, the Government of Canada has invested hundreds of millions of
dollars in regional economic development strategies through the Department of Aboriginal Af-
fairs and Northern Development. For instance, the Canadian Northern Economic Development
Agency (CanNor) has since its establishment in 2009 allocated almost $196 million to a range
of significant economic initiatives to help strengthen and diversify the northern economy, and to
create business and job opportunities northerners (Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, 2014e).
Another positive element in the territorial economic system is the Aboriginal Development Cor-
porations – Aboriginal controlled businesses – which has improved the financial wellbeing for
the lager indigenous political community and have become major players in the northern econ-
omy (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 27). However, although the economic situation in the territorial
north is reasonably strong and improving, with increased income and employment rates, there
are still large numbers of unemployed and poor northerners, especially in the Aboriginal popu-
lation and in the smaller, remote communities (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 25-26). Furthermore,
devolution is no substitute for federal planning and investments, seeing that sustainable Arctic
development is expensive, requires strategic and well-coordinated governance, partnerships and
significant investments (Grosu & Higginbotham, 2014, 5). Consequently, it is important that the
federal government continues its investments and funding through agencies such as CanNor.
7.3.2 Remaining challenges in Canada’s northern territories
Despite advancements and accomplishments, there are still significant challenges remaining
in Canada’s High North, and the devolution process, as part of Canadian nation building, is
far from complete (Poelzer, 2014). Professor Greg Poelzer (2014) highlights three areas of
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particular difficulty for the Government of Canada in terms of completing this process. First
and foremost, there are economic challenges associated with the enormous costs of developing
and modernizing the region, both in terms of infrastructure and technology. Secondly, Canada’s
political constituencies problematize territorial development. Naturally, politicians care about
the majority of the voters, and with 95% of Canada’s population living in the southern provinces,
the northern territories become politically marginalized. The territories have only three of the
total 308 members of parliament sitting in the House of Commons, which equals less than 1%.
Thirdly, according to professor Poelzer, a weakness of Canada’s Arctic foreign policy is that it
only focuses on the territories. By not consulting the provincial governments on northern issues,
the federal government creates distance and alienation between the Canadian High North and
the remaining Canadian population (Poelzer, 2014).
Yukon is by far the most advanced Canadian territory in terms of devolution and self-
government, and is highly integrated with Alaska and its southern provincial neighbor British
Columbia when it comes to transport and infrastructure compared to the other two territories
(Grosu & Higginbotham, 2014, 7). Yukon is not in control of its offshore zone, but consid-
ering its short Arctic Ocean boarder and low dependence on Arctic maritime transport, this is
not as important as for the other territories (Grosu & Higginbotham, 2014, 7). The Northwest
Territories Lands and Resource Devolution Agreement transferred responsibilities to the terri-
torial government related to onshore lands, but as with Yukon, the agreement does not extend
to offshore waters (Grosu & Higginbotham, 2014, 4). However, as a large part of the NWT’s
gas and oil reserves are situated in the Beaufort basin, offshore control becomes an increas-
ingly important concern for the NWT government (Grosu & Higginbotham, 2014, 7). The
Northwest Territories has the greatest potential of economic gains from resource exploitation,
but lack of transport and Arctic maritime infrastructure constrains resource development by
limiting access to markets and investments, and thus prevents the territorial government from
improving the lives of its population with these potential assets (Grosu & Higginbotham, 2014,
5-7). Lastly, Nunavut is the territory facing the greatest administrative and financial challenges,
which is further complicated by deeply entrenched socio-economic and cultural problems, and
dependence on the sea and lack of maritime transport infrastructure disables it from serving
community needs (Coates & Poelzer, 2014; Grosu & Higginbotham, 2014). Examples of the
challenges facing the least developed territory are incomplete administrative transitions and
staffing, capacity issues, federal and territorial government spending being the foundation for
the economy, shortage in terms of the availability of personnel and the Aboriginal govern-
ments being under-resourced and under-staffed to deal with their new responsibilities (Coates
& Poelzer, 2014, 19-23). Nunavut has a lot to gain in the long-term from the economic oppor-
tunities the melting polar ice will present. However, the region faces several challenges related
to the development and management of natural resources, and is far from prepared to address
the maritime challenges emerging in the Arctic (Grosu & Higginbotham, 2014, 6).
Overall, infrastructure stands out as one of the most crucial and comprehensive chal-
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lenges in the Canadian territories, and there is still a long way to go in terms of connecting the
region with southern Canada. Several of the northern communities have little or no modern
infrastructure, and depend on sea transport or even transportation along frozen rivers to access
other towns. For these communities to be able to evolve, prosper and integrate into Canada as
a whole, infrastructure development is essential. In addition, the Aboriginal’s traditional liveli-
hood based on hunting and fishing is threatened by the effects of climate change, and therefore,
better connection to southern cities is necessary for these people to have sufficient access to food
in the future. Nevertheless, there have been some improvements in the right direction, and the
Government is making significant and highly necessary investments towards improving infras-
tructure in the northern territories. Over the next decade, the Canadian government intends to
invest $70 billion in federal, provincial, territorial and community infrastructure (Canada, Gov-
ernor General, 2013, 9). For instance, the Building Canada Plan - the largest long-term federal
commitment to infrastructure in Canadian history - was launched through the 2013 Economic
Action Plan (Canada, Governor General, 2013, 9). One of the most significant investments is
the Inuvik to Tuktoyaktuk Highway, announced in 2011 and expected to be finished in 2018
at a total cost of $200 million. This 137 km highway will be the first year-round road linking
the Arctic coast and the rest of the country, it will complete Canada’s road network from coast
to coast, strengthen Canada’s Arctic presence, and contribute to economic and social develop-
ment in the north (Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, 2014e). Another example is the $130
million provided from 2014-2018 for the building of the Nanisivik Naval Facility, a deep water
docking and fueling facility that will serve as a staging area for government vessels operating
in the Arctic (Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, 2014e). However, federal investments have
not been exclusively successful, in large part due to northern economic liabilities and the un-
even distribution of pre-conditions for economic success (Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 27-28), and
infrastructure remains one of the major limitations to development in Canada’s High North.
Housing is another critical issue in Canada’s north, and consequently a priority in Canada’s
Economic Action Plan. Through the project “Affordable Housing in the North”, the Govern-
ment has invested $300 million between 2009-2015 (Office of the Prime Minister, Canada,
2014e). Yukon and the Northwest Territories each received $50 million, while the remaining
investment was allocated to Nunavut. This is where the need for social housing is greatest,
seeing how the territory continues to face unique challenges in providing affordable housing
due to its climate, geography and dispersed population (Office of the Prime Minister, Canada,
2014e). Another major housing project is the “Investment in Affordable Housing” from 2011-
2019, through which the federal government is investing $2 billion to reduce the number of
Canadians in housing need. The territories and provinces are responsible for adapting the pro-
gram’s design and delivery in order to meed their local need and priorities (Office of the Prime
Minister, Canada, 2014e). Poor health in Canada’s territories is also severe domestic problem,
and the Economic Action Plan 2014 committed $70 million over three years for a new fund to
increase health services in the territories in priority health areas, and to reduce the reliance on
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outside health care systems and medical travel (Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, 2014e).
Lastly, it is worth mentioning the security situation in Canada’s Arctic region. The
Government of Canada is still responsible for defense and formal international relations, and the
territorial north remains a crucial zone of engagement for the federal government in this regard
(Coates & Poelzer, 2014, 29). However, as emphasized in previous chapters, Canada is still
far behind the other circumpolar nations in terms of military investments, leaving the northern
territories almost without substantial defense facilities or capabilities (Coates & Poelzer, 2014,
30). A central area of focus and investment for the Canadian government has been and is the
Canadian Rangers, but several commentators argue that leaving Canada’s permanent presence
in the northern territories to the Rangers and reservists is not sufficient, and that PM Harper is
too slow to deliver on his promises to upgrade and strengthen Canada’s military capabilities.
7.4 Northerners in Canadian governmental documents
7.4.1 Northerners in Canada’s Northern Strategy (2009)
The Canadian government makes great effort to underline its commitment to protecting the
interests and status of northerners. Especially, when examining Canada’s Northern Strategy
and Achievements under Canada’s Northern Strategy, indigenous peoples hold a very central
role. “Canada as a northern nation” and “Canada’s north is first and foremost about people”
is strongly emphasized. The focus is on the growth of and collaboration with northern and
Aboriginal governments and institutions, and a key objective in the Government’s vision for
the north is “self-reliant individuals living in healthy, vital communities, managing their own
affairs and shape their own destinies” (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 1). The Government
emphasizes the importance of close cooperation with territorial and Aboriginal leaders, north-
erners and partners in the Arctic, to ensure the north achieves its full promise as a vibrant region
within a sovereign Canada (Achievements Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011).
Noteworthy under the pillar “exercising our Arctic sovereignty” is the acknowledgement
that Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and strong presence in the region today is founded in large
part on the historical occupation of Aboriginal peoples (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 9).
Aboriginal peoples, First Nations, Métis and Inuit have all made significant contribution to the
understanding and appreciation of a shared history, and continue to influence the Canadian way
of life in the north (Achievements Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011, 2). This recognition
is not a statement of historical curiosity, but rather of highly contemporary significance for the
Government. The basis for Canadian Arctic sovereignty rests on a combination of cession,
occupation and the will of the inhabitants of the Arctic islands to be governed under Canadian
institutions (4.1.1), therefore, for Canada to exercise this sovereignty, continuos habitation in the
northern region is necessary. Further, it is stated that northerners have an important role to play
in shaping regional priorities and actions, exemplified by the work of the indigenous peoples
groups granted permanent participant status in the Arctic Council (Canada’s Northern Strategy,
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2009, 13). Naturally, northerners are also central in the priority aiming to promote social and
economic development in Canada’s Arctic. When the Canadian government talks about social
and economic development, they really mean for northerners (Menzies, 2014). The immense
need for improvement of the living conditions for people in the Canadian territories has been
demonstrated, and their situation is incompatible to that of indigenous peoples in other Arctic
states. Thirdly, regarding environmental protection, northerners are attributed a significant role
in the work aiming to ensure the safeguarding of the Arctic’s fragile and unique ecosystems
(Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 24). This is also addressed through Canada’s Arctic Council
chairmanship program, acknowledging the importance of traditional and local knowledge in the
region, as well as through Canada’s International Polar Year research program.
Under the fourth priority, “improving and devolving northern governance”, land claims
and self-government agreements is attributed fundamental importance. As elaborated above,
northern governments have taken on greater responsibility for many aspects of their regional
affairs over the past decades, with the objective to transfer jurisdictional powers and respon-
sibilities to the territories, and to provide them with the necessary institutions and resources
to achieve greater self-sufficiency (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 28-30). In 2009, eleven
of the fourteen Yukon First Nations had signed self-government agreements, and a majority
of the Northwest Territories is covered by comprehensive land claim agreements giving Abo-
riginals the authority to manage their land and resources (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009,
30). The Government also expresses its commitment to renewing and rebuilding its relation-
ship with the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, and it is emphasized how the devolution of land
and resource management is an important part of building the future of the north (Achieve-
ments Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011, 9-10). This is an explicit recognition of the
historically unjust treatment of Canadian minorities by the Government. In August 2010, the
Government of Canada issued an apology to the Inuit families relocated in the High Arctic
in the 1950s, including recognition of their contribution to a strong Canadian presence in the
High Arctic (Achievements Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011, 9). Another significant
redress was the historic agreement signed in February 2011 with the Teslin Tlingit Council, a
self-governing First Nation in Yukon, allowing it to administer, enforce and adjudicate its laws
in its traditional way (Achievements Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011, 10).
7.4.2 The Harper Government’s Speech from the Throne, October 2013
In addition to Canada’s Northern Strategy, I have chosen to look at a more recent publication,
namely the Speech from the Throne - Seizing Canada’s moment: prosperity and opportunity
in an uncertain world - from October 16 2013. Here, the Government outlined its agenda for
the current period, focusing on the economy and job creation. Robert Murray, Vice-President
of Research at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy and Professor at the University of Alberta,
claims PM Stephen Harper returns to rhetoric and policy ideas from the early years of his
office, especially concerning Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, and is not prioritizing Canada or the
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Canadian Arctic (Murray, 2013). Nevertheless, several of the priorities addressed in the speech
concern Canada’s northerners, and are thus of interest for this analysis.
Creating jobs and securing economic growth is emphasized as the Canadian Govern-
ment’s top priority. Natural resources is considered fundamental for Canada’s economy, and
the Government promises to ensure the jobs and opportunities these bring are available to all
Canadians, in particular, Aboriginal peoples must have every opportunity to benefit (Canada,
Governor General, 2013, 4-8). Again, indigenous peoples are explicitly mentioned, and as
has been demonstrated, the well-being of and development for Canada’s Aboriginals is a re-
occurring theme in governmental documents. Economic development often go hand in hand
with environmental protection, also in the throne speech. The Government’s plan for respon-
sible resource development includes measures to protect against oil spills and other risks to
the environment and local communities (Canada, Governor General, 2013, 8), which is another
significant promise for Canada’s northerners.
Under the headline “Putting Canada First”, considerable attention is devoted to northern
sovereignty and interests. It is stated that Canada is a northern country with northern people, and
the Government is working to secure Canadian northern sovereignty, promoting prosperity for
northerners, protecting the Arctic environmental heritage and giving the people of the north a
greater say in their own affairs (Canada, Governor General, 2013, 18). These topics are identical
with the priorities in Canada’s Northern Strategy. Efforts made so far include the opening of
the Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Training Center, expanding the Canadian Rangers, creating
the Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency, mapping Canada’s Arctic seabed to
assert sovereignty, investing in health care, education and affordable housing for northerners,
concluding the Devolution Agreement with the Northwest Territories and negotiate one with
Nunavut (Canada, Governor General, 2013, 18). Additional promises include completing the
Dempster Highway to the Arctic Ocean, opening the Canadian High Arctic Research Station
and the first deep water Arctic port in Nanisivik, working with Inuit, First Nations, territorial
governments and the industry to ensure northerners are well trained to participate in the new
economy, and the Government will continue to defend seal hunt, an important source of food
and income for coastal and Inuit communities (Canada, Governor General, 2013, 19). However,
Murray interestingly questions how these initiatives will help secure Canada’s northern borders:
“The world has changed since 2008, and other states have made great strides in
living up to their Arctic claims, while Canada has been left behind. If Harper truly
wants to put Canada first, he owes it to the country to come up with new strategies
that reflect the realities of the contemporary Arctic and Canada’s limited capability
to protect its own interests” (Murray, 2013).
With this statement, Murray falls in line with Harper’s critics who argue he is moving too slow
and doing too little for Canada’s north and northerners.
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7.5 Indigenous peoples internationally
In addition to the domestic policy areas addressed above, northerners and Aboriginal peoples
should also undoubtedly play a central role in the framing and development of Canada’s Arctic
foreign policy, seeing as it concerns issues affecting them directly in several ways. Relevant
in this regard are the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) Canada, as well as the Government
of Canada’s work to raise indigenous peoples’ issues on the international agenda, which is
primarily done through the Arctic Council.
The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), established in 1977, is a body representing the
views and positions of approximately 160 000 Inuit from Greenland, Canada, Alaska and Russia
on an international level (Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, 2013). The ICC’s principal goals
are: strengthen unity among Inuit of the circumpolar region, promote Inuit rights and interests
on an international level, develop and encourage long-term policies safeguarding the Arctic
environment, and seek full and active partnership in political, economic and social development
in the circumpolar region (Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, 2013, 12). The international and
circumpolar interests of Canadian Inuit are expressed and represented through ICC Canada, a
non-profit organization led by a Board of Directors comprising the elected leaders of the four
land settlement regions: Inuvialuit Settlement Region, Nunavut, Nunavik and Nunatsiavut (Inuit
Circumpolar Council Canada, 2013). The ICC Canada’s activities consists of participation
through the Arctic Council, engagement in Arctic marine shipping, protection and facilitation of
the use of Arctic indigenous languages, government relations with officials responsible of Arctic
matters, involvement in United Nations meetings, engagement in Arctic resource development
and responses to climate change (Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, 2013).
The Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada’s Operational Plan for 2014-2015 outlines the
initiatives and objectives for this period, and focuses on organizational priorities, existing multi-
year programs, on-going projects and funding strategies for ICC Canada (Inuit Circumpolar
Council Canada, 2014). Highlighted policy areas are implementation of the Circumpolar Inuit
Declaration on Arctic resources, circumpolar health, food security, contaminants, research ini-
tiatives, biodiversity, sustainable utilization of resources, elders and youth and human rights
(Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, 2014). These policy areas are to a large extent in line
with the Government of Canada’s priorities for the Arctic region, but at the same time, the ICC
Canada’s operational plan clearly focuses on the human dimension to a much larger degree, and
address more specific issues regarding Inuit well-being than Canadian federal documents.
As mentioned, three of the six indigenous peoples organizations in the Arctic Council
have roots in Canada, and the Council and its working groups is seen by the ICC Canada as one
of the most important multilateral forums for its work (Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, 2013,
3). Canada has played a central role in promoting a human dimension to the Arctic Council,
and in acting on northerners’ wishes to extend the it’s mandate beyond a narrow scientific focus
(Lackenbauer, 2011a, 138). The previous chapter illustrated how the emphasis on the human
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dimension is continued through the current Arctic Council program, expressing Canada’s chair-
manship will put northerners first. The ICC’s operational plan highlights that the Arctic Council
will remain a central pillar of the ICC Canada’s work during the remaining term of Canada’s
chairmanship, and ICC Canada will continue its contribution to the Council’s Senior Arctic Of-
ficials meetings, the Arctic Council Advisory Committee and five of the working groups2 (Inuit
Circumpolar Council Canada, 2014). Of particular relevance is the Sustainable Development
Working Group (SDWG), due to its focus on the human dimension. ICC Canada participates
in the working group’s meetings as co-chair, has a representative on the SDWG Arctic Human
Health Expert Group and leads two special projects: the Arctic Indigenous Languages Initia-
tives and the Inuit Use of the Sea and Arctic Shipping (Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, 2014,
8-9). The ICC Canada also emphasizes the Canadian chairmanship priority of including local
and traditional knowledge into the work and working groups of the Arctic Council, and that this
is a means of strengthening the Council (Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, 2014, 9).
To summarize, by first sight the Canadian government seems committed to the inclusion
and well being of indigenous peoples and northerners in the circumpolar north. In Canada’s
Northern Strategy, indigenous peoples are mentioned as central in cooperation with other Arctic
states and through multinational forums. Indeed, the respected status and participation of in-
digenous peoples in the Arctic Council is the main indicator of their involvement in circumpolar
affairs. Also, an example of cross-boarder engagement is the Memorandum of Understanding
signed between the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada and the
Russian Ministry of Regional Development. This agreement is underlined in Canada’s North-
ern Strategy as an initiative intended to examine cooperative projects with indigenous peoples,
which also includes new trading relationships, transportation routes and environmental protec-
tion between Canada and Russia (Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2009, 34). Nevertheless, despite
such rhetoric and efforts, a gap remains between federal officials insisting on the engagement of
northern leaders on circumpolar affairs and northerners asserting they are not fully embraced as
active partners (Lackenbauer, 2011a, 141), and the question remains about how far they really
influence decision-making processes. One of the challenges in this regard is that under existing
international law, indigenous peoples are considered objects and not subjects, and thus special
care is needed to involve them actively in decision-making processes (Centre for Arctic Pol-
icy Studies, 2013). In addition, not enough attention is paid to who owns the resources to be
developed, and handling indigenous groups and their diversity may in fact be difficult within
modern, state oriented policies (Centre for Arctic Policy Studies, 2013). Therefore, as Coates
and Poelzer points out, there is still a lot to be done in terms of offering Aboriginals and north-
erners in the Canadian territories the same opportunities as the rest of the country, also regarding
political participation and representation.
2The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, the Emergency





The final chapter will return to the problem statement the thesis set out to answer - What are
the main priorities for Canada in its Arctic region, and how does Canada pursue its Arctic
policy on the domestic and international level? - as well as the research questions derived
from it. I will summarize and conclude based on the main findings in the analysis of Canada’s
Arctic policy, conducted primarily by document analysis, throughout the thesis. What stands
out as the most significant topics are the Canadian government’s emphasis on Arctic security
and military capabilities as well as indigenous peoples and northerners domestically, Canada’s
bilateral relationship with the United States (US), and its workings through the Arctic Council,
focusing on stewardship and circumpolar leadership. In the last section of this chapter, I will
address unsolved issues and potential research areas for further examination.
8.1 Analysis of the research questions
8.1.1 Motives for and driving forces behind Canada’s Arctic policymaking
The first research question - Is Canada driven primarily by sovereignty and security motives, or
by a genuine interest in cooperative stewardship? - concerns the motives for and driving forces
behind Canada’s Arctic policymaking and implementation, and aims to support the development
of an answer to the first part of the problem statement. It also relates to the theoretical framework
of the thesis: sovereignty and security concerns being in line with realism’s assumptions about
state motives, while neoliberal institutionalism would argue Canada’s actions are driven by the
ambition to accomplish mutually beneficial policy outcomes with the other Arctic states.
“Exercising sovereignty over Canada’s North is the number one Arctic foreign pol-
icy priority” (Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010).
Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and security are undoubtedly priority areas and matters of great
importance for the current government. The United States has in large part provided for Cana-
dian Arctic security in the past, and to some degree still is, but Canadians have never liked to
be reliant on the US. This has led to questions about Canadian sovereignty, and in fact, over
the past decades it is the US, through utilizing the Northwest Passage as an international strait,
who has posed the biggest threat to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. Consequently, the Canadian
government has been and is working to increase its own capabilities to protect its north. This
is expressed through investments, especially in the Canadian Forces and the Coast Guard, in
addition to Arctic sovereignty being at the center of governmental statements and strategies.
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On the other side, Canada is also devoted to cooperative stewardship and the pursuit
of shared interests and fulfillment of common goals with the other Arctic states. This is first
and foremost expressed through Canada’s sincere commitment to cooperation through the Arc-
tic Council, with the other Arctic Ocean coastal states and bilaterally with the United States
(Achievements Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011, 12). Realism has a hard time account-
ing for why a state would enter cooperative arrangements, unless it saw the opportunity for
relative gains at the expense of others. Thus, Canada’s work towards responsible resource man-
agement is more in line with the neoliberal institutionalist perspective, as it is difficult to se how
Canada can gain from such collaboration to the disadvantage of the other Arctic states.
Looking in depth at the Arctic stewardship pursued by Canada, actions can be identi-
fied on the national and international level. Firstly, several domestic efforts are being made by
the Canadian government to promote sustainable resource development and management in the
Arctic. “Protecting our environmental heritage” is one of the four priority areas in Canada’s
Northern Strategy, which is done in close cooperation with indigenous peoples and northern
communities. In Achievements under Canada’s Northern Strategy, several initiatives towards
this objective are listed, illustrating that Canada is actually making an effort to promote eco-
nomic development while protecting the environment. Examples are establishments and ex-
pansions of national parks and reserves, and programs to assess climate change vulnerabilities
and develop adaptation plans in northern communities (Achievements Under Canada’s North-
ern Strategy, 2011). Secondly, Canada is also making efforts on the international arena in terms
of cooperative stewardship. In particular, the Canadian government emphasizes, and is praised
for, its leadership role in the Arctic Council and its six working groups. Canada made a signifi-
cant contribution to the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, work that is informing ongo-
ing efforts to develop an international Code of Safety for polar ships operating in ice-covered
waters, and played a key role in the development of an assessment of mercury in the Arctic
(Achievements Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011, 13). Canada also aims at demonstrat-
ing leadership in Arctic science and technology, which plays an important role in supporting
the Government’s activities in the north, especially related to the mapping of the Arctic Ocean
floor and Canada’s submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(Achievements Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011, 14-16).
Regarding the first research question, I initially began with the distinction between
sovereignty and security concerns versus commitment to cooperative stewardship. This was
based on the theoretical framework the thesis builds on, as well as focus areas highlighted in
the existing literature on Canadian Arctic policymaking. As demonstrated in the introduction,
scholars are divided between those in the realist camp encouraging the strengthening of Cana-
dian Arctic security and assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the region, and those in the liberal
camp claiming these matters are safeguarded, and that the Government instead should focus on
cooperative stewardship and diplomatic relations. Examples of the later are the authors of the
book “Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North”, who praise the Harper government,
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although with some reservations, for making progress to improve Canada’s Arctic defense ca-
pabilities, and for responding to the threats and opportunities in the High North more serious
than its predecessors (Coates et al., 2008, 192). At the same time, they emphasize how the
Government has failed in integrating the north into the country as a whole, and how Canada
lacks the northern outlook of other polar nations (Coates et al., 2008, 191-197). While there
might still be some truth to this critique, I will argue the situation has changed since 2008.
Professor Greg Poelzer, one of the contributors to the above-mentioned book, pointed
out that by making Arctic issues part of the electoral platform in 2005-06, and by shifting fo-
cus north during his time in office, Prime Minister Stephen Harper has indeed contributed to
changes in the region. According to Poelzer (2014), it is therefore wrong to accuse Harper of
doing nothing in or for Canada’s north. Two of the most significant contributions towards im-
provement in the north made by the Harper government are the 2007 commitment to establish a
Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut and the devolu-
tion agreement signed with the Northwest Territories in 2013 (Poelzer, 2014). This agreement
entered into force June 25th 2013, and transferred significant government power, authority and
responsibilities to the Northwest Territories, including the responsibility for the development
and administration of natural resources (Government of Canada, 2013). Also worth mentioning
are housing projects aiming to improve the living conditions for Canada’s northerners, which is
a critical issue. As of 2006, housing was the component of the Community Well Being index
that showed the greatest differences between Inuit and non-Aboriginal communities, primarily
due to the poor housing quality in regions where the Inuit live (Penney et al., 2012).
Hence, throughout the research and work with my thesis, a different area than secu-
rity/sovereignty or cooperative stewardship stood out as a potential primary motive behind
Canada’s Arctic policymaking: the well being of and development for Canada’s northerners.
I find it remarkable that in terms of domestic interests and focus, the Harper government has
chosen to strongly emphasize northerners. This is for instance expressed in the Arctic Council
chairmanship program, focusing in large part on the human dimension of the Arctic. There is
little doubt that this political choice can be justified by domestic interests and needs, seeing
that Canada has a substantial demand for social, economic and infrastructure development in
its northern region. Canada’s territorial north covers 3,593,589 km² of land, which is about
twelve times the size of Norway, and towns are dispersed and inaccessible. Thus, northerners in
Canada live very isolated, both geographically and socially, from the rest of society compared
to northerners in other countries. For these communities to adapt and thrive in the changing
region, the Government acknowledges the importance of safeguarding traditional ways of life
and the value of incorporating local and traditional knowledge into broader circumpolar work.
However, despite these commitments, I will like to again emphasize a noteworthy link
between two seemingly different policy areas. The political focus on northerners and northern
development, while important in its own regard and probably based on a genuine engagement by
the Government, is also in fact related to sovereignty. Seeing that sovereignty consists of three
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elements - a defined territory, a governance system and a people within the defined territory
(Huebert, 2011, 14), and that Canada’s Arctic sovereignty rests on occupation and the will
of Arctic inhabitants to be governed under Canadian institutions (Côté & Dufresne, 2008), it
is essential for the Canadian government that the northern population continue to inhabit the
territory and accept the Government’s right to govern. In other words, since Canada’s assertion
and exercise of sovereignty in its High North depends on the presence of a people, it is in
the Government’s interest to facilitate settlements in the region. In this way, development for
northerners and of the Arctic region becomes linked to the broader national interest of Canadian
sovereignty. However, even though northern issues were raised on the political agenda from
the mid-2000s, there is a vast gap between the efforts made and the actual need in Canada’s
territorial north. There is an immense need for social and economic development, infrastructure
projects, improvements in Aboriginal physical and mental health, better educational services,
job opportunities and so on for the region to be equalized with southern Canada.
8.1.2 Canada’s actions to position itself in the High North
Regarding the second research question – How does Canada work to position itself in its High
North, both domestically and internationally, seen in light of the recent spark of interest in the
circumpolar region – a noteworthy feature about Canada’s Arctic policy was made apparent
to me through conversation with professor Greg Poelzer. He pointed out how Canada usually
sees itself as a “middle power” in international relations, and mostly considers multilateralism
to be the best way forward. However, Arctic issues and sovereignty stands out as an exception
from this approach, where Canada tends to prefer unilateral actions (Poelzer, 2014). This is a
paradox, seeing how Canada is in great need of cooperation with other states in order to address
and meet challenges and opportunities arising in its northern region. However, in addition to
unilateral actions, efforts can also be identified on the bilateral and multilateral levels.
When examining Canada’s unilateral actions, two main ways in which the Canadian
government works to position itself in the High North stand out. Firstly by attempting to
strengthen its military capabilities in the Arctic, and secondly by affirming the historical oc-
cupation of Canadian Aboriginal peoples in the region. When taking office in 2006, Prime
Minister Stephen Harper was resolute to make the Arctic a top priority. He emphasized the
primacy of security, defending Canadian sovereignty and ensuring Canadian credibility and in-
fluence on the international stage (Canada First Defence Strategy, 2008). To this end, the Harper
government made promises to upgrade Canadian capabilities in the High North, in particular,
to rebuild the Canadian Forces into a first-class, modern military (Canada First Defence Strat-
egy, 2008). This is realist “hard politics”, focusing on protection of national interests through
military means. In addition, the Canadian government is working on the unilateral level with
indigenous peoples and northerners to position itself in the High North. As elaborated above,
the process of social and economic development of the territories is connected to the broader
national objective of asserting and exercising Arctic sovereignty. The Government recognizes
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the Inuits’ contribution to a strong Canadian presence in the High Arctic, and cooperates with
territorial and Aboriginal leaders to ensure their traditional ways of life and interests in the north
are safeguarded, while at the same time taking advantage of their local knowledge to realize the
north’s full potential as a vibrant region within a strong and sovereign Canada (Achievements
Under Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2011, 2). The assertion of land claims through demon-
strating the historical occupation of a territory has the potential to become a race for resources
among the Arctic states. Thus, this activity conflicts with the interests of the other Arctic states,
and it is natural that Canada pursues this objective on the unilateral level.
Bilaterally, there is no doubt that the majority of initiatives are directed towards the
United States – Canada’s premier ally and partner in the Arctic. The United States is explicitly
mentioned several times in central governmental strategies and statements, and substantial ef-
forts are being made to establish solid bilateral relations with the US. Other states are addressed
mostly in terms of relations through the Arctic Council or collaboration among the Arctic Ocean
coastal states. On the one side, it is understandable that Canada wishes to establish and maintain
a strong relationship and cooperation with its closest neighbor, especially seen in light of the
historical dependence on the US for security. At the same time, it also seems to be a Canadian
priority to reduce its dependence on the United States and develop capabilities to safeguard its
own north, which is seen at the unilateral level. In addition to focusing on the US, it is interesting
that the Harper government does not devote more efforts towards a good working relationship
with Russia, seeing how Russia is an Arctic great power and has been much more active in the
region than the US for decades. As mentioned in section 7.5, Canada and Russia cooperate on
indigenous peoples issues, but with the melting polar ice and increased Arctic shipping, Canada
and Russia will become closer in the future, both geographically and politically, and Canada
will have to deal with Russia on a higher level. To this end, northern expert Franklyn Griffiths
(2011, 195) points out how American involvement is essential to engage Russia in cooperative
stewardship, so Canada can definitely benefit from good relations with both its neighbor in the
west and in the east. Even so, political developments on the international arena in the past year
has greatly problematized Canada’s and the other Arctic states’ relations with Russia, including
in the Arctic. The Russian invasion of Crimea, Ukraine in the spring of 2014 triggered boy-
cotts and cancelations of meetings and military operations - thus illustrating how circumpolar
cooperation has a vulnerable side and is sensitive to high politics in other regions of the world.
Lastly, in addition to Canada’s inclination towards unilateral actions in the High North,
and preferred bilateral relations with the United States, Canadian actions to position itself in
the region can also be identified on a multilateral level. Such efforts are necessary, both due to
the challenging conditions in the Arctic and the norms and rules prevailing in the international
community. Resource development and management is a good example of a task that can be
too comprehensive for one state to confront singlehandedly, especially when including environ-
mental protection in case of oil spills, and thus, it is beneficial for the Arctic states to collaborate
on these undertakings. Another example is search and rescue preparedness in the High North,
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which is emphasized by most Arctic states as an area where they aim to conduct shared opera-
tions. Primarily, Canada is strongly committed to and engaged in the Arctic Council, which is
constantly emphasized in governmental documents as the “leading forum for intergovernmental
cooperation on Arctic issues”. At the same time, Canada participates in the Arctic Five meet-
ings, so despite the commitment to and faith in the Arctic Council, Canada shows it will pursue
national interests in other forums. The Government has expressed it considers it appropriate for
the Arctic Five to deal with issues related to the Arctic Ocean coast, regardless of the critique it
has received for excluding the remaining Arctic Council member states, permanent participants
and observers. Lastly, Canada acts on a multilateral level in terms of UNCLOS negotiations
concerning extended continental shelf claims and maritime boundaries in the Arctic, seeing
how overlapping claims and disputes must be solved among states themselves. Canada has
been working in particular with Denmark and Russia, but despite such joint efforts in science
and the mapping process, there are still unsolved issues. The question of ownership to the North
Pole - claimed by Canada, Russia and Denmark - is the most recent example.
8.1.3 The broader implications of Canadian Arctic policymaking
The third research question this thesis set out to answer was: To what extent does Canada’s
Arctic policy contribute to influence international relations and shape the international Arctic
agenda? I chose to include this perspective in order to examine the broader international impli-
cations of Canada’s Arctic policymaking, and I will focus primarily on the Arctic Council, co-
operation in Arctic science and the expression of Canadian core values. This research question
is also closely related to the theoretical framework and one of the primary differences between
realism and neoliberal institutionalism. While the theories converge around the premise that
states are the main actors in international relations, they have different views on which interests
are expressed through international regimes, and whether they can affect the prospects for co-
operation and international stability. Realism sees states as primarily concerned with security
and military capacities, and an international organization expresses the interests of the most
powerful state within it. Neoliberal institutionalism on the other hand, argue states care about a
much wider range of issue areas, and that international regimes can facilitate the promotion of
shared goals and the achievement of mutually beneficial policy outcomes.
The Arctic Council consists of all the Arctic states, and considering the emphasis put on
the Council by every one of them, it can be expected to be the primary forum for influencing
and shaping the circumpolar agenda. In addition, the Council is considered important and le-
gitimate by non-Arctic actors, which means it can be an arena to impact international politics
more broadly. This thesis has manifested the Arctic Council’s prominence for Canada when ex-
pressing its Arctic policy and interests regionally, and Canada’s efforts through the Council has
been thoroughly demonstrated. These include contributions to working groups’ assessments,
the involvement of indigenous peoples organizations since the beginning of interstate circum-
polar cooperation, the promotion of the human dimension both before and during its current
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chairmanship, contributions to preparations of the Council’s agreements and so on. The ques-
tion becomes whether this contributes to shape the Arctic agenda or not, and if it does, why?
Realists would argue that if Canada was the most powerful member state in the Arctic Coun-
cil, it would express Canadian interests and goals. However, while Canada has the potential to
become an Arctic great power by virtue of it vast northern territory and extensive Arctic coast
line, it is far from being one today due to poor military capabilities and underdeveloped com-
munities in the region. Therefore, Canada would not be able to influence international politics
through the Council. Seen from a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, the Arctic Council will
converge member states’ interests and goals into common objectives, and thus, if Canada is
successful in promoting its national interests as the interests of the broader community, it could
influence international relations and shape the Arctic agenda through the Council. The fact that
international regimes are limited to the extent states can use them in pursuit of purely national
interests and objectives, and that cooperative stewardship mainly takes place within the Arctic
Council, underlines neoliberal institutionalism’s assumptions about how international regimes
can facilitate the promotion of shared goals and work towards mutually beneficial outcomes.
Canada also aims to be a leader in Arctic science and technology, and to this end, an im-
portant contribution was Canada’s International Polar Year (IPY) research program. As with the
opportunity for agenda setting through the Arctic Council, active participation and significant
contributions through such programs is definitely a way to influence the Arctic agenda in terms
of what areas are highlighted in policy recommendations and for future research. It is also a
way to capture public attention if participants are successful in framing results in a comprehen-
sive manner. To this end, Canada’s ambitious objective was to support policy-relevant science
useful at all levels of government and society, both nationally and internationally (Minister of
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, 2011). Canada’s actions through the IPY is an
illustration of the Government’s work to draw southerners’ attention towards the north, both
within Canada and globally. It also demonstrated how the Government recognizes the need to
cooperate with other Arctic states and actors to meet challenges and opportunities in the High
North. The later was expressed through Canadian leadership for eight international science net-
works, and collaboration with more than 240 researchers from 23 countries. Such cooperation
is a way for Canadian scientists to share their ideas and perspectives, and to promote Canadian
focus areas and values to the international scientific community.
Lastly, I will address a situation in which international events had an effect on Arctic
collaboration, namely the Russian invasion of Crimea, Ukraine in March 2014. In the aftermath,
Canada chose to pursue a tough stance against Russia, leading to speculations about spill-over
effects from the conflict to Arctic cooperation. Perhaps the most striking example was how
Canadian Minister Leona Aglukkaq refused to attend the Arctic Council working group meeting
held in Moscow in April 2014. This case can be seen as an illustration of the importance of
Canadian core values, the human dimension and human rights, for Canada’s political actions
internationally (Poelzer, 2014). These issues issues have always been extremely important for
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Canada, and it has always been in the forefront fighting for international human rights. The
situation in Ukraine exemplifies the linkages between circumpolar politics and international
relations, and illustrates how Canada used Arctic cooperation to set an example internationally.
By refusing to participate at the Arctic Council meeting, Canada set the standard for what it
considers acceptable behavior and showed that the Government is not afraid to speak up when
others take actions it considers unjust, even at the expense of circumpolar cooperation. This is
in accordance with what is expressed in Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy:
“When positions or actions are taken by others that affect our national interests,
undermine the cooperative relationships we have built, or demonstrate a lack of
sensitivity to the interests or perspectives of Arctic peoples or states, we respond”
(Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2010, 27).
8.2 Problem statement and concluding remarks
What are the main priorities for Canada in its Arctic region, and how does Canada
pursue its Arctic foreign policy on the domestic and international level?
Regarding the first part of the problem statement - What are the main priorities for Canada in
its Arctic region - I will conclude that when formulating and pursuing its Arctic policy, Canada
is doing so based on a combination of national interests and shared interests with the other
Arctic stakeholders, in particular with concern to indigenous peoples. Policy areas promoted
for domestic reasons include social and economic development for northerners, improvement
of infrastructure in Canada’s territorial north, better educational and job opportunities and im-
proved housing quality. Likewise, the goal to establish sustainable circumpolar communities, as
well as the aim to promote understanding for the importance and value of traditional and local
knowledge and ways of life, are pursued based on national interests. Lastly, the improvement
of indigenous peoples’ health and the promotion of mental wellness among Arctic residents is
also in Canada’s domestic concern, as the suicide rates in the territorial north are very high1.
Before addressing Canada’s shared objectives with the other Arctic states, I will once
more emphasize the the second agenda of the Harper government’s engagement for northerners
and Aboriginal peoples. While such political issues clearly have value in their own regard, it is
also obvious that the promotion of the well-being of and development for Canada’s northerners
is pursued in wider national interests. By recognizing the occupation by Inuits in the Canadian
Arctic for centuries, and by facilitating continuous habitation of the region, the Government is
reaffirming and asserting Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. This agenda was confirmed in September
2014, when Canadian scientist in the Government-supported Victoria Strait Expedition finally
discovered one of ships that got lost in the Franklin Expedition in 1846. Since 2008, there
have been six major Parks Canada-led searches for the two lost ships at the cost of millions of
1See section 6.2.2 on page 62
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dollars (Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, 2014d). However, the 2014 discovery had far
from exclusively historical and scientific value for Prime Minister Stephen Harper.
“This is truly a historic moment for Canada. Franklin’s ships are an important
part of Canadian history given that his expeditions, which took place nearly 200
years ago, laid the foundations of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty” (Office of the Prime
Minister, Canada, 2014d).
Thus, the excitement surrounding the announcement of the discovery was not solemnly based
on a newfound liking for science and archeology, but rather linked to Canada’s territorial claim
to the Arctic region. Seeing as Canada is still a lagger in terms of naval capabilities compared to
the other Arctic states, in particular Russia, it will have to rely on history, as well as occupation
by the Aboriginal population, to assert its territorial claims in the region (Dvorsky, 2014).
Nonetheless, despite the Government of Canada might wanting to uphold a more uni-
lateral approach to its north, it also pursues Arctic policy issues based on shared interests with
other states and for the common good of the circumpolar community. This is to be anticipated,
considering the norms and rules prevailing in the international community in general, and in the
High North especially. In addition to expectations about interstate collaboration around issues
of common interest, it is also an unescapable fact that such cooperation is necessary for Canada
regarding matters too comprehensive to deal with unilaterally. Examples of priority areas pur-
sued collaboratively are responsible Arctic resource development and safe Arctic shipping –
including the establishment of guidelines for sustainable tourism and cruise-ship operations
and a mandatory Polar Code for the Arctic Ocean, as well as the enhancement of scientific
cooperation in the Arctic to improve shared knowledge and promote good governance. Also,
environmental protection and addressing climate pollutants is seen as a collaborative task for
the entire international community, in addition to conservation of animals, birds and plants.
The second part of the problem statement - How does Canada pursue its Arctic policy on
the domestic and international level - is strongly supported by the discussion around the thesis’
second research question. Canada pursues it Arctic policy unilaterally, bilaterally - mainly
in close cooperation with the United States, and multilaterally - primarily through the Arctic
Council. Connecting the two parts of the problem statement, it is apparent that the different
priority areas are pursued on different political levels. Unilaterally, Canada focuses in large
part on Arctic sovereignty, security and military capabilities - policy areas naturally pursued on
the national level. The assertion of Canadian sovereignty, the strengthening of Arctic security
and upgrading Canada’s military capabilities in the region are key priority areas for the current
Government. In conclusion, one can argue that the effects of this commitment and following
investments have had mixed results. On the one hand, the Harper government is praised for
doing more than its predecessors, but at the same time, several commentators criticize the Prime
Minister for not doing enough and for moving to slow in terms of bringing Canadian Arctic
defense up to international standards. The other side of the Governments unilateral actions are
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connected to priorities associated with indigenous peoples and northerners, which however also
is linked to sovereignty. As demonstrated throughout this thesis, sovereignty is not only about
national defense, but also about the historical and continuos occupation by the Aboriginals, as
well as regional development. Thus, while it is important to bring Canadian Arctic defense
up to international standards, it is equally important to continue efforts to improve the lives of
northern residents and to act for the Arctic people and environment in order for the Canadian
government to assert its sovereignty in the region (Coates et al., 2008, 213-217).
Bilaterally, Canada’s Arctic policy is primarily pursued through cooperation with the
United States (US). Security is also given primacy on this level, in addition to resource devel-
opment. While the Canadian government over the past years have worked to improve its own
military capabilities in the region, it is an inescapable fact that it still depends on the United
States for security in the High North. From the United States’ point of view, engagement in
Canadian Arctic security is very much in its national interest, seeing that Canada is the back
door into North America. This is particularly relevant if the polar ice continues to melt, lead-
ing to easier access to and increased shipping activity in the region. In this scenario, hostile
states could utilize for instance the Northwest Passage to enter the US and Canada, so it is in
the interest of both states to be able to control, and if necessary protect, these waters. As of
today, neither state is capable of doing so alone, which makes security the main priority on
their common agenda. Additionally, the primacy given to the United States by the Government
of Canada in this regard is connected to its reluctant relationship with NATO and the general
opinion that the Alliance is not doing enough to protect Canadian interests. Other bilateral rela-
tionships include with Denmark, and the United States, on sovereignty operations in the Arctic,
with Denmark and Russia on the geological mapping of the Arctic Ocean seabed to establish
extended continental shelves, with Russia on indigenous peoples issues and with Norway on
research collaboration and university partnerships. Lastly, Canada pursues its Arctic policy on
the regional and multilateral level, especially through the Arctic Council, which is highly cen-
tral both for issues of primarily domestic interest, as well as common policy areas with the
other member states. Canada’s multinational efforts can be summarized as primarily channeled
towards assuming international leadership and pursuing cooperative circumpolar stewardship.
In addition, Canada consolidates its alliances and partnerships by engaging in multinational fo-
rums with the other Arctic states, which in turn contributes to its Arctic security as states are
much likely to engage in conflict with their collaborators ( 4.3 on page 42).
Returning to the theoretical framework, I would argue the neoliberal institutionalist per-
spective on driving forces for state behavior and international regimes is most accurate in ac-
counting for Canada’s Arctic motivations and priorities. States do cooperate in a realist world
as well, but this theory tends to focus on relative gains. When examining Canadian Arctic pol-
icymaking and participation in circumpolar cooperative arrangements, despite this being based
on a combination of national interests and shared objectives, it is difficult to see how Canada can
achieve large gains at the expense of other stakeholders. Examples are security cooperation with
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the United States to their mutual benefit, and collaboration through the Arctic Council on envi-
ronmental protection, to the benefit of the whole international community. With regards to the
second part of the problem statement, while the unilateral focus on Arctic security, sovereignty
and military capabilities is very much in line with the realist perspective on state behavior, I will
argue neoliberal institutionalism also has the most accurate account for Canada’s actions in the
High North. To a large extent, Canada aims for cooperation with other Arctic states and actors,
the Government is accommodating and attentive to others’ interests, and realizes that certain
challenges in the circumpolar north are too immense to deal with unilaterally.
Based on the findings from the research conducted throughout this project and the analysis of
the research questions and problem statement presented above, Canada’s priorities and actions
in the Arctic on different levels can be summarized as follows:
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8.3 Areas for further research
While this thesis has addressed Canada’s work through the Arctic Council before assuming the
chairmanship in 2013, as well as the primary policy areas pursued in the current period, it re-
mains to conclude on Canada’s overall success by the end of the office in 2015. In particular, an
assessment of achievements in terms of international cooperation on significant issues beyond
environmental protection will be in order. With the rapid changes taking place in the Arctic new
issues will be brought forward, such as oil and gas exploration and exploitation, and it will be
interesting to see how the member states handle these issues and balance them with the current
mandate of the Council. Related, the United States (US) takes over the office in 2015, which
means the chairmanship will remain in the North American region. Interesting in this regard is
to what extent the US continues Canada’s political focus, strongly emphasizing the human di-
mension, or whether the US will change the direction of the Council towards security issues and
resource exploration - areas highlighted in the US Arctic strategy from 2013. Lastly, another
interesting process to follow within the Arctic Council will be the European Union’s observer
status application, now that the Union has lifted its ban on Canadian seal products, and Canada
in return has lifted its reservations concerning the EU’s observer status to the Council.
Furthermore, a challenge during the work with my thesis was the conflicted situation un-
folding between Russia and Ukraine, which clearly had a spillover effect on Arctic politics and
affected circumpolar cooperation. Because of the many uncertainties related to this situation, I
chose to downplay the focus directed towards the conflict, as it was not possible to outline the
total effect of this crisis by the deadline for my work. Nevertheless, I chose to address the issue,
seeing that Canada was one of the most outspoken critics of the invasion, and demonstrated
its discontent by boycotting an Arctic Council meeting in Moscow and canceling joint military
operations with Russia. At a later point of time, it will be interesting and necessary to look
at this conflict in relation to Arctic policy and cooperation, in order to assess the vulnerability
and/or robustness of circumpolar arrangements to outside factors in international relations.
Lastly, as emphasized, there is still a lot to be done in Canada’s northern territories in
order to give its inhabitants equal living conditions and opportunities as the southern Canadian
population. Will the Harper government succeed with its promises for the north and northerners,
or will his critics who claim he is doing to little for the north be proven right? Additionally,
increased activity in the High North strongly affects Canada’s Aboriginal population and other
northerners. While these areas have been addressed in a significant number of studies and
research projects, many of them referred to in this thesis, it is still highly important to keep
monitoring the effects of the changes in the Arctic on its population, in order to help northern
communities adapt to the transformations. What I find of particular interest in this regard are
differences between the more and the less developed northern regions. It would be interesting
to compare for instance the Scandinavian countries with Canada’s northern territories, in order
to examine what experiences can be learned from the more developed Arctic states.
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List of Abbreviations
AANDC Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada
AC The Arctic Council
ACAP Arctic Contaminants Action Plan (Arctic Council working group)
AEPS The Arctic Environment Protection Strategy
AMAP Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (Arctic Council working group)
CAFF Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (Arctic Council working group)
CanNor Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency
CF Canadian Forces
CIIF Community Infrastructure Improvement Fund
CWB-Index Community Well-Being Index
DFAIT Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
EPPR Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (Arctic Council working group)
ICC Inuit Circumpolar Council
IMO The International Maritime Organization
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
NRC National Resources Canada
NRC-Canada National Research Council, Canada
IPY International Polar Year
PAME Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (Arctic Council working group)
SAO Senior Arctic Official
SAR-agreement Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
in the Arctic
SINED Strategic Investments in Northern Economic Development
SDWG Sustainable Development Working Group (Arctic Council working group)
UNCLOS The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
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